security: remediate review B findings

cmd/chfs/main.go

@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ func main() {
 			}
 		}
 	}
-	srv := &api.Server{Store: store, Auth: mgr, Sessions: map[string]*auth.Account{}, SessionExpiry: map[string]time.Time{}, SessionTimeout: cfg.SessionTimeout, JWTSecret: jwtSecret, WebDAVRoot: root, Allow: cfg.Allow, MultiRoot: len(cfg.Path) > 1, RemoveMode: cfg.FileRemove, ImagePreview: cfg.ImagePreview, FolderDownload: cfg.FolderDownload, HTMLTitle: cfg.HTMLTitle, HTMLNotice: cfg.HTMLNotice, Log: opslog.New(cfg.Log), UserStore: users, UserHome: cfg.UserHome}
+	srv := &api.Server{Store: store, Auth: mgr, Sessions: map[string]*auth.Account{}, SessionExpiry: map[string]time.Time{}, SessionTimeout: cfg.SessionTimeout, JWTSecret: jwtSecret, WebDAVRoot: root, Allow: cfg.Allow, TrustedProxies: cfg.TrustedProxies, MultiRoot: len(cfg.Path) > 1, RemoveMode: cfg.FileRemove, ImagePreview: cfg.ImagePreview, FolderDownload: cfg.FolderDownload, HTMLTitle: cfg.HTMLTitle, HTMLNotice: cfg.HTMLNotice, Log: opslog.New(cfg.Log), UserStore: users, UserHome: cfg.UserHome, ThumbnailMaxSize: cfg.ThumbnailMaxSize, ThumbnailMaxPixels: cfg.ThumbnailMaxPixels, ZipMaxSize: cfg.ZipMaxSize, ZipMaxFiles: cfg.ZipMaxFiles, UploadMaxSize: cfg.UploadMaxSize, UploadMaxTotalSize: cfg.UploadMaxTotalSize, UploadMaxFiles: cfg.UploadMaxFiles, SearchMaxResults: cfg.SearchMaxResults}
 	addr := ":" + itoa(cfg.Port)
 	log.Printf("chfs-ng listening on %s root=%s removeMode=%d", addr, filepath.Clean(root), cfg.FileRemove)
 	if cfg.SSLCert != "" && cfg.SSLKey != "" {

docs/REVIEW_B_AUDIT_20261002.md

@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
+# 审核专家 B：CHFS-NG 代码安全审计报告
+
+- **审核人**：审核专家 B
+- **日期**：2026-10-02
+- **对象**：`/root/chfs-ng-research`（Go，11 个非测试源文件，约 3900 行）
+- **生产环境**：`chfs-ng.service`（root 用户），`bin/chfs-ng -file chfs.ini`，监听 *:18999
+- **验证**：`go vet ./...` 干净；`go test ./...` 全通过
+- **结论**：**有条件通过** —— 代码层面的路径防御与权限检查扎实，但生产部署配置存在阻断项，另有 2 高/3 中需处理
+
+---
+
+## 【阻断】生产配置使用弱密码 admin123，明文存储且文件全局可读
+
+**【严重度：阻断】**
+
+**【位置】** `/root/chfs-ng-research/chfs.ini`（生产配置文件）
+
+**【问题描述】**
+生产 `chfs.ini` 中 `[admin]` 的密码为明文 `admin123`，文件权限为 `-rw-r--r--`（全局可读）。
+服务监听 `*:18999`（所有网卡），主机防火墙 INPUT 策略为 ACCEPT 且无规则，等同于直接暴露公网。
+远程攻击者无需任何前置条件，直接用 `admin/admin123` 登录即获得全部文件读写删除权限。
+
+**【利用/触发条件】**
+`curl -X POST http://<host>:18999/chfs/session -d "user=admin&pwd=admin123"` 即得管理员 JWT。
+
+**【修复建议】**
+1. 立即更换高强度密码；2. `chmod 600 chfs.ini`；3. 配置 `allow` IP 白名单或置于反向代理后；
+4. 考虑主机防火墙限制 18999 入站。
+
+---
+
+## 【高】/chfs/exist 未鉴权的文件存在性预言机
+
+**【严重度：高】**
+
+**【位置】** `internal/api/server.go:512` `func (s *Server) exist`
+
+**【问题描述】**
+该端点全程未调用 `account(r, s)`，未做任何权限检查：`GET /chfs/exist?file=<path>` 返回 201/404
+直接泄露任意路径是否存在。所有其他文件端点都有 `MaskFor` 检查，唯独此处遗漏，
+与 README 宣称的"完善的权限体系"不一致。
+
+**【利用/触发条件】**
+当前生产 guest=r，攻击者本就可列目录，实际影响有限；但在 guest 被收紧的部署中，
+该端点绕过权限模型造成信息泄漏。
+
+**【修复建议】**
+加上 `if !account(r, s).MaskFor(p).HasRead() { 403 }`，与其他端点保持一致。
+
+---
+
+## 【高】缩略图接口无文件大小限制，可被解压炸弹打 OOM
+
+**【严重度：高】**
+
+**【位置】** `internal/api/server.go:1164` `func (s *Server) thumbnail`
+
+**【问题描述】**
+`image.Decode(f)` 会把整个文件读入内存解码，而此前没有任何文件大小检查。
+缓存层虽有 8MB/64 项上限（`thumbnail_cache.go`），但 decode 本身在缓存之外无限制。
+攻击者（生产环境 guest 即有 read 权限）可请求超大文件或特制解压炸弹
+（小文件声明超大宽高，如 PNG 头声明 100000x100000 → 数十 GB 内存分配），直接 OOM 杀死服务。
+
+**【利用/触发条件】**
+`GET /chfs/thumbnail?file=<大文件或炸弹图片>`，无需登录（guest 可读）。
+
+**【修复建议】**
+`Stat` 后检查 `fi.Size()`，超过阈值（如 32MB）直接拒绝；或对 decode 加内存上限。
+
+---
+
+## 【中】目录 ZIP 下载无总大小/数量限制，CPU 与带宽耗尽
+
+**【严重度：中】**
+
+**【位置】** `internal/api/server.go:1290` `downloadSelectedZip`、`1368` `downloadDir`
+
+**【问题描述】**
+两个接口把目录树流式打包为 zip 直接写回 response，全程无总字节数、无文件数上限
+（`downloadSelectedZip` 仅限制了顶层 path 参数 ≤100 个，但每个可为超大目录；`downloadDir` 无任何限制）。
+`zip.Deflate` 是 CPU 密集型，多并发请求可打满 CPU 并占满带宽。guest 可读即触发。
+
+**【修复建议】**
+增加可配置的打包上限（总大小、文件数），超限返回 413；或对该接口加并发信号量。
+
+---
+
+## 【中】上传无单文件/总量配额，可填满磁盘
+
+**【严重度：中】**
+
+**【位置】** `internal/api/server.go:838` `upload`、`937` `upload2`、`savePart`
+
+**【问题描述】**
+`ParseMultipartForm` 仅限制内存部分（64MB/128MB），`savePart` 的 `io.Copy(f, in)` 无任何大小上限。
+有写权限的用户可上传超大文件填满磁盘。当前生产仅 admin 有写权限，实际影响有限，
+但项目主打"动态权限控制"（会给普通用户开写权限），属于设计缺口。
+
+**【修复建议】**
+增加 `upload.max-size` 配置项，`savePart` 中用 `io.LimitReader` 截断并报错。
+
+---
+
+## 【中】默认删除进系统回收站且永不清理，磁盘被"已删除"文件占满
+
+**【严重度：中】**
+
+**【位置】** `internal/storage/storage.go` `Trash`；`internal/config/config.go` 默认 `FileRemove: 1`
+
+**【问题描述】**
+默认 `file.remove=1` 走 `wastebasket.Trash`（`~/.local/share/Trash`），该库无自动清理机制
+（只有模式 2 的 `MoveToTrash` 有 30 天清理）。长期运行的服务删除的文件永久占用磁盘，
+`df` 与用户认知不一致，最终表现为神秘的磁盘占满。
+
+**【修复建议】**
+对模式 1 也加定期清理（如 30 天），或在文档中明确说明并给出清理方式。
+
+---
+
+## 【中低】search 无结果数量上限
+
+**【严重度：中低】**
+
+**【位置】** `internal/api/server.go:1009` `func (s *Server) search`
+
+**【问题描述】**
+全树递归遍历，结果集无上限一次性 JSON 返回。超大目录树下内存与响应体膨胀，
+guest 可直接触发。
+
+**【修复建议】**
+加 `limit` 参数（默认如 500），超限截断并提示。
+
+---
+
+## 【低】ipFilter 不识别 X-Forwarded-For，反代后 allow 白名单失效
+
+**【严重度：低】**
+
+**【位置】** `internal/api/server.go:2065` `ipFilter` / `clientIP`
+
+**【问题描述】**
+`clientIP` 只读 `r.RemoteAddr`。README 建议生产用 HTTPS 反向代理，
+一旦接入反代，`allow` 看到的永远是代理 IP，白名单名存实亡（要么全放行要么全拒绝）。
+
+**【修复建议】**
+支持可信代理 + `X-Forwarded-For` 解析，或在文档中明确说明该限制。
+
+---
+
+## 【低】密码哈希为无盐 SHA256
+
+**【严重度：低】**
+
+**【位置】** `internal/auth/auth.go` `func PasswordHash`
+
+**【问题描述】**
+`users.json` 中存储 `hex(sha256(password))`，无盐。文件泄漏后彩虹表可直接破解弱密码。
+
+**【修复建议】**
+改用 bcrypt（`golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt`），并做旧哈希的兼容迁移。
+
+---
+
+## 已验证为安全的关键点（正面结论）
+
+1. **JWT 密钥管理正确**：`main.go` 在未配置 `jwt.secret` 时生成随机 32 字节密钥并以 0600 权限持久化
+   到 `users.json.jwt-secret`（生产已生效，文件存在）。`auth.go` 中的硬编码常量在 server 路径中不可达。
+2. **路径穿越防御扎实**：`unsafePath`（NUL + `..` 段）与 `storage.real()` 双层防御；`real()` 对最近存在祖先
+   做 `EvalSymlinks`，连路径中间的符号链接逃逸都能拦住。多根目录经 `Multi` 路由后仍走同一检查。
+3. **权限检查完整**：除 `exist` 外所有 mutating 端点都有 `MaskFor` 检查；`rename` 为 create-only；
+   `remove`/`transfer` 有递归 preflight；WebDAV 有独立 `webdavAuthFS` 包装，Move/Copy/RemoveAll 均有 `checkTree`。
+4. **上传 preflight**：`upload`/`upload2` 全量校验后再落盘，失败回滚已保存分片；`createExclusive` 防并发覆盖。
+5. **Cookie 安全**：JWT cookie 为 `HttpOnly`；生产 guest 为只读。
+6. **生产密钥文件权限正确**：`users.json.jwt-secret` 为 0600。
+
+---
+
+## 总体结论
+
+**有条件通过**。
+
+代码本身质量不错：路径穿越防御、权限模型、并发处理都经过认真设计，测试全过、vet 干净。
+真正的风险在**生产部署**：`admin123` 弱密码 + 公网直连 + 无防火墙是阻断项，必须立即处理。
+代码层面需修：`exist` 鉴权缺失（高）、缩略图 OOM（高），以及 ZIP/上传/回收站/搜索的资源限制（中）。
+修完阻断项和高优先级后可认为达到生产安全标准。

go.mod

@@ -10,4 +10,7 @@ require (
 	github.com/skip2/go-qrcode v0.0.0-20200617195104-da1b6568686e
 )
 
-require golang.org/x/sys v0.3.0 // indirect
+require (
+	golang.org/x/crypto v0.28.0 // indirect
+	golang.org/x/sys v0.26.0 // indirect
+)

go.sum

@@ -11,5 +11,9 @@ github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v4 v4.5.2/go.mod h1:m21LjoU+eqJr34lmDMbreY2eSTRJ1cv77w
 github.com/skip2/go-qrcode v0.0.0-20200617195104-da1b6568686e h1:MRM5ITcdelLK2j1vwZ3Je0FKVCfqOLp5zO6trqMLYs0=
 github.com/skip2/go-qrcode v0.0.0-20200617195104-da1b6568686e/go.mod h1:XV66xRDqSt+GTGFMVlhk3ULuV0y9ZmzeVGR4mloJI3M=
 github.com/teambition/rrule-go v1.8.2/go.mod h1:Ieq5AbrKGciP1V//Wq8ktsTXwSwJHDD5mD/wLBGl3p4=
+golang.org/x/crypto v0.28.0 h1:GBDwsMXVQi34v5CCYUm2jkJvu4cbtru2U4TN2PSyQnw=
+golang.org/x/crypto v0.28.0/go.mod h1:rmgy+3RHxRZMyY0jjAJShp2zgEdOqj2AO7U0pYmeQ7U=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.3.0 h1:w8ZOecv6NaNa/zC8944JTU3vz4u6Lagfk4RPQxv92NQ=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.3.0/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
+golang.org/x/sys v0.26.0 h1:KHjCJyddX0LoSTb3J+vWpupP9p0oznkqVk/IfjymZbo=
+golang.org/x/sys v0.26.0/go.mod h1:/VUhepiaJMQUp4+oa/7Zr1D23ma6VTLIYjOOTFZPUcA=

internal/api/review_b_audit_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+package api
+
+import (
+	"image"
+	"image/color"
+	"image/png"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+
+	"chfs-ng/internal/auth"
+	"chfs-ng/internal/storage"
+)
+
+func TestAuditExistEnforcesReadPermission(t *testing.T) {
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(root, "secret.txt"), []byte("x"), 0600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	s := &Server{Store: storage.Local{Root: root}, Auth: &auth.Manager{Guest: &auth.Account{Mask: auth.None}}}
+	rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/chfs/exist?file=secret.txt", nil)
+	s.exist(rr, req)
+	if rr.Code != 403 {
+		t.Fatalf("exist status=%d want 403", rr.Code)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAuditThumbnailRejectsOversizeBeforeDecode(t *testing.T) {
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(root, "big.bin"), make([]byte, 64), 0600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	s := &Server{Store: storage.Local{Root: root}, Auth: &auth.Manager{Guest: &auth.Account{Mask: auth.Read}}, ImagePreview: true, ThumbnailMaxSize: 32}
+	rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/chfs/thumbnail?file=big.bin", nil)
+	s.thumbnail(rr, req)
+	if rr.Code != 413 {
+		t.Fatalf("thumbnail status=%d want 413", rr.Code)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAuditZipLimitsUseOriginalFileSizes(t *testing.T) {
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(root, "a.txt"), make([]byte, 100), 0600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	s := &Server{Store: storage.Local{Root: root}, ZipMaxSize: 99, ZipMaxFiles: 10}
+	a := &auth.Account{Mask: auth.Read}
+	if err := s.checkZipLimits(a, []string{""}); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected zip size limit")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAuditSearchLimit(t *testing.T) {
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	for _, name := range []string{"a.txt", "b.txt", "c.txt"} {
+		if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(root, name), []byte(name), 0600); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	s := &Server{Store: storage.Local{Root: root}, Auth: &auth.Manager{Guest: &auth.Account{Mask: auth.Read}}, SearchMaxResults: 2}
+	rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/chfs/search?str=.txt", nil)
+	s.search(rr, req)
+	if rr.Code != 200 {
+		t.Fatalf("search status=%d", rr.Code)
+	}
+	if len(rr.Body.Bytes()) == 0 || !contains(rr.Body.String(), `"truncated":true`) {
+		t.Fatalf("search did not report truncation: %s", rr.Body.String())
+	}
+}
+
+func contains(s, sub string) bool {
+	return len(s) >= len(sub) && (s == sub || func() bool {
+		for i := 0; i+len(sub) <= len(s); i++ {
+			if s[i:i+len(sub)] == sub {
+				return true
+			}
+		}
+		return false
+	}())
+}
+
+func TestAuditThumbnailPixelLimit(t *testing.T) {
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	img := image.NewRGBA(image.Rect(0, 0, 20, 20))
+	img.Set(0, 0, color.White)
+	f, err := os.Create(filepath.Join(root, "large.png"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := png.Encode(f, img); err != nil {
+		f.Close()
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	f.Close()
+	s := &Server{Store: storage.Local{Root: root}, Auth: &auth.Manager{Guest: &auth.Account{Mask: auth.Read}}, ImagePreview: true, ThumbnailMaxPixels: 100}
+	rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/chfs/thumbnail?file=large.png", nil)
+	s.thumbnail(rr, req)
+	if rr.Code != 415 {
+		t.Fatalf("thumbnail pixel-limit status=%d want 415", rr.Code)
+	}
+}

internal/api/server.go

@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ type Server struct {
 	WebDAVRoot         string
 	WebDAVFS           webdav.FileSystem
 	Allow              string
+	TrustedProxies     string
 	MultiRoot          bool
 	RemoveMode         int
 	ImagePreview       bool
@@ -56,6 +57,14 @@ type Server struct {
 	Log                *opslog.Logger
 	UserStore          *auth.UserStore
 	UserHome           string
+	ThumbnailMaxSize   int64
+	ThumbnailMaxPixels int64
+	ZipMaxSize         int64
+	ZipMaxFiles        int
+	UploadMaxSize      int64
+	UploadMaxTotalSize int64
+	UploadMaxFiles     int
+	SearchMaxResults   int
 	ThumbnailCache     *thumbnailCache
 	thumbnailCacheOnce sync.Once
 }
@@ -138,11 +147,11 @@ func (s *Server) logOp(r *http.Request, action string) {
 	if a != nil {
 		user = a.Username
 	}
-	_ = s.Log.Write(clientIPString(r), user, action)
+	_ = s.Log.Write(s.clientIPString(r), user, action)
 }
 
-func clientIPString(r *http.Request) string {
+func (s *Server) clientIPString(r *http.Request) string {
-	ip := clientIP(r)
+	ip := s.clientIP(r)
 	if ip == nil {
 		return "-"
 	}
@@ -516,6 +525,10 @@ func (s *Server) exist(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		return
 	}
 	p := strings.Trim(strings.ReplaceAll(raw, "\\", "/"), "/")
+	if !account(r, s).MaskFor(p).HasRead() {
+		writeJSONError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "has no privilege")
+		return
+	}
 	_, e := s.Store.Stat(p)
 	if e != nil {
 		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
@@ -639,7 +652,7 @@ func (s *Server) password(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		writeJSONError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid json")
 		return
 	}
-	if a.Password != req.CurrentPassword && a.PasswordHash != auth.PasswordHash(req.CurrentPassword) {
+	if a.Password != req.CurrentPassword && !auth.VerifyPasswordHash(a.PasswordHash, req.CurrentPassword) {
 		writeJSONError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "current password incorrect")
 		return
 	}
@@ -855,8 +868,24 @@ func (s *Server) upload(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	// This prevents duplicate/bad entries from leaving a partial upload.
 	seen := make(map[string]struct{})
 	var saved []string
+	var totalUpload int64
+	var uploadFiles int
 	for _, hs := range r.MultipartForm.File {
 		for _, h := range hs {
+			uploadFiles++
+			if s.UploadMaxFiles > 0 && uploadFiles > s.UploadMaxFiles {
+				http.Error(w, "upload file count limit exceeded", http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
+				return
+			}
+			if s.UploadMaxSize > 0 && h.Size > s.UploadMaxSize {
+				http.Error(w, "upload file too large", http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
+				return
+			}
+			totalUpload += h.Size
+			if s.UploadMaxTotalSize > 0 && totalUpload > s.UploadMaxTotalSize {
+				http.Error(w, "upload total size limit exceeded", http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
+				return
+			}
 			name := filepath.ToSlash(h.Filename)
 			if name == "" || strings.HasPrefix(name, "/") || unsafePath(name) {
 				http.Error(w, "invalid filename", 400)
@@ -881,7 +910,7 @@ func (s *Server) upload(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	for _, hs := range r.MultipartForm.File {
 		for _, h := range hs {
 			target := path.Join(dir, filepath.ToSlash(h.Filename))
-			if e := savePart(s.Store, target, h); e != nil {
+			if e := savePart(s.Store, target, h, s.UploadMaxSize); e != nil {
 				for _, previous := range saved {
 					_ = s.Store.Remove(previous)
 				}
@@ -908,7 +937,7 @@ func createExclusive(st storage.Storage, target string) (*os.File, error) {
 	return st.Create(target)
 }
 
-func savePart(st storage.Storage, target string, h *multipart.FileHeader) error {
+func savePart(st storage.Storage, target string, h *multipart.FileHeader, maxSize int64) error {
 	in, e := h.Open()
 	if e != nil {
 		return e
@@ -919,8 +948,18 @@ func savePart(st storage.Storage, target string, h *multipart.FileHeader) error
 		return e
 	}
 	copyErr := func() error {
-		_, err := io.Copy(f, in)
+		var src io.Reader = in
-		return err
+		if maxSize > 0 {
+			src = io.LimitReader(in, maxSize+1)
+		}
+		n, err := io.Copy(f, src)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if maxSize > 0 && n > maxSize {
+			return fmt.Errorf("upload file too large")
+		}
+		return nil
 	}()
 	closeErr := f.Close()
 	if copyErr != nil {
@@ -953,8 +992,24 @@ func (s *Server) upload2(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	// Preflight the complete multipart batch before creating anything.
 	// This prevents duplicate/bad entries from leaving a partial upload.
 	seen := make(map[string]struct{})
+	var totalUpload int64
+	var uploadFiles int
 	for _, hs := range r.MultipartForm.File {
 		for _, h := range hs {
+			uploadFiles++
+			if s.UploadMaxFiles > 0 && uploadFiles > s.UploadMaxFiles {
+				http.Error(w, "upload file count limit exceeded", http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
+				return
+			}
+			if s.UploadMaxSize > 0 && h.Size > s.UploadMaxSize {
+				http.Error(w, "upload file too large", http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
+				return
+			}
+			totalUpload += h.Size
+			if s.UploadMaxTotalSize > 0 && totalUpload > s.UploadMaxTotalSize {
+				http.Error(w, "upload total size limit exceeded", http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
+				return
+			}
 			name := filepath.ToSlash(h.Filename)
 			name = strings.TrimPrefix(name, "/")
 			if name == "" || unsafePath(name) {
@@ -981,7 +1036,7 @@ func (s *Server) upload2(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		for _, h := range hs {
 			name := strings.TrimPrefix(filepath.ToSlash(h.Filename), "/")
 			target := path.Join(dir, name)
-			if err := savePart(s.Store, target, h); err != nil {
+			if err := savePart(s.Store, target, h, s.UploadMaxSize); err != nil {
 				for _, previous := range saved {
 					_ = s.Store.Remove(previous)
 				}
@@ -1015,6 +1070,11 @@ func (s *Server) search(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	}
 	needle := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(r.URL.Query().Get("str")))
 	out := make([]searchFileInfo, 0)
+	maxResults := s.SearchMaxResults
+	if maxResults < 0 {
+		maxResults = 0
+	}
+	truncated := false
 	var walk func(string) error
 	walk = func(dir string) error {
 		items, err := s.Store.List(dir)
@@ -1022,6 +1082,10 @@ func (s *Server) search(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 			return err
 		}
 		for _, fi := range items {
+			if maxResults > 0 && len(out) >= maxResults {
+				truncated = true
+				return nil
+			}
 			p := path.Join(dir, fi.Name())
 			if !a.MaskFor(p).HasRead() {
 				continue
@@ -1041,7 +1105,7 @@ func (s *Server) search(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		http.Error(w, err.Error(), 500)
 		return
 	}
-	writeJSON(w, map[string]any{"virtualRoot": 0, "currentMask": permString(rootMask), "files": out})
+	writeJSON(w, map[string]any{"virtualRoot": 0, "currentMask": permString(rootMask), "files": out, "truncated": truncated})
 }
 
 func sharedPath(parts ...string) string {
@@ -1183,6 +1247,10 @@ func (s *Server) thumbnail(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		http.NotFound(w, r)
 		return
 	}
+	if s.ThumbnailMaxSize > 0 && fi.Size() > s.ThumbnailMaxSize {
+		writeJSONError(w, http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, "thumbnail file too large")
+		return
+	}
 	key := thumbnailCacheKey{Path: file, Size: fi.Size(), ModTime: fi.ModTime().UnixNano()}
 	s.thumbnailCacheOnce.Do(func() {
 		if s.ThumbnailCache == nil {
@@ -1194,6 +1262,12 @@ func (s *Server) thumbnail(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		if err != nil {
 			return nil, err
 		}
+		if s.ThumbnailMaxPixels > 0 {
+			b := src.Bounds()
+			if int64(b.Dx())*int64(b.Dy()) > s.ThumbnailMaxPixels {
+				return nil, fmt.Errorf("thumbnail dimensions too large")
+			}
+		}
 		thumb := transform.Resize(src, 320, 240, transform.Linear)
 		var buf bytes.Buffer
 		if err := png.Encode(&buf, thumb); err != nil {
@@ -1287,6 +1361,62 @@ func (s *Server) qrcode(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	_, _ = w.Write(data)
 }
 
+func (s *Server) zipStats(a *auth.Account, roots []string) (int64, int, error) {
+	var total int64
+	files := 0
+	seen := map[string]bool{}
+	var walk func(string) error
+	walk = func(p string) error {
+		if seen[p] {
+			return nil
+		}
+		seen[p] = true
+		fi, err := s.Store.Stat(p)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if !a.MaskFor(p).HasRead() {
+			return nil
+		}
+		if !fi.IsDir() {
+			files++
+			total += fi.Size()
+			return nil
+		}
+		items, err := s.Store.List(p)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		for _, it := range items {
+			child := path.Join(p, it.Name())
+			if err := walk(child); err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+		}
+		return nil
+	}
+	for _, root := range roots {
+		if err := walk(root); err != nil {
+			return 0, 0, err
+		}
+	}
+	return total, files, nil
+}
+
+func (s *Server) checkZipLimits(a *auth.Account, roots []string) error {
+	total, files, err := s.zipStats(a, roots)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if s.ZipMaxFiles > 0 && files > s.ZipMaxFiles {
+		return fmt.Errorf("zip file count limit exceeded")
+	}
+	if s.ZipMaxSize > 0 && total > s.ZipMaxSize {
+		return fmt.Errorf("zip size limit exceeded")
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
 func (s *Server) downloadSelectedZip(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	a := account(r, s)
 	paths := r.URL.Query()["path"]
@@ -1312,6 +1442,10 @@ func (s *Server) downloadSelectedZip(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 			return
 		}
 	}
+	if err := s.checkZipLimits(a, paths); err != nil {
+		writeJSONError(w, http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, err.Error())
+		return
+	}
 	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/zip")
 	w.Header().Set("Content-Disposition", `attachment; filename="download.zip"`)
 	zw := zip.NewWriter(w)
@@ -1403,6 +1537,10 @@ func (s *Server) downloadDir(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 			}
 		}
 	}
+	if err := s.checkZipLimits(a, []string{p}); err != nil {
+		writeJSONError(w, http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, err.Error())
+		return
+	}
 	name := fi.Name()
 	if name == "." || name == "" {
 		name = "download"
@@ -2064,7 +2202,7 @@ func (f *webdavAuthFS) checkTree(ctx context.Context, name string, p auth.PermMa
 
 func (s *Server) ipFilter(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
 	return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-		if s.Allow != "" && !allowedIP(s.Allow, clientIP(r)) {
+		if s.Allow != "" && !allowedIP(s.Allow, s.clientIP(r)) {
 			http.Error(w, "forbidden", http.StatusForbidden)
 			return
 		}
@@ -2072,6 +2210,33 @@ func (s *Server) ipFilter(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
 	})
 }
 
+func (s *Server) clientIP(r *http.Request) net.IP {
+	host, _, _ := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
+	remote := net.ParseIP(host)
+	if remote == nil {
+		remote = net.ParseIP(r.RemoteAddr)
+	}
+	if remote == nil || s.TrustedProxies == "" || !allowedIP(s.TrustedProxies, remote) {
+		return remote
+	}
+	// Only a trusted proxy may supply the forwarding chain. Walk right-to-left
+	// and return the first address that is not itself a trusted proxy.
+	parts := strings.Split(r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"), ",")
+	for i := len(parts) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
+		ip := net.ParseIP(strings.TrimSpace(parts[i]))
+		if ip == nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		if !allowedIP(s.TrustedProxies, ip) {
+			return ip
+		}
+	}
+	if v := net.ParseIP(strings.TrimSpace(r.Header.Get("X-Real-IP"))); v != nil && !allowedIP(s.TrustedProxies, v) {
+		return v
+	}
+	return remote
+}
+
 func clientIP(r *http.Request) net.IP {
 	host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
 	if err == nil {

internal/auth/auth.go

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
 	"time"
 
 	jwt "github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v4"
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
 )
 
 type PermMask uint8
@@ -86,8 +87,10 @@ func ParseRules(values []string) (*Manager, error) {
 }
 
 func (m *Manager) Authenticate(user, pwd string) *Account {
-	if a, ok := m.Accounts[user]; ok && (a.Enabled || a.PasswordHash == "") && (a.Password == pwd || a.PasswordHash == PasswordHash(pwd)) {
+	if a, ok := m.Accounts[user]; ok && (a.Enabled || a.PasswordHash == "") {
-		return a
+		if a.Password == pwd || VerifyPasswordHash(a.PasswordHash, pwd) {
+			return a
+		}
 	}
 	if user == "" && pwd == "" {
 		return m.Guest
@@ -95,8 +98,23 @@ func (m *Manager) Authenticate(user, pwd string) *Account {
 	return nil
 }
 func PasswordHash(password string) string {
+	h, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(password), bcrypt.DefaultCost)
+	if err != nil {
+		return ""
+	}
+	return string(h)
+}
+
+func VerifyPasswordHash(stored, password string) bool {
+	if stored == "" {
+		return false
+	}
+	if strings.HasPrefix(stored, "$2a$") || strings.HasPrefix(stored, "$2b$") || strings.HasPrefix(stored, "$2y$") {
+		return bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword([]byte(stored), []byte(password)) == nil
+	}
+	// Legacy unsalted SHA-256 hashes remain readable for one migration cycle.
 	h := sha256.Sum256([]byte(password))
-	return hex.EncodeToString(h[:])
+	return hex.EncodeToString(h[:]) == stored
 }
 
 func (a *Account) MaskFor(path string) PermMask {

internal/auth/password_migration_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+package auth
+
+import (
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestPasswordHashUsesBcryptAndVerifies(t *testing.T) {
+	hash := PasswordHash("correct horse battery staple")
+	if len(hash) < 4 || (hash[0:4] != "$2a$" && hash[0:4] != "$2b$") {
+		t.Fatalf("hash=%q is not bcrypt", hash)
+	}
+	if !VerifyPasswordHash(hash, "correct horse battery staple") {
+		t.Fatal("bcrypt password did not verify")
+	}
+	if VerifyPasswordHash(hash, "wrong") {
+		t.Fatal("wrong password verified")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLegacySHA256PasswordStillVerifies(t *testing.T) {
+	sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte("legacy-pass"))
+	hash := hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
+	if !VerifyPasswordHash(hash, "legacy-pass") {
+		t.Fatal("legacy hash did not verify")
+	}
+	if VerifyPasswordHash(hash, "wrong") {
+		t.Fatal("wrong legacy password verified")
+	}
+}

internal/config/config.go

@@ -20,27 +20,36 @@ type AccountConfig struct {
 }
 
 type Config struct {
-	Path           []string
+	Path               []string
-	Port           int
+	Port               int
-	Allow          string
+	Allow              string
-	Rules          []string
+	TrustedProxies     string
-	Log            string
+	Rules              []string
-	FileRemove     int
+	Log                string
-	ImagePreview   bool
+	FileRemove         int
-	FolderDownload string
+	ImagePreview       bool
-	SessionTimeout int
+	FolderDownload     string
-	JWTSecret      string
+	SessionTimeout     int
-	HTMLTitle      string
+	JWTSecret          string
-	HTMLNotice     string
+	HTMLTitle          string
-	UserFile       string
+	HTMLNotice         string
-	UserHome       string
+	UserFile           string
-	SSLCert        string
+	UserHome           string
-	SSLKey         string
+	ThumbnailMaxSize   int64
-	Accounts       []AccountConfig
+	ThumbnailMaxPixels int64
+	ZipMaxSize         int64
+	ZipMaxFiles        int
+	UploadMaxSize      int64
+	UploadMaxTotalSize int64
+	UploadMaxFiles     int
+	SearchMaxResults   int
+	SSLCert            string
+	SSLKey             string
+	Accounts           []AccountConfig
 }
 
 func Default() Config {
-	return Config{Path: []string{"."}, Port: 80, FileRemove: 1, ImagePreview: true, FolderDownload: "enable", SessionTimeout: 30, UserHome: "users"}
+	return Config{Path: []string{"."}, Port: 80, FileRemove: 1, ImagePreview: true, FolderDownload: "enable", SessionTimeout: 30, UserHome: "users", ThumbnailMaxSize: 32 << 20, ThumbnailMaxPixels: 40_000_000, ZipMaxSize: 2 << 30, ZipMaxFiles: 5000, UploadMaxSize: 2 << 30, UploadMaxTotalSize: 4 << 30, UploadMaxFiles: 100, SearchMaxResults: 500}
 }
 
 func Load(path string) (Config, error) {
@@ -101,6 +110,8 @@ func Load(path string) (Config, error) {
 			}
 		case "allow":
 			c.Allow = val
+		case "trusted-proxies":
+			c.TrustedProxies = val
 		case "rule":
 			if val != "" {
 				c.Rules = append(c.Rules, val)
@@ -133,6 +144,38 @@ func Load(path string) (Config, error) {
 			c.UserFile = val
 		case "user.home":
 			c.UserHome = strings.Trim(val, "/")
+		case "thumbnail.max-size":
+			if n, e := strconv.ParseInt(val, 10, 64); e == nil && n >= 0 {
+				c.ThumbnailMaxSize = n
+			}
+		case "thumbnail.max-pixels":
+			if n, e := strconv.ParseInt(val, 10, 64); e == nil && n >= 0 {
+				c.ThumbnailMaxPixels = n
+			}
+		case "zip.max-size":
+			if n, e := strconv.ParseInt(val, 10, 64); e == nil && n >= 0 {
+				c.ZipMaxSize = n
+			}
+		case "zip.max-files":
+			if n, e := strconv.Atoi(val); e == nil && n >= 0 {
+				c.ZipMaxFiles = n
+			}
+		case "upload.max-size":
+			if n, e := strconv.ParseInt(val, 10, 64); e == nil && n >= 0 {
+				c.UploadMaxSize = n
+			}
+		case "upload.max-total-size":
+			if n, e := strconv.ParseInt(val, 10, 64); e == nil && n >= 0 {
+				c.UploadMaxTotalSize = n
+			}
+		case "upload.max-files":
+			if n, e := strconv.Atoi(val); e == nil && n >= 0 {
+				c.UploadMaxFiles = n
+			}
+		case "search.max-results":
+			if n, e := strconv.Atoi(val); e == nil && n >= 0 {
+				c.SearchMaxResults = n
+			}
 		case "ssl.cert":
 			c.SSLCert = val
 		case "ssl.key":

internal/storage/storage.go

@@ -150,7 +150,49 @@ func (s Local) Trash(path string) error {
 	if e != nil {
 		return e
 	}
-	return wastebasket.Trash(p)
+	if err := wastebasket.Trash(p); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	_ = cleanupSystemTrash(30 * 24 * time.Hour)
+	return nil
+}
+
+func cleanupSystemTrash(maxAge time.Duration) error {
+	base := os.Getenv("XDG_DATA_HOME")
+	if base == "" {
+		home, err := os.UserHomeDir()
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		base = filepath.Join(home, ".local", "share")
+	}
+	root := filepath.Join(base, "Trash")
+	filesDir := filepath.Join(root, "files")
+	infoDir := filepath.Join(root, "info")
+	now := time.Now()
+	entries, err := os.ReadDir(infoDir)
+	if err != nil {
+		if os.IsNotExist(err) {
+			return nil
+		}
+		return err
+	}
+	for _, entry := range entries {
+		if entry.IsDir() || filepath.Ext(entry.Name()) != ".trashinfo" {
+			continue
+		}
+		info, err := entry.Info()
+		if err != nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		if now.Sub(info.ModTime()) <= maxAge {
+			continue
+		}
+		name := strings.TrimSuffix(entry.Name(), ".trashinfo")
+		_ = os.Remove(filepath.Join(infoDir, entry.Name()))
+		_ = os.RemoveAll(filepath.Join(filesDir, name))
+	}
+	return nil
 }
 
 func (s Local) MoveToTrash(path, trashRoot string) error {

internal/storage/trash_cleanup_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+package storage
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+func TestCleanupSystemTrashRemovesOldEntries(t *testing.T) {
+	data := t.TempDir()
+	t.Setenv("XDG_DATA_HOME", data)
+	files := filepath.Join(data, "Trash", "files")
+	info := filepath.Join(data, "Trash", "info")
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(files, 0755); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(info, 0755); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	oldInfo := filepath.Join(info, "old.txt.trashinfo")
+	oldFile := filepath.Join(files, "old.txt")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(oldInfo, []byte("[Trash Info]\n"), 0600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := os.WriteFile(oldFile, []byte("old"), 0600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	old := time.Now().Add(-31 * 24 * time.Hour)
+	if err := os.Chtimes(oldInfo, old, old); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := cleanupSystemTrash(30 * 24 * time.Hour); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(oldInfo); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		t.Fatalf("old info remains: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(oldFile); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		t.Fatalf("old file remains: %v", err)
+	}
+}