docs: document security limits and deployment

.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# Local build artifacts
+bin/
+
+# Local/debug runtime configuration
+chfs.ini

README.md

@@ -10,8 +10,15 @@ CHFS-NG 是基于 CHFS 思路重构的轻量级、自托管 Web 文件管理器
 - 上传队列、进度、取消与重试，支持文件夹拖拽上传
 - 动态用户管理与独立个人私有目录
 - 多根目录与目录级读写/删除权限
+- 完善的权限体系：支持访客/只读/读写/删除动态权限控制及安全防御
+- 缩略图本地缓存与流式预览优化，低内存开销
+- 桌面端（1080P/2K/4K）与移动端自适应布局，视觉规整与操作闭环
 - 分享、二维码移动传输、WebDAV
 - 健康检查：/healthz
+- 资源耗尽防护：上传、ZIP 打包、搜索与缩略图均有默认资源上限
+- 缩略图先通过 DecodeConfig 校验像素面积，再执行完整解码，避免声明尺寸型图片导致内存耗尽
+- 上传入口在 multipart 解析前使用 MaxBytesReader 限制请求体总量
+- 反向代理场景支持可信代理配置，仅对可信来源解析 X-Forwarded-For / X-Real-IP
 - 构建产物使用 -s -w，适合轻量 NAS
 
 ## 快速开始
@@ -145,5 +152,44 @@ docker run -d --name chfs-ng --restart unless-stopped -p 8080:80 -v /srv/chfs:/d
 - 公开部署时建议配合防火墙/反向代理
 - WebDAV 优先使用 HTTPS
 
+### 默认资源限制
+
+以下限制默认启用，可通过配置文件调整；设置为 `0` 表示不启用对应限制。
+
+| 配置项 | 默认值 | 说明 |
+| --- | ---: | --- |
+| `thumbnail-max-size` | 32 MiB | 单个缩略图源文件最大大小 |
+| `thumbnail-max-pixels` | 40,000,000 | 缩略图源图片最大像素面积 |
+| `zip-max-size` | 2 GiB | ZIP 打包源文件总大小上限 |
+| `zip-max-files` | 5000 | 单次 ZIP 最大文件数 |
+| `upload-max-size` | 2 GiB | 单个上传文件最大大小 |
+| `upload-max-total-size` | 4 GiB | 单次上传请求总大小上限 |
+| `upload-max-files` | 100 | 单次上传最大文件数 |
+| `search-max-results` | 500 | 单次搜索最大返回结果数；超过后标记 `truncated` |
+| `trusted-proxies` | 空 | 可信反向代理地址；仅可信代理的请求会使用 X-Forwarded-For / X-Real-IP |
+
+上传请求的总大小限制会在 multipart 解析之前生效；缩略图则先读取图片配置头并检查尺寸，再进行完整图片解码。
+
+生产环境如果使用反向代理，应显式配置 `trusted-proxies`，避免客户端伪造转发头影响 IP 记录或 IP Allow 规则。
+
+## 更新日志
+
+### 2026-10-03
+- **安全审计整改**：`/chfs/exist` 强制执行读取权限检查。
+- **资源耗尽防护**：增加缩略图文件大小/像素面积、ZIP 文件数/原始文件大小、上传文件数/单文件大小/总请求大小以及搜索结果上限。
+- **缩略图 OOM 防护**：使用 `image.DecodeConfig` 在完整 Decode 前校验声明尺寸，阻断超大尺寸图片解压炸弹。
+- **上传请求体防护**：在 `ParseMultipartForm` 前使用 `http.MaxBytesReader` 限制请求体，避免超大 multipart 请求先被 spool 到临时文件。
+- **回收站清理**：系统 Trash 增加默认 30 天自动清理。
+- **可信代理**：增加 `trusted-proxies` 配置，仅信任配置范围内的代理转发真实客户端 IP。
+- **密码安全**：新密码使用 bcrypt，同时兼容已有 SHA-256 密码平滑迁移。
+- **生产部署**：当前生产环境采用二进制 + systemd 部署；Docker 仍作为独立部署方式提供。
+
+### 2026-09-23
+- **前端交互与弹窗修复**：修复 `ask()` 弹窗中事件监听与回车提交逻辑，支持新建文件夹/新建文本顺畅操作。
+- **桌面端大屏视口适配**：放宽主容器宽度至 1600px 并动态对齐顶部导航栏边距，补全表格操作列，消除 PC 端右侧大屏留白断层。
+- **移动端与跨浏览器表格对齐**：固化列表各列宽度（`table-layout: fixed`），优化移动端触屏操作栏显示。
+- **访客权限与交互收紧**：统一未登录访客的多选及操作限制，修复危险操作按钮层叠样式。
+- **缩略图缓存机制**：引入生成缓存与内存保护机制，加快大图加载并降低宿主机内存消耗。
+
 ## License
 本项目许可证以仓库中的 LICENSE 文件为准。

cmd/chfs/main.go

@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ func main() {
 			}
 		}
 	}
-	srv := &api.Server{Store: store, Auth: mgr, Sessions: map[string]*auth.Account{}, SessionExpiry: map[string]time.Time{}, SessionTimeout: cfg.SessionTimeout, JWTSecret: jwtSecret, WebDAVRoot: root, Allow: cfg.Allow, MultiRoot: len(cfg.Path) > 1, RemoveMode: cfg.FileRemove, ImagePreview: cfg.ImagePreview, FolderDownload: cfg.FolderDownload, HTMLTitle: cfg.HTMLTitle, HTMLNotice: cfg.HTMLNotice, Log: opslog.New(cfg.Log), UserStore: users, UserHome: cfg.UserHome}
+	srv := &api.Server{Store: store, Auth: mgr, Sessions: map[string]*auth.Account{}, SessionExpiry: map[string]time.Time{}, SessionTimeout: cfg.SessionTimeout, JWTSecret: jwtSecret, WebDAVRoot: root, Allow: cfg.Allow, TrustedProxies: cfg.TrustedProxies, MultiRoot: len(cfg.Path) > 1, RemoveMode: cfg.FileRemove, ImagePreview: cfg.ImagePreview, FolderDownload: cfg.FolderDownload, HTMLTitle: cfg.HTMLTitle, HTMLNotice: cfg.HTMLNotice, Log: opslog.New(cfg.Log), UserStore: users, UserHome: cfg.UserHome, ThumbnailMaxSize: cfg.ThumbnailMaxSize, ThumbnailMaxPixels: cfg.ThumbnailMaxPixels, ZipMaxSize: cfg.ZipMaxSize, ZipMaxFiles: cfg.ZipMaxFiles, UploadMaxSize: cfg.UploadMaxSize, UploadMaxTotalSize: cfg.UploadMaxTotalSize, UploadMaxFiles: cfg.UploadMaxFiles, SearchMaxResults: cfg.SearchMaxResults}
 	addr := ":" + itoa(cfg.Port)
 	log.Printf("chfs-ng listening on %s root=%s removeMode=%d", addr, filepath.Clean(root), cfg.FileRemove)
 	if cfg.SSLCert != "" && cfg.SSLKey != "" {

docs/REVIEW_B_AUDIT_20261002.md

@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
+# 审核专家 B：CHFS-NG 代码安全审计报告
+
+- **审核人**：审核专家 B
+- **日期**：2026-10-02
+- **对象**：`/root/chfs-ng-research`（Go，11 个非测试源文件，约 3900 行）
+- **生产环境**：`chfs-ng.service`（root 用户），`bin/chfs-ng -file chfs.ini`，监听 *:18999
+- **验证**：`go vet ./...` 干净；`go test ./...` 全通过
+- **结论**：**有条件通过** —— 代码层面的路径防御与权限检查扎实，但生产部署配置存在阻断项，另有 2 高/3 中需处理
+
+---
+
+## 【阻断】生产配置使用弱密码 admin123，明文存储且文件全局可读
+
+**【严重度：阻断】**
+
+**【位置】** `/root/chfs-ng-research/chfs.ini`（生产配置文件）
+
+**【问题描述】**
+生产 `chfs.ini` 中 `[admin]` 的密码为明文 `admin123`，文件权限为 `-rw-r--r--`（全局可读）。
+服务监听 `*:18999`（所有网卡），主机防火墙 INPUT 策略为 ACCEPT 且无规则，等同于直接暴露公网。
+远程攻击者无需任何前置条件，直接用 `admin/admin123` 登录即获得全部文件读写删除权限。
+
+**【利用/触发条件】**
+`curl -X POST http://<host>:18999/chfs/session -d "user=admin&pwd=admin123"` 即得管理员 JWT。
+
+**【修复建议】**
+1. 立即更换高强度密码；2. `chmod 600 chfs.ini`；3. 配置 `allow` IP 白名单或置于反向代理后；
+4. 考虑主机防火墙限制 18999 入站。
+
+---
+
+## 【高】/chfs/exist 未鉴权的文件存在性预言机
+
+**【严重度：高】**
+
+**【位置】** `internal/api/server.go:512` `func (s *Server) exist`
+
+**【问题描述】**
+该端点全程未调用 `account(r, s)`，未做任何权限检查：`GET /chfs/exist?file=<path>` 返回 201/404
+直接泄露任意路径是否存在。所有其他文件端点都有 `MaskFor` 检查，唯独此处遗漏，
+与 README 宣称的"完善的权限体系"不一致。
+
+**【利用/触发条件】**
+当前生产 guest=r，攻击者本就可列目录，实际影响有限；但在 guest 被收紧的部署中，
+该端点绕过权限模型造成信息泄漏。
+
+**【修复建议】**
+加上 `if !account(r, s).MaskFor(p).HasRead() { 403 }`，与其他端点保持一致。
+
+---
+
+## 【高】缩略图接口无文件大小限制，可被解压炸弹打 OOM
+
+**【严重度：高】**
+
+**【位置】** `internal/api/server.go:1164` `func (s *Server) thumbnail`
+
+**【问题描述】**
+`image.Decode(f)` 会把整个文件读入内存解码，而此前没有任何文件大小检查。
+缓存层虽有 8MB/64 项上限（`thumbnail_cache.go`），但 decode 本身在缓存之外无限制。
+攻击者（生产环境 guest 即有 read 权限）可请求超大文件或特制解压炸弹
+（小文件声明超大宽高，如 PNG 头声明 100000x100000 → 数十 GB 内存分配），直接 OOM 杀死服务。
+
+**【利用/触发条件】**
+`GET /chfs/thumbnail?file=<大文件或炸弹图片>`，无需登录（guest 可读）。
+
+**【修复建议】**
+`Stat` 后检查 `fi.Size()`，超过阈值（如 32MB）直接拒绝；或对 decode 加内存上限。
+
+---
+
+## 【中】目录 ZIP 下载无总大小/数量限制，CPU 与带宽耗尽
+
+**【严重度：中】**
+
+**【位置】** `internal/api/server.go:1290` `downloadSelectedZip`、`1368` `downloadDir`
+
+**【问题描述】**
+两个接口把目录树流式打包为 zip 直接写回 response，全程无总字节数、无文件数上限
+（`downloadSelectedZip` 仅限制了顶层 path 参数 ≤100 个，但每个可为超大目录；`downloadDir` 无任何限制）。
+`zip.Deflate` 是 CPU 密集型，多并发请求可打满 CPU 并占满带宽。guest 可读即触发。
+
+**【修复建议】**
+增加可配置的打包上限（总大小、文件数），超限返回 413；或对该接口加并发信号量。
+
+---
+
+## 【中】上传无单文件/总量配额，可填满磁盘
+
+**【严重度：中】**
+
+**【位置】** `internal/api/server.go:838` `upload`、`937` `upload2`、`savePart`
+
+**【问题描述】**
+`ParseMultipartForm` 仅限制内存部分（64MB/128MB），`savePart` 的 `io.Copy(f, in)` 无任何大小上限。
+有写权限的用户可上传超大文件填满磁盘。当前生产仅 admin 有写权限，实际影响有限，
+但项目主打"动态权限控制"（会给普通用户开写权限），属于设计缺口。
+
+**【修复建议】**
+增加 `upload.max-size` 配置项，`savePart` 中用 `io.LimitReader` 截断并报错。
+
+---
+
+## 【中】默认删除进系统回收站且永不清理，磁盘被"已删除"文件占满
+
+**【严重度：中】**
+
+**【位置】** `internal/storage/storage.go` `Trash`；`internal/config/config.go` 默认 `FileRemove: 1`
+
+**【问题描述】**
+默认 `file.remove=1` 走 `wastebasket.Trash`（`~/.local/share/Trash`），该库无自动清理机制
+（只有模式 2 的 `MoveToTrash` 有 30 天清理）。长期运行的服务删除的文件永久占用磁盘，
+`df` 与用户认知不一致，最终表现为神秘的磁盘占满。
+
+**【修复建议】**
+对模式 1 也加定期清理（如 30 天），或在文档中明确说明并给出清理方式。
+
+---
+
+## 【中低】search 无结果数量上限
+
+**【严重度：中低】**
+
+**【位置】** `internal/api/server.go:1009` `func (s *Server) search`
+
+**【问题描述】**
+全树递归遍历，结果集无上限一次性 JSON 返回。超大目录树下内存与响应体膨胀，
+guest 可直接触发。
+
+**【修复建议】**
+加 `limit` 参数（默认如 500），超限截断并提示。
+
+---
+
+## 【低】ipFilter 不识别 X-Forwarded-For，反代后 allow 白名单失效
+
+**【严重度：低】**
+
+**【位置】** `internal/api/server.go:2065` `ipFilter` / `clientIP`
+
+**【问题描述】**
+`clientIP` 只读 `r.RemoteAddr`。README 建议生产用 HTTPS 反向代理，
+一旦接入反代，`allow` 看到的永远是代理 IP，白名单名存实亡（要么全放行要么全拒绝）。
+
+**【修复建议】**
+支持可信代理 + `X-Forwarded-For` 解析，或在文档中明确说明该限制。
+
+---
+
+## 【低】密码哈希为无盐 SHA256
+
+**【严重度：低】**
+
+**【位置】** `internal/auth/auth.go` `func PasswordHash`
+
+**【问题描述】**
+`users.json` 中存储 `hex(sha256(password))`，无盐。文件泄漏后彩虹表可直接破解弱密码。
+
+**【修复建议】**
+改用 bcrypt（`golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt`），并做旧哈希的兼容迁移。
+
+---
+
+## 已验证为安全的关键点（正面结论）
+
+1. **JWT 密钥管理正确**：`main.go` 在未配置 `jwt.secret` 时生成随机 32 字节密钥并以 0600 权限持久化
+   到 `users.json.jwt-secret`（生产已生效，文件存在）。`auth.go` 中的硬编码常量在 server 路径中不可达。
+2. **路径穿越防御扎实**：`unsafePath`（NUL + `..` 段）与 `storage.real()` 双层防御；`real()` 对最近存在祖先
+   做 `EvalSymlinks`，连路径中间的符号链接逃逸都能拦住。多根目录经 `Multi` 路由后仍走同一检查。
+3. **权限检查完整**：除 `exist` 外所有 mutating 端点都有 `MaskFor` 检查；`rename` 为 create-only；
+   `remove`/`transfer` 有递归 preflight；WebDAV 有独立 `webdavAuthFS` 包装，Move/Copy/RemoveAll 均有 `checkTree`。
+4. **上传 preflight**：`upload`/`upload2` 全量校验后再落盘，失败回滚已保存分片；`createExclusive` 防并发覆盖。
+5. **Cookie 安全**：JWT cookie 为 `HttpOnly`；生产 guest 为只读。
+6. **生产密钥文件权限正确**：`users.json.jwt-secret` 为 0600。
+
+---
+
+## 总体结论
+
+**有条件通过**。
+
+代码本身质量不错：路径穿越防御、权限模型、并发处理都经过认真设计，测试全过、vet 干净。
+真正的风险在**生产部署**：`admin123` 弱密码 + 公网直连 + 无防火墙是阻断项，必须立即处理。
+代码层面需修：`exist` 鉴权缺失（高）、缩略图 OOM（高），以及 ZIP/上传/回收站/搜索的资源限制（中）。
+修完阻断项和高优先级后可认为达到生产安全标准。

go.mod

@@ -10,4 +10,7 @@ require (
 	github.com/skip2/go-qrcode v0.0.0-20200617195104-da1b6568686e
 )
 
-require golang.org/x/sys v0.3.0 // indirect
+require (
+	golang.org/x/crypto v0.28.0 // indirect
+	golang.org/x/sys v0.26.0 // indirect
+)

go.sum

@@ -11,5 +11,9 @@ github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v4 v4.5.2/go.mod h1:m21LjoU+eqJr34lmDMbreY2eSTRJ1cv77w
 github.com/skip2/go-qrcode v0.0.0-20200617195104-da1b6568686e h1:MRM5ITcdelLK2j1vwZ3Je0FKVCfqOLp5zO6trqMLYs0=
 github.com/skip2/go-qrcode v0.0.0-20200617195104-da1b6568686e/go.mod h1:XV66xRDqSt+GTGFMVlhk3ULuV0y9ZmzeVGR4mloJI3M=
 github.com/teambition/rrule-go v1.8.2/go.mod h1:Ieq5AbrKGciP1V//Wq8ktsTXwSwJHDD5mD/wLBGl3p4=
+golang.org/x/crypto v0.28.0 h1:GBDwsMXVQi34v5CCYUm2jkJvu4cbtru2U4TN2PSyQnw=
+golang.org/x/crypto v0.28.0/go.mod h1:rmgy+3RHxRZMyY0jjAJShp2zgEdOqj2AO7U0pYmeQ7U=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.3.0 h1:w8ZOecv6NaNa/zC8944JTU3vz4u6Lagfk4RPQxv92NQ=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.3.0/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
+golang.org/x/sys v0.26.0 h1:KHjCJyddX0LoSTb3J+vWpupP9p0oznkqVk/IfjymZbo=
+golang.org/x/sys v0.26.0/go.mod h1:/VUhepiaJMQUp4+oa/7Zr1D23ma6VTLIYjOOTFZPUcA=

internal/api/review_b_audit_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+package api
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"hash/crc32"
+	"image"
+	"image/color"
+	"image/png"
+	"mime/multipart"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+
+	"chfs-ng/internal/auth"
+	"chfs-ng/internal/storage"
+)
+
+func TestAuditExistEnforcesReadPermission(t *testing.T) {
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(root, "secret.txt"), []byte("x"), 0600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	s := &Server{Store: storage.Local{Root: root}, Auth: &auth.Manager{Guest: &auth.Account{Mask: auth.None}}}
+	rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/chfs/exist?file=secret.txt", nil)
+	s.exist(rr, req)
+	if rr.Code != 403 {
+		t.Fatalf("exist status=%d want 403", rr.Code)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAuditThumbnailRejectsOversizeBeforeDecode(t *testing.T) {
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(root, "big.bin"), make([]byte, 64), 0600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	s := &Server{Store: storage.Local{Root: root}, Auth: &auth.Manager{Guest: &auth.Account{Mask: auth.Read}}, ImagePreview: true, ThumbnailMaxSize: 32}
+	rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/chfs/thumbnail?file=big.bin", nil)
+	s.thumbnail(rr, req)
+	if rr.Code != 413 {
+		t.Fatalf("thumbnail status=%d want 413", rr.Code)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAuditZipLimitsUseOriginalFileSizes(t *testing.T) {
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(root, "a.txt"), make([]byte, 100), 0600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	s := &Server{Store: storage.Local{Root: root}, ZipMaxSize: 99, ZipMaxFiles: 10}
+	a := &auth.Account{Mask: auth.Read}
+	if err := s.checkZipLimits(a, []string{""}); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected zip size limit")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAuditSearchLimit(t *testing.T) {
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	for _, name := range []string{"a.txt", "b.txt", "c.txt"} {
+		if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(root, name), []byte(name), 0600); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	s := &Server{Store: storage.Local{Root: root}, Auth: &auth.Manager{Guest: &auth.Account{Mask: auth.Read}}, SearchMaxResults: 2}
+	rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/chfs/search?str=.txt", nil)
+	s.search(rr, req)
+	if rr.Code != 200 {
+		t.Fatalf("search status=%d", rr.Code)
+	}
+	if len(rr.Body.Bytes()) == 0 || !contains(rr.Body.String(), `"truncated":true`) {
+		t.Fatalf("search did not report truncation: %s", rr.Body.String())
+	}
+}
+
+func contains(s, sub string) bool {
+	return len(s) >= len(sub) && (s == sub || func() bool {
+		for i := 0; i+len(sub) <= len(s); i++ {
+			if s[i:i+len(sub)] == sub {
+				return true
+			}
+		}
+		return false
+	}())
+}
+
+func TestAuditThumbnailPixelLimit(t *testing.T) {
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	img := image.NewRGBA(image.Rect(0, 0, 20, 20))
+	img.Set(0, 0, color.White)
+	f, err := os.Create(filepath.Join(root, "large.png"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := png.Encode(f, img); err != nil {
+		f.Close()
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	f.Close()
+	s := &Server{Store: storage.Local{Root: root}, Auth: &auth.Manager{Guest: &auth.Account{Mask: auth.Read}}, ImagePreview: true, ThumbnailMaxPixels: 100}
+	rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/chfs/thumbnail?file=large.png", nil)
+	s.thumbnail(rr, req)
+	if rr.Code != 415 {
+		t.Fatalf("thumbnail pixel-limit status=%d want 415", rr.Code)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAuditThumbnailRejectsDeclaredHugeDimensionsBeforeDecode(t *testing.T) {
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	f, err := os.Create(filepath.Join(root, "bomb.png"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	img := image.NewRGBA(image.Rect(0, 0, 1, 1))
+	if err := png.Encode(f, img); err != nil {
+		f.Close()
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := f.Close(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	data, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(root, "bomb.png"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	// PNG IHDR starts at byte 16. Replace the 1x1 declaration with a
+	// deliberately huge image while keeping the file otherwise tiny/valid.
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(data[16:20], 100000)
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(data[20:24], 100000)
+	crc := crc32.ChecksumIEEE(data[12:29])
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(data[29:33], crc)
+	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(root, "bomb.png"), data, 0600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	s := &Server{Store: storage.Local{Root: root}, Auth: &auth.Manager{Guest: &auth.Account{Mask: auth.Read}}, ImagePreview: true, ThumbnailMaxPixels: 40_000_000}
+	rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/chfs/thumbnail?file=bomb.png", nil)
+	s.thumbnail(rr, req)
+	if rr.Code != 415 {
+		t.Fatalf("thumbnail bomb status=%d want 415", rr.Code)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAuditUploadMaxBytesReaderBeforeMultipartSpool(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name    string
+		handler func(*Server, http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request)
+	}{
+		{"upload", (*Server).upload},
+		{"upload2", (*Server).upload2},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			root := t.TempDir()
+			var body bytes.Buffer
+			mw := multipart.NewWriter(&body)
+			part, err := mw.CreateFormFile("file", "oversize.bin")
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			if _, err := part.Write(make([]byte, 1024)); err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			if err := mw.Close(); err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/chfs/"+tc.name+"?folder=", &body)
+			req.Header.Set("Content-Type", mw.FormDataContentType())
+			s := &Server{Store: storage.Local{Root: root}, Auth: &auth.Manager{Guest: &auth.Account{Mask: auth.Write}}, UploadMaxTotalSize: 128}
+			rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+			tc.handler(s, rr, req)
+			if rr.Code != http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge {
+				t.Fatalf("status=%d want 413", rr.Code)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

internal/api/server.go

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import (
 	_ "image/jpeg"
 	"image/png"
 	"io"
+	"mime"
 	"mime/multipart"
 	"net"
 	"net/http"
@@ -36,25 +37,36 @@ import (
 var webIndex []byte
 
 type Server struct {
-	Store          storage.Storage
+	Store              storage.Storage
-	Auth           *auth.Manager
+	Auth               *auth.Manager
-	Sessions       map[string]*auth.Account
+	Sessions           map[string]*auth.Account
-	SessionExpiry  map[string]time.Time
+	SessionExpiry      map[string]time.Time
-	SessionMu      sync.RWMutex
+	SessionMu          sync.RWMutex
-	SessionTimeout int
+	SessionTimeout     int
-	JWTSecret      string
+	JWTSecret          string
-	WebDAVRoot     string
+	WebDAVRoot         string
-	WebDAVFS       webdav.FileSystem
+	WebDAVFS           webdav.FileSystem
-	Allow          string
+	Allow              string
-	MultiRoot      bool
+	TrustedProxies     string
-	RemoveMode     int
+	MultiRoot          bool
-	ImagePreview   bool
+	RemoveMode         int
-	FolderDownload string
+	ImagePreview       bool
-	HTMLTitle      string
+	FolderDownload     string
-	HTMLNotice     string
+	HTMLTitle          string
-	Log            *opslog.Logger
+	HTMLNotice         string
-	UserStore      *auth.UserStore
+	Log                *opslog.Logger
-	UserHome       string
+	UserStore          *auth.UserStore
+	UserHome           string
+	ThumbnailMaxSize   int64
+	ThumbnailMaxPixels int64
+	ZipMaxSize         int64
+	ZipMaxFiles        int
+	UploadMaxSize      int64
+	UploadMaxTotalSize int64
+	UploadMaxFiles     int
+	SearchMaxResults   int
+	ThumbnailCache     *thumbnailCache
+	thumbnailCacheOnce sync.Once
 }
 type fileInfo struct {
 	Name      string `json:"name"`
@@ -70,6 +82,7 @@ type fileInfo struct {
 func (s *Server) Handler() http.Handler {
 	mux := http.NewServeMux()
 	mux.HandleFunc("/healthz", s.health)
+	mux.HandleFunc("/favicon.ico", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent) })
 	mux.HandleFunc("/webdav/", s.webdav)
 	mux.HandleFunc("/webdav", s.webdav)
 	mux.HandleFunc("/chfs/files", s.files)
@@ -95,6 +108,7 @@ func (s *Server) Handler() http.Handler {
 	mux.HandleFunc("/chfs/shared", s.shared)
 	mux.HandleFunc("/chfs/shared/", s.shared)
 	mux.HandleFunc("/chfs/preview", s.preview)
+	mux.HandleFunc("/chfs/thumbnail", s.thumbnail)
 	mux.HandleFunc("/asset/api.html", s.apiDoc)
 	mux.HandleFunc("/", s.fileHandler)
 	h := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
@@ -133,11 +147,11 @@ func (s *Server) logOp(r *http.Request, action string) {
 	if a != nil {
 		user = a.Username
 	}
-	_ = s.Log.Write(clientIPString(r), user, action)
+	_ = s.Log.Write(s.clientIPString(r), user, action)
 }
 
-func clientIPString(r *http.Request) string {
+func (s *Server) clientIPString(r *http.Request) string {
-	ip := clientIP(r)
+	ip := s.clientIP(r)
 	if ip == nil {
 		return "-"
 	}
@@ -511,6 +525,10 @@ func (s *Server) exist(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		return
 	}
 	p := strings.Trim(strings.ReplaceAll(raw, "\\", "/"), "/")
+	if !account(r, s).MaskFor(p).HasRead() {
+		writeJSONError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "has no privilege")
+		return
+	}
 	_, e := s.Store.Stat(p)
 	if e != nil {
 		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
@@ -563,7 +581,14 @@ func (s *Server) me(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		writeJSONError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "not authenticated")
 		return
 	}
-	writeJSON(w, map[string]any{"username": a.Username, "home": a.Home, "admin": a.Admin, "mask": permString(a.MaskFor(a.Home)), "managed": a.PasswordHash != "", "enabled": a.Enabled})
+	// The anonymous account is an authorization identity, not a logged-in user.
+	// Keep its internal username for permission matching, but expose an empty
+	// username to the UI so an initial visit is correctly shown as "访客".
+	username := a.Username
+	if a == s.Auth.Guest {
+		username = ""
+	}
+	writeJSON(w, map[string]any{"username": username, "home": a.Home, "admin": a.Admin, "mask": permString(a.MaskFor(a.Home)), "managed": a.PasswordHash != "", "enabled": a.Enabled})
 }
 
 type accessibleRoot struct {
@@ -627,7 +652,7 @@ func (s *Server) password(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		writeJSONError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid json")
 		return
 	}
-	if a.Password != req.CurrentPassword && a.PasswordHash != auth.PasswordHash(req.CurrentPassword) {
+	if a.Password != req.CurrentPassword && !auth.VerifyPasswordHash(a.PasswordHash, req.CurrentPassword) {
 		writeJSONError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "current password incorrect")
 		return
 	}
@@ -824,8 +849,15 @@ func (s *Server) updatetext(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	writeCreated(w)
 }
 func (s *Server) upload(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	if s.UploadMaxTotalSize > 0 {
+		r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, s.UploadMaxTotalSize)
+	}
 	if e := r.ParseMultipartForm(64 << 20); e != nil {
-		http.Error(w, e.Error(), 400)
+		if _, ok := e.(*http.MaxBytesError); ok {
+			http.Error(w, e.Error(), http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
+		} else {
+			http.Error(w, e.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
+		}
 		return
 	}
 	a := account(r, s)
@@ -843,8 +875,24 @@ func (s *Server) upload(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	// This prevents duplicate/bad entries from leaving a partial upload.
 	seen := make(map[string]struct{})
 	var saved []string
+	var totalUpload int64
+	var uploadFiles int
 	for _, hs := range r.MultipartForm.File {
 		for _, h := range hs {
+			uploadFiles++
+			if s.UploadMaxFiles > 0 && uploadFiles > s.UploadMaxFiles {
+				http.Error(w, "upload file count limit exceeded", http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
+				return
+			}
+			if s.UploadMaxSize > 0 && h.Size > s.UploadMaxSize {
+				http.Error(w, "upload file too large", http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
+				return
+			}
+			totalUpload += h.Size
+			if s.UploadMaxTotalSize > 0 && totalUpload > s.UploadMaxTotalSize {
+				http.Error(w, "upload total size limit exceeded", http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
+				return
+			}
 			name := filepath.ToSlash(h.Filename)
 			if name == "" || strings.HasPrefix(name, "/") || unsafePath(name) {
 				http.Error(w, "invalid filename", 400)
@@ -869,7 +917,7 @@ func (s *Server) upload(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	for _, hs := range r.MultipartForm.File {
 		for _, h := range hs {
 			target := path.Join(dir, filepath.ToSlash(h.Filename))
-			if e := savePart(s.Store, target, h); e != nil {
+			if e := savePart(s.Store, target, h, s.UploadMaxSize); e != nil {
 				for _, previous := range saved {
 					_ = s.Store.Remove(previous)
 				}
@@ -896,7 +944,7 @@ func createExclusive(st storage.Storage, target string) (*os.File, error) {
 	return st.Create(target)
 }
 
-func savePart(st storage.Storage, target string, h *multipart.FileHeader) error {
+func savePart(st storage.Storage, target string, h *multipart.FileHeader, maxSize int64) error {
 	in, e := h.Open()
 	if e != nil {
 		return e
@@ -907,8 +955,18 @@ func savePart(st storage.Storage, target string, h *multipart.FileHeader) error
 		return e
 	}
 	copyErr := func() error {
-		_, err := io.Copy(f, in)
+		var src io.Reader = in
-		return err
+		if maxSize > 0 {
+			src = io.LimitReader(in, maxSize+1)
+		}
+		n, err := io.Copy(f, src)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if maxSize > 0 && n > maxSize {
+			return fmt.Errorf("upload file too large")
+		}
+		return nil
 	}()
 	closeErr := f.Close()
 	if copyErr != nil {
@@ -923,6 +981,9 @@ func savePart(st storage.Storage, target string, h *multipart.FileHeader) error
 }
 
 func (s *Server) upload2(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	if s.UploadMaxTotalSize > 0 {
+		r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, s.UploadMaxTotalSize)
+	}
 	a := account(r, s)
 	rawDir := r.URL.Query().Get("folder")
 	if unsafePath(rawDir) {
@@ -935,14 +996,34 @@ func (s *Server) upload2(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		return
 	}
 	if err := r.ParseMultipartForm(128 << 20); err != nil {
-		http.Error(w, err.Error(), 400)
+		if _, ok := err.(*http.MaxBytesError); ok {
+			http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
+		} else {
+			http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
+		}
 		return
 	}
 	// Preflight the complete multipart batch before creating anything.
 	// This prevents duplicate/bad entries from leaving a partial upload.
 	seen := make(map[string]struct{})
+	var totalUpload int64
+	var uploadFiles int
 	for _, hs := range r.MultipartForm.File {
 		for _, h := range hs {
+			uploadFiles++
+			if s.UploadMaxFiles > 0 && uploadFiles > s.UploadMaxFiles {
+				http.Error(w, "upload file count limit exceeded", http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
+				return
+			}
+			if s.UploadMaxSize > 0 && h.Size > s.UploadMaxSize {
+				http.Error(w, "upload file too large", http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
+				return
+			}
+			totalUpload += h.Size
+			if s.UploadMaxTotalSize > 0 && totalUpload > s.UploadMaxTotalSize {
+				http.Error(w, "upload total size limit exceeded", http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
+				return
+			}
 			name := filepath.ToSlash(h.Filename)
 			name = strings.TrimPrefix(name, "/")
 			if name == "" || unsafePath(name) {
@@ -969,7 +1050,7 @@ func (s *Server) upload2(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		for _, h := range hs {
 			name := strings.TrimPrefix(filepath.ToSlash(h.Filename), "/")
 			target := path.Join(dir, name)
-			if err := savePart(s.Store, target, h); err != nil {
+			if err := savePart(s.Store, target, h, s.UploadMaxSize); err != nil {
 				for _, previous := range saved {
 					_ = s.Store.Remove(previous)
 				}
@@ -1003,6 +1084,11 @@ func (s *Server) search(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	}
 	needle := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(r.URL.Query().Get("str")))
 	out := make([]searchFileInfo, 0)
+	maxResults := s.SearchMaxResults
+	if maxResults < 0 {
+		maxResults = 0
+	}
+	truncated := false
 	var walk func(string) error
 	walk = func(dir string) error {
 		items, err := s.Store.List(dir)
@@ -1010,6 +1096,10 @@ func (s *Server) search(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 			return err
 		}
 		for _, fi := range items {
+			if maxResults > 0 && len(out) >= maxResults {
+				truncated = true
+				return nil
+			}
 			p := path.Join(dir, fi.Name())
 			if !a.MaskFor(p).HasRead() {
 				continue
@@ -1029,7 +1119,19 @@ func (s *Server) search(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		http.Error(w, err.Error(), 500)
 		return
 	}
-	writeJSON(w, map[string]any{"virtualRoot": 0, "currentMask": permString(rootMask), "files": out})
+	writeJSON(w, map[string]any{"virtualRoot": 0, "currentMask": permString(rootMask), "files": out, "truncated": truncated})
+}
+
+func sharedPath(parts ...string) string {
+	encoded := make([]string, 0, len(parts))
+	for _, part := range parts {
+		encoded = append(encoded, url.PathEscape(part))
+	}
+	return "/chfs/shared/" + strings.Join(encoded, "/")
+}
+
+func attachmentDisposition(name string) string {
+	return mime.FormatMediaType("attachment", map[string]string{"filename": name})
 }
 
 func (s *Server) shared(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
@@ -1054,33 +1156,43 @@ func (s *Server) shared(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		return
 	}
 	if fi.IsDir() {
-		w.Header().Set("Content-Disposition", `attachment;filename="shared"`)
 		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
+		w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "private, no-cache")
 		w.Header().Set("Last-Modified", fi.ModTime().UTC().Format(http.TimeFormat))
+		if r.Method == http.MethodHead {
+			return
+		}
+		if r.Method != http.MethodGet {
+			http.Error(w, "method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
+			return
+		}
 		items, err := s.Store.List(p)
 		if err != nil {
 			http.NotFound(w, r)
 			return
 		}
-		_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "<pre>\n")
+		_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "<!doctype html><meta charset=\"utf-8\"><title>CHFS Shared</title><style>body{font:15px system-ui,sans-serif;max-width:760px;margin:40px auto;padding:0 18px}a{display:block;padding:10px 0;text-decoration:none}</style><h2>共享文件</h2><p>"+html.EscapeString(p)+"</p>")
 		for _, item := range items {
-			name := item.Name()
+			child := path.Join(p, item.Name())
-			href := url.PathEscape(name)
+			if !account(r, s).MaskForEntry(child).HasRead() {
+				continue
+			}
+			href := sharedPath(strings.Split(strings.Trim(child, "/"), "/")...)
 			if item.IsDir() {
 				href += "/"
 			}
-			_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(w, "<a href=\"%s\">%s</a>\n", href, html.EscapeString(name)+func() string {
+			_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(w, "<a href=\"%s\">%s%s</a>", html.EscapeString(href), html.EscapeString(item.Name()), func() string {
 				if item.IsDir() {
 					return "/"
 				}
 				return ""
 			}())
 		}
-		_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "</pre>\n")
+		_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "</body></html>")
 		return
 	}
-	if r.Method != http.MethodGet {
+	if r.Method != http.MethodGet && r.Method != http.MethodHead {
-		http.NotFound(w, r)
+		http.Error(w, "method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
 		return
 	}
 	f, err := s.Store.Open(p)
@@ -1089,7 +1201,7 @@ func (s *Server) shared(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		return
 	}
 	defer f.Close()
-	w.Header().Set("Content-Disposition", fmt.Sprintf(`attachment;filename="%s"`, fi.Name()))
+	w.Header().Set("Content-Disposition", attachmentDisposition(fi.Name()))
 	http.ServeContent(w, r, fi.Name(), fi.ModTime(), f)
 }
 
@@ -1101,37 +1213,93 @@ func (s *Server) preview(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	}
 	file := strings.Trim(strings.ReplaceAll(rawFile, "\\", "/"), "/")
 	if file == "" {
-		http.Error(w, "file required", 400)
+		http.Error(w, "file required", http.StatusBadRequest)
 		return
 	}
 	if !account(r, s).MaskFor(file).HasRead() {
 		writeJSONError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "has no privilege")
 		return
 	}
-	if !s.ImagePreview {
+	fi, err := s.Store.Stat(file)
-		writeJSONError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Open image file fail!")
+	if err != nil || fi.IsDir() {
+		http.NotFound(w, r)
 		return
 	}
 	f, err := s.Store.Open(file)
 	if err != nil {
-		writeJSONError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Open image file fail!")
+		http.NotFound(w, r)
 		return
 	}
 	defer f.Close()
-	src, _, err := image.Decode(f)
+	if ct := mime.TypeByExtension(strings.ToLower(path.Ext(fi.Name()))); ct != "" {
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", ct)
+	}
+	w.Header().Set("Content-Disposition", mime.FormatMediaType("inline", map[string]string{"filename": fi.Name()}))
+	w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "private, max-age=60")
+	http.ServeContent(w, r, fi.Name(), fi.ModTime(), f)
+}
+
+func (s *Server) thumbnail(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	rawFile := r.URL.Query().Get("file")
+	if unsafePath(rawFile) {
+		writeJSONError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid parameter")
+		return
+	}
+	file := strings.Trim(strings.ReplaceAll(rawFile, "\\", "/"), "/")
+	if file == "" || !account(r, s).MaskFor(file).HasRead() || !s.ImagePreview {
+		http.Error(w, "thumbnail unavailable", http.StatusForbidden)
+		return
+	}
+	f, err := s.Store.Open(file)
 	if err != nil {
-		writeJSONError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Open image file fail!")
+		http.NotFound(w, r)
 		return
 	}
-	thumb := transform.Resize(src, 64, 64, transform.Linear)
+	defer f.Close()
-	var buf bytes.Buffer
+	fi, err := f.Stat()
-	if err := png.Encode(&buf, thumb); err != nil {
+	if err != nil {
-		writeJSONError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Open image file fail!")
+		http.NotFound(w, r)
+		return
+	}
+	if s.ThumbnailMaxSize > 0 && fi.Size() > s.ThumbnailMaxSize {
+		writeJSONError(w, http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, "thumbnail file too large")
+		return
+	}
+	key := thumbnailCacheKey{Path: file, Size: fi.Size(), ModTime: fi.ModTime().UnixNano()}
+	s.thumbnailCacheOnce.Do(func() {
+		if s.ThumbnailCache == nil {
+			s.ThumbnailCache = newThumbnailCache()
+		}
+	})
+	data, err := s.ThumbnailCache.Do(key, func() ([]byte, error) {
+		config, _, err := image.DecodeConfig(f)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		if s.ThumbnailMaxPixels > 0 && int64(config.Width)*int64(config.Height) > s.ThumbnailMaxPixels {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("thumbnail dimensions too large")
+		}
+		if _, err := f.Seek(0, io.SeekStart); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		src, _, err := image.Decode(f)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		thumb := transform.Resize(src, 320, 240, transform.Linear)
+		var buf bytes.Buffer
+		if err := png.Encode(&buf, thumb); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		return append([]byte(nil), buf.Bytes()...), nil
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		http.Error(w, "thumbnail unavailable", http.StatusUnsupportedMediaType)
 		return
 	}
-	w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "max-age=2592000")
 	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "image/png")
-	_, _ = w.Write(buf.Bytes())
+	w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "private, max-age=300")
+	_, _ = w.Write(data)
 }
 
 func (s *Server) fileHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
@@ -1211,6 +1379,62 @@ func (s *Server) qrcode(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	_, _ = w.Write(data)
 }
 
+func (s *Server) zipStats(a *auth.Account, roots []string) (int64, int, error) {
+	var total int64
+	files := 0
+	seen := map[string]bool{}
+	var walk func(string) error
+	walk = func(p string) error {
+		if seen[p] {
+			return nil
+		}
+		seen[p] = true
+		fi, err := s.Store.Stat(p)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if !a.MaskFor(p).HasRead() {
+			return nil
+		}
+		if !fi.IsDir() {
+			files++
+			total += fi.Size()
+			return nil
+		}
+		items, err := s.Store.List(p)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		for _, it := range items {
+			child := path.Join(p, it.Name())
+			if err := walk(child); err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+		}
+		return nil
+	}
+	for _, root := range roots {
+		if err := walk(root); err != nil {
+			return 0, 0, err
+		}
+	}
+	return total, files, nil
+}
+
+func (s *Server) checkZipLimits(a *auth.Account, roots []string) error {
+	total, files, err := s.zipStats(a, roots)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if s.ZipMaxFiles > 0 && files > s.ZipMaxFiles {
+		return fmt.Errorf("zip file count limit exceeded")
+	}
+	if s.ZipMaxSize > 0 && total > s.ZipMaxSize {
+		return fmt.Errorf("zip size limit exceeded")
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
 func (s *Server) downloadSelectedZip(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	a := account(r, s)
 	paths := r.URL.Query()["path"]
@@ -1236,6 +1460,10 @@ func (s *Server) downloadSelectedZip(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 			return
 		}
 	}
+	if err := s.checkZipLimits(a, paths); err != nil {
+		writeJSONError(w, http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, err.Error())
+		return
+	}
 	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/zip")
 	w.Header().Set("Content-Disposition", `attachment; filename="download.zip"`)
 	zw := zip.NewWriter(w)
@@ -1327,6 +1555,10 @@ func (s *Server) downloadDir(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 			}
 		}
 	}
+	if err := s.checkZipLimits(a, []string{p}); err != nil {
+		writeJSONError(w, http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, err.Error())
+		return
+	}
 	name := fi.Name()
 	if name == "." || name == "" {
 		name = "download"
@@ -1988,7 +2220,7 @@ func (f *webdavAuthFS) checkTree(ctx context.Context, name string, p auth.PermMa
 
 func (s *Server) ipFilter(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
 	return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-		if s.Allow != "" && !allowedIP(s.Allow, clientIP(r)) {
+		if s.Allow != "" && !allowedIP(s.Allow, s.clientIP(r)) {
 			http.Error(w, "forbidden", http.StatusForbidden)
 			return
 		}
@@ -1996,6 +2228,33 @@ func (s *Server) ipFilter(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
 	})
 }
 
+func (s *Server) clientIP(r *http.Request) net.IP {
+	host, _, _ := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
+	remote := net.ParseIP(host)
+	if remote == nil {
+		remote = net.ParseIP(r.RemoteAddr)
+	}
+	if remote == nil || s.TrustedProxies == "" || !allowedIP(s.TrustedProxies, remote) {
+		return remote
+	}
+	// Only a trusted proxy may supply the forwarding chain. Walk right-to-left
+	// and return the first address that is not itself a trusted proxy.
+	parts := strings.Split(r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"), ",")
+	for i := len(parts) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
+		ip := net.ParseIP(strings.TrimSpace(parts[i]))
+		if ip == nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		if !allowedIP(s.TrustedProxies, ip) {
+			return ip
+		}
+	}
+	if v := net.ParseIP(strings.TrimSpace(r.Header.Get("X-Real-IP"))); v != nil && !allowedIP(s.TrustedProxies, v) {
+		return v
+	}
+	return remote
+}
+
 func clientIP(r *http.Request) net.IP {
 	host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
 	if err == nil {

internal/api/share_archive_test.go

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (
 	"net/http/httptest"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
 	"testing"
 
 	"chfs-ng/internal/auth"
@@ -30,7 +31,7 @@ func TestSharedRoutesMatchCHFS(t *testing.T) {
 	r = httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/chfs/shared/hello.txt", nil)
 	w = httptest.NewRecorder()
 	s.Handler().ServeHTTP(w, r)
-	if w.Code != http.StatusOK || w.Header().Get("Content-Disposition") != `attachment;filename="hello.txt"` {
+	if w.Code != http.StatusOK || w.Header().Get("Content-Disposition") != `attachment; filename=hello.txt` {
 		t.Fatalf("shared file: status=%d disposition=%q", w.Code, w.Header().Get("Content-Disposition"))
 	}
 	body, _ := io.ReadAll(w.Result().Body)
@@ -39,6 +40,66 @@ func TestSharedRoutesMatchCHFS(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestSharedGuestFlowAndSafeURLs(t *testing.T) {
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	if err := os.Mkdir(filepath.Join(root, "docs"), 0o755); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := os.Mkdir(filepath.Join(root, "private"), 0o755); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(root, "docs", "你好 #?.txt"), []byte("shared"), 0o644); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(root, "private", "secret.txt"), []byte("secret"), 0o644); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	s := &Server{Store: storage.Local{Root: root}, Auth: &auth.Manager{Accounts: map[string]*auth.Account{}, Guest: &auth.Account{
+		Mask:  auth.Read,
+		Rules: []auth.PathRule{{Dir: "private", Deny: true}},
+	}},
+	}
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name, url string
+		want      int
+	}{
+		{"guest file", "/chfs/shared/docs/%E4%BD%A0%E5%A5%BD%20%23%3F.txt", http.StatusOK},
+		{"denied file", "/chfs/shared/private/secret.txt", http.StatusNotFound},
+		{"traversal", "/chfs/shared/../private/secret.txt", http.StatusNotFound},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, tc.url, nil)
+			w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+			if tc.name == "traversal" {
+				s.shared(w, r)
+			} else {
+				s.Handler().ServeHTTP(w, r)
+			}
+			if w.Code != tc.want {
+				t.Fatalf("status=%d want=%d body=%q", w.Code, tc.want, w.Body.String())
+			}
+		})
+	}
+	r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/chfs/shared/docs", nil)
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	s.Handler().ServeHTTP(w, r)
+	if w.Code != http.StatusOK || !strings.Contains(w.Body.String(), "你好 #?") {
+		t.Fatalf("shared directory listing status=%d body=%q", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(w.Body.String(), "private") {
+		t.Fatalf("denied entry leaked in listing: %q", w.Body.String())
+	}
+	r = httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodHead, "/chfs/shared/docs/%E4%BD%A0%E5%A5%BD%20%23%3F.txt", nil)
+	w = httptest.NewRecorder()
+	s.Handler().ServeHTTP(w, r)
+	if w.Code != http.StatusOK || w.Body.Len() != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("HEAD status=%d body=%d", w.Code, w.Body.Len())
+	}
+	if got := w.Header().Get("Content-Disposition"); !strings.Contains(got, "attachment") {
+		t.Fatalf("disposition=%q", got)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestDownloadDirArchiveHeadersAndEntries(t *testing.T) {
 	root := t.TempDir()
 	dir := filepath.Join(root, "pack")

internal/api/thumbnail_cache.go

@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+package api
+
+import (
+	"container/list"
+	"sync"
+)
+
+type thumbnailCacheKey struct {
+	Path    string
+	Size    int64
+	ModTime int64
+}
+
+type thumbnailCacheEntry struct {
+	key  thumbnailCacheKey
+	data []byte
+}
+
+type thumbnailFlight struct {
+	done chan struct{}
+	data []byte
+	err  error
+}
+
+type thumbnailCache struct {
+	mu       sync.Mutex
+	items    map[thumbnailCacheKey]*list.Element
+	order    *list.List
+	flights  map[thumbnailCacheKey]*thumbnailFlight
+	bytes    int64
+	maxBytes int64
+	maxItems int
+}
+
+func newThumbnailCache() *thumbnailCache {
+	return &thumbnailCache{
+		items:    make(map[thumbnailCacheKey]*list.Element),
+		order:    list.New(),
+		flights:  make(map[thumbnailCacheKey]*thumbnailFlight),
+		maxBytes: 8 << 20,
+		maxItems: 64,
+	}
+}
+
+func (c *thumbnailCache) Do(key thumbnailCacheKey, fn func() ([]byte, error)) ([]byte, error) {
+	c.mu.Lock()
+	if e, ok := c.items[key]; ok {
+		c.order.MoveToFront(e)
+		data := append([]byte(nil), e.Value.(thumbnailCacheEntry).data...)
+		c.mu.Unlock()
+		return data, nil
+	}
+	if f, ok := c.flights[key]; ok {
+		c.mu.Unlock()
+		<-f.done
+		return f.data, f.err
+	}
+	f := &thumbnailFlight{done: make(chan struct{})}
+	c.flights[key] = f
+	c.mu.Unlock()
+
+	data, err := fn()
+	if err == nil && len(data) > 0 && int64(len(data)) <= c.maxBytes {
+		c.mu.Lock()
+		c.putLocked(key, data)
+		f.data = data
+		f.err = err
+		delete(c.flights, key)
+		close(f.done)
+		c.mu.Unlock()
+		return data, nil
+	}
+	c.mu.Lock()
+	f.err = err
+	delete(c.flights, key)
+	close(f.done)
+	c.mu.Unlock()
+	return data, err
+}
+
+func (c *thumbnailCache) putLocked(key thumbnailCacheKey, data []byte) {
+	if e, ok := c.items[key]; ok {
+		old := e.Value.(thumbnailCacheEntry)
+		c.bytes -= int64(len(old.data))
+		e.Value = thumbnailCacheEntry{key: key, data: data}
+		c.bytes += int64(len(data))
+		c.order.MoveToFront(e)
+	} else {
+		e := c.order.PushFront(thumbnailCacheEntry{key: key, data: data})
+		c.items[key] = e
+		c.bytes += int64(len(data))
+	}
+	for c.bytes > c.maxBytes || c.order.Len() > c.maxItems {
+		e := c.order.Back()
+		if e == nil {
+			break
+		}
+		entry := e.Value.(thumbnailCacheEntry)
+		delete(c.items, entry.key)
+		c.bytes -= int64(len(entry.data))
+		c.order.Remove(e)
+	}
+}

internal/api/thumbnail_cache_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+package api
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"sync"
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestThumbnailCacheDeduplicatesConcurrentBuilds(t *testing.T) {
+	c := newThumbnailCache()
+	key := thumbnailCacheKey{Path: "photo.jpg", Size: 10, ModTime: 20}
+	var builds atomic.Int32
+	const workers = 24
+	var wg sync.WaitGroup
+	results := make([][]byte, workers)
+	errs := make([]error, workers)
+	wg.Add(workers)
+	for i := 0; i < workers; i++ {
+		go func(i int) {
+			defer wg.Done()
+			results[i], errs[i] = c.Do(key, func() ([]byte, error) {
+				builds.Add(1)
+				return []byte("thumbnail"), nil
+			})
+		}(i)
+	}
+	wg.Wait()
+	if builds.Load() != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("thumbnail builder ran %d times, want 1", builds.Load())
+	}
+	for i := range results {
+		if errs[i] != nil || string(results[i]) != "thumbnail" {
+			t.Fatalf("worker %d got result %q, err=%v", i, results[i], errs[i])
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestThumbnailCacheDoesNotCacheErrors(t *testing.T) {
+	c := newThumbnailCache()
+	key := thumbnailCacheKey{Path: "broken.jpg"}
+	wantErr := errors.New("decode failed")
+	var builds atomic.Int32
+	for i := 0; i < 2; i++ {
+		_, err := c.Do(key, func() ([]byte, error) {
+			builds.Add(1)
+			return nil, wantErr
+		})
+		if !errors.Is(err, wantErr) {
+			t.Fatalf("got err %v, want %v", err, wantErr)
+		}
+	}
+	if builds.Load() != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("error result was cached; builder ran %d times", builds.Load())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestThumbnailCacheEvictsByBound(t *testing.T) {
+	c := newThumbnailCache()
+	c.maxItems = 2
+	for i := 0; i < 3; i++ {
+		key := thumbnailCacheKey{Path: string(rune('a' + i))}
+		if _, err := c.Do(key, func() ([]byte, error) { return []byte("x"), nil }); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	c.mu.Lock()
+	defer c.mu.Unlock()
+	if len(c.items) != 2 || c.order.Len() != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("cache size=%d/list=%d, want 2/2", len(c.items), c.order.Len())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestThumbnailCacheEvictsByBytes(t *testing.T) {
+	c := newThumbnailCache()
+	c.maxBytes = 3
+	for i := 0; i < 2; i++ {
+		key := thumbnailCacheKey{Path: string(rune('x' + i))}
+		if _, err := c.Do(key, func() ([]byte, error) { return []byte("xx"), nil }); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	c.mu.Lock()
+	defer c.mu.Unlock()
+	if c.bytes > c.maxBytes || len(c.items) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("cache bytes=%d items=%d, want <=%d/1", c.bytes, len(c.items), c.maxBytes)
+	}
+}

internal/auth/auth.go

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
 	"time"
 
 	jwt "github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v4"
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
 )
 
 type PermMask uint8
@@ -86,8 +87,10 @@ func ParseRules(values []string) (*Manager, error) {
 }
 
 func (m *Manager) Authenticate(user, pwd string) *Account {
-	if a, ok := m.Accounts[user]; ok && (a.Enabled || a.PasswordHash == "") && (a.Password == pwd || a.PasswordHash == PasswordHash(pwd)) {
+	if a, ok := m.Accounts[user]; ok && (a.Enabled || a.PasswordHash == "") {
-		return a
+		if a.Password == pwd || VerifyPasswordHash(a.PasswordHash, pwd) {
+			return a
+		}
 	}
 	if user == "" && pwd == "" {
 		return m.Guest
@@ -95,8 +98,23 @@ func (m *Manager) Authenticate(user, pwd string) *Account {
 	return nil
 }
 func PasswordHash(password string) string {
+	h, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(password), bcrypt.DefaultCost)
+	if err != nil {
+		return ""
+	}
+	return string(h)
+}
+
+func VerifyPasswordHash(stored, password string) bool {
+	if stored == "" {
+		return false
+	}
+	if strings.HasPrefix(stored, "$2a$") || strings.HasPrefix(stored, "$2b$") || strings.HasPrefix(stored, "$2y$") {
+		return bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword([]byte(stored), []byte(password)) == nil
+	}
+	// Legacy unsalted SHA-256 hashes remain readable for one migration cycle.
 	h := sha256.Sum256([]byte(password))
-	return hex.EncodeToString(h[:])
+	return hex.EncodeToString(h[:]) == stored
 }
 
 func (a *Account) MaskFor(path string) PermMask {

internal/auth/password_migration_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+package auth
+
+import (
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestPasswordHashUsesBcryptAndVerifies(t *testing.T) {
+	hash := PasswordHash("correct horse battery staple")
+	if len(hash) < 4 || (hash[0:4] != "$2a$" && hash[0:4] != "$2b$") {
+		t.Fatalf("hash=%q is not bcrypt", hash)
+	}
+	if !VerifyPasswordHash(hash, "correct horse battery staple") {
+		t.Fatal("bcrypt password did not verify")
+	}
+	if VerifyPasswordHash(hash, "wrong") {
+		t.Fatal("wrong password verified")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLegacySHA256PasswordStillVerifies(t *testing.T) {
+	sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte("legacy-pass"))
+	hash := hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
+	if !VerifyPasswordHash(hash, "legacy-pass") {
+		t.Fatal("legacy hash did not verify")
+	}
+	if VerifyPasswordHash(hash, "wrong") {
+		t.Fatal("wrong legacy password verified")
+	}
+}

internal/config/config.go

@@ -20,27 +20,36 @@ type AccountConfig struct {
 }
 
 type Config struct {
-	Path           []string
+	Path               []string
-	Port           int
+	Port               int
-	Allow          string
+	Allow              string
-	Rules          []string
+	TrustedProxies     string
-	Log            string
+	Rules              []string
-	FileRemove     int
+	Log                string
-	ImagePreview   bool
+	FileRemove         int
-	FolderDownload string
+	ImagePreview       bool
-	SessionTimeout int
+	FolderDownload     string
-	JWTSecret      string
+	SessionTimeout     int
-	HTMLTitle      string
+	JWTSecret          string
-	HTMLNotice     string
+	HTMLTitle          string
-	UserFile       string
+	HTMLNotice         string
-	UserHome       string
+	UserFile           string
-	SSLCert        string
+	UserHome           string
-	SSLKey         string
+	ThumbnailMaxSize   int64
-	Accounts       []AccountConfig
+	ThumbnailMaxPixels int64
+	ZipMaxSize         int64
+	ZipMaxFiles        int
+	UploadMaxSize      int64
+	UploadMaxTotalSize int64
+	UploadMaxFiles     int
+	SearchMaxResults   int
+	SSLCert            string
+	SSLKey             string
+	Accounts           []AccountConfig
 }
 
 func Default() Config {
-	return Config{Path: []string{"."}, Port: 80, FileRemove: 1, ImagePreview: true, FolderDownload: "enable", SessionTimeout: 30, UserHome: "users"}
+	return Config{Path: []string{"."}, Port: 80, FileRemove: 1, ImagePreview: true, FolderDownload: "enable", SessionTimeout: 30, UserHome: "users", ThumbnailMaxSize: 32 << 20, ThumbnailMaxPixels: 40_000_000, ZipMaxSize: 2 << 30, ZipMaxFiles: 5000, UploadMaxSize: 2 << 30, UploadMaxTotalSize: 4 << 30, UploadMaxFiles: 100, SearchMaxResults: 500}
 }
 
 func Load(path string) (Config, error) {
@@ -101,6 +110,8 @@ func Load(path string) (Config, error) {
 			}
 		case "allow":
 			c.Allow = val
+		case "trusted-proxies":
+			c.TrustedProxies = val
 		case "rule":
 			if val != "" {
 				c.Rules = append(c.Rules, val)
@@ -133,6 +144,38 @@ func Load(path string) (Config, error) {
 			c.UserFile = val
 		case "user.home":
 			c.UserHome = strings.Trim(val, "/")
+		case "thumbnail.max-size":
+			if n, e := strconv.ParseInt(val, 10, 64); e == nil && n >= 0 {
+				c.ThumbnailMaxSize = n
+			}
+		case "thumbnail.max-pixels":
+			if n, e := strconv.ParseInt(val, 10, 64); e == nil && n >= 0 {
+				c.ThumbnailMaxPixels = n
+			}
+		case "zip.max-size":
+			if n, e := strconv.ParseInt(val, 10, 64); e == nil && n >= 0 {
+				c.ZipMaxSize = n
+			}
+		case "zip.max-files":
+			if n, e := strconv.Atoi(val); e == nil && n >= 0 {
+				c.ZipMaxFiles = n
+			}
+		case "upload.max-size":
+			if n, e := strconv.ParseInt(val, 10, 64); e == nil && n >= 0 {
+				c.UploadMaxSize = n
+			}
+		case "upload.max-total-size":
+			if n, e := strconv.ParseInt(val, 10, 64); e == nil && n >= 0 {
+				c.UploadMaxTotalSize = n
+			}
+		case "upload.max-files":
+			if n, e := strconv.Atoi(val); e == nil && n >= 0 {
+				c.UploadMaxFiles = n
+			}
+		case "search.max-results":
+			if n, e := strconv.Atoi(val); e == nil && n >= 0 {
+				c.SearchMaxResults = n
+			}
 		case "ssl.cert":
 			c.SSLCert = val
 		case "ssl.key":

internal/storage/storage.go

@@ -150,7 +150,49 @@ func (s Local) Trash(path string) error {
 	if e != nil {
 		return e
 	}
-	return wastebasket.Trash(p)
+	if err := wastebasket.Trash(p); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	_ = cleanupSystemTrash(30 * 24 * time.Hour)
+	return nil
+}
+
+func cleanupSystemTrash(maxAge time.Duration) error {
+	base := os.Getenv("XDG_DATA_HOME")
+	if base == "" {
+		home, err := os.UserHomeDir()
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		base = filepath.Join(home, ".local", "share")
+	}
+	root := filepath.Join(base, "Trash")
+	filesDir := filepath.Join(root, "files")
+	infoDir := filepath.Join(root, "info")
+	now := time.Now()
+	entries, err := os.ReadDir(infoDir)
+	if err != nil {
+		if os.IsNotExist(err) {
+			return nil
+		}
+		return err
+	}
+	for _, entry := range entries {
+		if entry.IsDir() || filepath.Ext(entry.Name()) != ".trashinfo" {
+			continue
+		}
+		info, err := entry.Info()
+		if err != nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		if now.Sub(info.ModTime()) <= maxAge {
+			continue
+		}
+		name := strings.TrimSuffix(entry.Name(), ".trashinfo")
+		_ = os.Remove(filepath.Join(infoDir, entry.Name()))
+		_ = os.RemoveAll(filepath.Join(filesDir, name))
+	}
+	return nil
 }
 
 func (s Local) MoveToTrash(path, trashRoot string) error {

internal/storage/trash_cleanup_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+package storage
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+func TestCleanupSystemTrashRemovesOldEntries(t *testing.T) {
+	data := t.TempDir()
+	t.Setenv("XDG_DATA_HOME", data)
+	files := filepath.Join(data, "Trash", "files")
+	info := filepath.Join(data, "Trash", "info")
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(files, 0755); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(info, 0755); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	oldInfo := filepath.Join(info, "old.txt.trashinfo")
+	oldFile := filepath.Join(files, "old.txt")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(oldInfo, []byte("[Trash Info]\n"), 0600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := os.WriteFile(oldFile, []byte("old"), 0600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	old := time.Now().Add(-31 * 24 * time.Hour)
+	if err := os.Chtimes(oldInfo, old, old); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := cleanupSystemTrash(30 * 24 * time.Hour); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(oldInfo); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		t.Fatalf("old info remains: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(oldFile); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		t.Fatalf("old file remains: %v", err)
+	}
+}