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| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
 kory
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4dafcff680 | ||
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kory
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5d7e8f1ec0 | ||
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kory
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56b05b11d9 | ||
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OpenClaw Agent
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ca4d54d5b3 |
@@ -15,6 +15,10 @@ CHFS-NG 是基于 CHFS 思路重构的轻量级、自托管 Web 文件管理器
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- 桌面端（1080P/2K/4K）与移动端自适应布局，视觉规整与操作闭环
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- 分享、二维码移动传输、WebDAV
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- 健康检查：/healthz
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- 资源耗尽防护：上传、ZIP 打包、搜索与缩略图均有默认资源上限
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- 缩略图先通过 DecodeConfig 校验像素面积，再执行完整解码，避免声明尺寸型图片导致内存耗尽
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- 上传入口在 multipart 解析前使用 MaxBytesReader 限制请求体总量
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- 反向代理场景支持可信代理配置，仅对可信来源解析 X-Forwarded-For / X-Real-IP
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- 构建产物使用 -s -w，适合轻量 NAS
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## 快速开始
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@@ -148,8 +152,38 @@ docker run -d --name chfs-ng --restart unless-stopped -p 8080:80 -v /srv/chfs:/d
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- 公开部署时建议配合防火墙/反向代理
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- WebDAV 优先使用 HTTPS
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### 默认资源限制
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以下限制默认启用，可通过配置文件调整；设置为 `0` 表示不启用对应限制。
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| 配置项 | 默认值 | 说明 |
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| --- | ---: | --- |
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| `thumbnail-max-size` | 32 MiB | 单个缩略图源文件最大大小 |
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| `thumbnail-max-pixels` | 40,000,000 | 缩略图源图片最大像素面积 |
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| `zip-max-size` | 2 GiB | ZIP 打包源文件总大小上限 |
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| `zip-max-files` | 5000 | 单次 ZIP 最大文件数 |
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| `upload-max-size` | 2 GiB | 单个上传文件最大大小 |
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| `upload-max-total-size` | 4 GiB | 单次上传请求总大小上限 |
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| `upload-max-files` | 100 | 单次上传最大文件数 |
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| `search-max-results` | 500 | 单次搜索最大返回结果数；超过后标记 `truncated` |
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| `trusted-proxies` | 空 | 可信反向代理地址；仅可信代理的请求会使用 X-Forwarded-For / X-Real-IP |
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上传请求的总大小限制会在 multipart 解析之前生效；缩略图则先读取图片配置头并检查尺寸，再进行完整图片解码。
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生产环境如果使用反向代理，应显式配置 `trusted-proxies`，避免客户端伪造转发头影响 IP 记录或 IP Allow 规则。
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## 更新日志
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### 2026-10-03
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- **安全审计整改**：`/chfs/exist` 强制执行读取权限检查。
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- **资源耗尽防护**：增加缩略图文件大小/像素面积、ZIP 文件数/原始文件大小、上传文件数/单文件大小/总请求大小以及搜索结果上限。
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- **缩略图 OOM 防护**：使用 `image.DecodeConfig` 在完整 Decode 前校验声明尺寸，阻断超大尺寸图片解压炸弹。
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- **上传请求体防护**：在 `ParseMultipartForm` 前使用 `http.MaxBytesReader` 限制请求体，避免超大 multipart 请求先被 spool 到临时文件。
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- **回收站清理**：系统 Trash 增加默认 30 天自动清理。
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- **可信代理**：增加 `trusted-proxies` 配置，仅信任配置范围内的代理转发真实客户端 IP。
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- **密码安全**：新密码使用 bcrypt，同时兼容已有 SHA-256 密码平滑迁移。
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- **生产部署**：当前生产环境采用二进制 + systemd 部署；Docker 仍作为独立部署方式提供。
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### 2026-09-23
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- **前端交互与弹窗修复**：修复 `ask()` 弹窗中事件监听与回车提交逻辑，支持新建文件夹/新建文本顺畅操作。
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- **桌面端大屏视口适配**：放宽主容器宽度至 1600px 并动态对齐顶部导航栏边距，补全表格操作列，消除 PC 端右侧大屏留白断层。
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+1
-1
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ func main() {
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}
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}
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}
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srv := &api.Server{Store: store, Auth: mgr, Sessions: map[string]*auth.Account{}, SessionExpiry: map[string]time.Time{}, SessionTimeout: cfg.SessionTimeout, JWTSecret: jwtSecret, WebDAVRoot: root, Allow: cfg.Allow, MultiRoot: len(cfg.Path) > 1, RemoveMode: cfg.FileRemove, ImagePreview: cfg.ImagePreview, FolderDownload: cfg.FolderDownload, HTMLTitle: cfg.HTMLTitle, HTMLNotice: cfg.HTMLNotice, Log: opslog.New(cfg.Log), UserStore: users, UserHome: cfg.UserHome}
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srv := &api.Server{Store: store, Auth: mgr, Sessions: map[string]*auth.Account{}, SessionExpiry: map[string]time.Time{}, SessionTimeout: cfg.SessionTimeout, JWTSecret: jwtSecret, WebDAVRoot: root, Allow: cfg.Allow, TrustedProxies: cfg.TrustedProxies, MultiRoot: len(cfg.Path) > 1, RemoveMode: cfg.FileRemove, ImagePreview: cfg.ImagePreview, FolderDownload: cfg.FolderDownload, HTMLTitle: cfg.HTMLTitle, HTMLNotice: cfg.HTMLNotice, Log: opslog.New(cfg.Log), UserStore: users, UserHome: cfg.UserHome, ThumbnailMaxSize: cfg.ThumbnailMaxSize, ThumbnailMaxPixels: cfg.ThumbnailMaxPixels, ZipMaxSize: cfg.ZipMaxSize, ZipMaxFiles: cfg.ZipMaxFiles, UploadMaxSize: cfg.UploadMaxSize, UploadMaxTotalSize: cfg.UploadMaxTotalSize, UploadMaxFiles: cfg.UploadMaxFiles, SearchMaxResults: cfg.SearchMaxResults}
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addr := ":" + itoa(cfg.Port)
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log.Printf("chfs-ng listening on %s root=%s removeMode=%d", addr, filepath.Clean(root), cfg.FileRemove)
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if cfg.SSLCert != "" && cfg.SSLKey != "" {
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@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
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# 审核专家 B：CHFS-NG 代码安全审计报告
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- **审核人**：审核专家 B
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- **日期**：2026-10-02
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- **对象**：`/root/chfs-ng-research`（Go，11 个非测试源文件，约 3900 行）
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- **生产环境**：`chfs-ng.service`（root 用户），`bin/chfs-ng -file chfs.ini`，监听 *:18999
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- **验证**：`go vet ./...` 干净；`go test ./...` 全通过
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- **结论**：**有条件通过** —— 代码层面的路径防御与权限检查扎实，但生产部署配置存在阻断项，另有 2 高/3 中需处理
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---
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## 【阻断】生产配置使用弱密码 admin123，明文存储且文件全局可读
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**【严重度：阻断】**
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**【位置】** `/root/chfs-ng-research/chfs.ini`（生产配置文件）
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**【问题描述】**
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生产 `chfs.ini` 中 `[admin]` 的密码为明文 `admin123`，文件权限为 `-rw-r--r--`（全局可读）。
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服务监听 `*:18999`（所有网卡），主机防火墙 INPUT 策略为 ACCEPT 且无规则，等同于直接暴露公网。
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远程攻击者无需任何前置条件，直接用 `admin/admin123` 登录即获得全部文件读写删除权限。
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**【利用/触发条件】**
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`curl -X POST http://<host>:18999/chfs/session -d "user=admin&pwd=admin123"` 即得管理员 JWT。
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**【修复建议】**
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1. 立即更换高强度密码；2. `chmod 600 chfs.ini`；3. 配置 `allow` IP 白名单或置于反向代理后；
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4. 考虑主机防火墙限制 18999 入站。
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---
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## 【高】/chfs/exist 未鉴权的文件存在性预言机
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**【严重度：高】**
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**【位置】** `internal/api/server.go:512` `func (s *Server) exist`
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**【问题描述】**
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该端点全程未调用 `account(r, s)`，未做任何权限检查：`GET /chfs/exist?file=<path>` 返回 201/404
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直接泄露任意路径是否存在。所有其他文件端点都有 `MaskFor` 检查，唯独此处遗漏，
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与 README 宣称的"完善的权限体系"不一致。
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**【利用/触发条件】**
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当前生产 guest=r，攻击者本就可列目录，实际影响有限；但在 guest 被收紧的部署中，
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该端点绕过权限模型造成信息泄漏。
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**【修复建议】**
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加上 `if !account(r, s).MaskFor(p).HasRead() { 403 }`，与其他端点保持一致。
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---
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## 【高】缩略图接口无文件大小限制，可被解压炸弹打 OOM
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**【严重度：高】**
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**【位置】** `internal/api/server.go:1164` `func (s *Server) thumbnail`
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**【问题描述】**
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`image.Decode(f)` 会把整个文件读入内存解码，而此前没有任何文件大小检查。
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缓存层虽有 8MB/64 项上限（`thumbnail_cache.go`），但 decode 本身在缓存之外无限制。
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攻击者（生产环境 guest 即有 read 权限）可请求超大文件或特制解压炸弹
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（小文件声明超大宽高，如 PNG 头声明 100000x100000 → 数十 GB 内存分配），直接 OOM 杀死服务。
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**【利用/触发条件】**
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`GET /chfs/thumbnail?file=<大文件或炸弹图片>`，无需登录（guest 可读）。
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**【修复建议】**
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`Stat` 后检查 `fi.Size()`，超过阈值（如 32MB）直接拒绝；或对 decode 加内存上限。
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---
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## 【中】目录 ZIP 下载无总大小/数量限制，CPU 与带宽耗尽
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**【严重度：中】**
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**【位置】** `internal/api/server.go:1290` `downloadSelectedZip`、`1368` `downloadDir`
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**【问题描述】**
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两个接口把目录树流式打包为 zip 直接写回 response，全程无总字节数、无文件数上限
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（`downloadSelectedZip` 仅限制了顶层 path 参数 ≤100 个，但每个可为超大目录；`downloadDir` 无任何限制）。
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`zip.Deflate` 是 CPU 密集型，多并发请求可打满 CPU 并占满带宽。guest 可读即触发。
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**【修复建议】**
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增加可配置的打包上限（总大小、文件数），超限返回 413；或对该接口加并发信号量。
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---
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## 【中】上传无单文件/总量配额，可填满磁盘
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**【严重度：中】**
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**【位置】** `internal/api/server.go:838` `upload`、`937` `upload2`、`savePart`
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**【问题描述】**
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`ParseMultipartForm` 仅限制内存部分（64MB/128MB），`savePart` 的 `io.Copy(f, in)` 无任何大小上限。
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有写权限的用户可上传超大文件填满磁盘。当前生产仅 admin 有写权限，实际影响有限，
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但项目主打"动态权限控制"（会给普通用户开写权限），属于设计缺口。
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**【修复建议】**
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增加 `upload.max-size` 配置项，`savePart` 中用 `io.LimitReader` 截断并报错。
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---
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## 【中】默认删除进系统回收站且永不清理，磁盘被"已删除"文件占满
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**【严重度：中】**
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**【位置】** `internal/storage/storage.go` `Trash`；`internal/config/config.go` 默认 `FileRemove: 1`
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**【问题描述】**
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默认 `file.remove=1` 走 `wastebasket.Trash`（`~/.local/share/Trash`），该库无自动清理机制
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（只有模式 2 的 `MoveToTrash` 有 30 天清理）。长期运行的服务删除的文件永久占用磁盘，
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`df` 与用户认知不一致，最终表现为神秘的磁盘占满。
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**【修复建议】**
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对模式 1 也加定期清理（如 30 天），或在文档中明确说明并给出清理方式。
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---
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## 【中低】search 无结果数量上限
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**【严重度：中低】**
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**【位置】** `internal/api/server.go:1009` `func (s *Server) search`
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**【问题描述】**
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全树递归遍历，结果集无上限一次性 JSON 返回。超大目录树下内存与响应体膨胀，
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guest 可直接触发。
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**【修复建议】**
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加 `limit` 参数（默认如 500），超限截断并提示。
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---
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## 【低】ipFilter 不识别 X-Forwarded-For，反代后 allow 白名单失效
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**【严重度：低】**
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**【位置】** `internal/api/server.go:2065` `ipFilter` / `clientIP`
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**【问题描述】**
|
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`clientIP` 只读 `r.RemoteAddr`。README 建议生产用 HTTPS 反向代理，
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一旦接入反代，`allow` 看到的永远是代理 IP，白名单名存实亡（要么全放行要么全拒绝）。
|
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|
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**【修复建议】**
|
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支持可信代理 + `X-Forwarded-For` 解析，或在文档中明确说明该限制。
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---
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## 【低】密码哈希为无盐 SHA256
|
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**【严重度：低】**
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|
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**【位置】** `internal/auth/auth.go` `func PasswordHash`
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**【问题描述】**
|
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`users.json` 中存储 `hex(sha256(password))`，无盐。文件泄漏后彩虹表可直接破解弱密码。
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|
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**【修复建议】**
|
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改用 bcrypt（`golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt`），并做旧哈希的兼容迁移。
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---
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## 已验证为安全的关键点（正面结论）
|
||||
|
||||
1. **JWT 密钥管理正确**：`main.go` 在未配置 `jwt.secret` 时生成随机 32 字节密钥并以 0600 权限持久化
|
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到 `users.json.jwt-secret`（生产已生效，文件存在）。`auth.go` 中的硬编码常量在 server 路径中不可达。
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2. **路径穿越防御扎实**：`unsafePath`（NUL + `..` 段）与 `storage.real()` 双层防御；`real()` 对最近存在祖先
|
||||
做 `EvalSymlinks`，连路径中间的符号链接逃逸都能拦住。多根目录经 `Multi` 路由后仍走同一检查。
|
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3. **权限检查完整**：除 `exist` 外所有 mutating 端点都有 `MaskFor` 检查；`rename` 为 create-only；
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`remove`/`transfer` 有递归 preflight；WebDAV 有独立 `webdavAuthFS` 包装，Move/Copy/RemoveAll 均有 `checkTree`。
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4. **上传 preflight**：`upload`/`upload2` 全量校验后再落盘，失败回滚已保存分片；`createExclusive` 防并发覆盖。
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5. **Cookie 安全**：JWT cookie 为 `HttpOnly`；生产 guest 为只读。
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6. **生产密钥文件权限正确**：`users.json.jwt-secret` 为 0600。
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|
||||
---
|
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|
||||
## 总体结论
|
||||
|
||||
**有条件通过**。
|
||||
|
||||
代码本身质量不错：路径穿越防御、权限模型、并发处理都经过认真设计，测试全过、vet 干净。
|
||||
真正的风险在**生产部署**：`admin123` 弱密码 + 公网直连 + 无防火墙是阻断项，必须立即处理。
|
||||
代码层面需修：`exist` 鉴权缺失（高）、缩略图 OOM（高），以及 ZIP/上传/回收站/搜索的资源限制（中）。
|
||||
修完阻断项和高优先级后可认为达到生产安全标准。
|
||||
@@ -10,4 +10,7 @@ require (
|
||||
github.com/skip2/go-qrcode v0.0.0-20200617195104-da1b6568686e
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
require golang.org/x/sys v0.3.0 // indirect
|
||||
require (
|
||||
golang.org/x/crypto v0.28.0 // indirect
|
||||
golang.org/x/sys v0.26.0 // indirect
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -11,5 +11,9 @@ github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v4 v4.5.2/go.mod h1:m21LjoU+eqJr34lmDMbreY2eSTRJ1cv77w
|
||||
github.com/skip2/go-qrcode v0.0.0-20200617195104-da1b6568686e h1:MRM5ITcdelLK2j1vwZ3Je0FKVCfqOLp5zO6trqMLYs0=
|
||||
github.com/skip2/go-qrcode v0.0.0-20200617195104-da1b6568686e/go.mod h1:XV66xRDqSt+GTGFMVlhk3ULuV0y9ZmzeVGR4mloJI3M=
|
||||
github.com/teambition/rrule-go v1.8.2/go.mod h1:Ieq5AbrKGciP1V//Wq8ktsTXwSwJHDD5mD/wLBGl3p4=
|
||||
golang.org/x/crypto v0.28.0 h1:GBDwsMXVQi34v5CCYUm2jkJvu4cbtru2U4TN2PSyQnw=
|
||||
golang.org/x/crypto v0.28.0/go.mod h1:rmgy+3RHxRZMyY0jjAJShp2zgEdOqj2AO7U0pYmeQ7U=
|
||||
golang.org/x/sys v0.3.0 h1:w8ZOecv6NaNa/zC8944JTU3vz4u6Lagfk4RPQxv92NQ=
|
||||
golang.org/x/sys v0.3.0/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
|
||||
golang.org/x/sys v0.26.0 h1:KHjCJyddX0LoSTb3J+vWpupP9p0oznkqVk/IfjymZbo=
|
||||
golang.org/x/sys v0.26.0/go.mod h1:/VUhepiaJMQUp4+oa/7Zr1D23ma6VTLIYjOOTFZPUcA=
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
|
||||
package api
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"bytes"
|
||||
"encoding/binary"
|
||||
"hash/crc32"
|
||||
"image"
|
||||
"image/color"
|
||||
"image/png"
|
||||
"mime/multipart"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"net/http/httptest"
|
||||
"os"
|
||||
"path/filepath"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
|
||||
"chfs-ng/internal/auth"
|
||||
"chfs-ng/internal/storage"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAuditExistEnforcesReadPermission(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
root := t.TempDir()
|
||||
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(root, "secret.txt"), []byte("x"), 0600); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
s := &Server{Store: storage.Local{Root: root}, Auth: &auth.Manager{Guest: &auth.Account{Mask: auth.None}}}
|
||||
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/chfs/exist?file=secret.txt", nil)
|
||||
s.exist(rr, req)
|
||||
if rr.Code != 403 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("exist status=%d want 403", rr.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAuditThumbnailRejectsOversizeBeforeDecode(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
root := t.TempDir()
|
||||
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(root, "big.bin"), make([]byte, 64), 0600); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
s := &Server{Store: storage.Local{Root: root}, Auth: &auth.Manager{Guest: &auth.Account{Mask: auth.Read}}, ImagePreview: true, ThumbnailMaxSize: 32}
|
||||
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/chfs/thumbnail?file=big.bin", nil)
|
||||
s.thumbnail(rr, req)
|
||||
if rr.Code != 413 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("thumbnail status=%d want 413", rr.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAuditZipLimitsUseOriginalFileSizes(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
root := t.TempDir()
|
||||
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(root, "a.txt"), make([]byte, 100), 0600); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
s := &Server{Store: storage.Local{Root: root}, ZipMaxSize: 99, ZipMaxFiles: 10}
|
||||
a := &auth.Account{Mask: auth.Read}
|
||||
if err := s.checkZipLimits(a, []string{""}); err == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal("expected zip size limit")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAuditSearchLimit(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
root := t.TempDir()
|
||||
for _, name := range []string{"a.txt", "b.txt", "c.txt"} {
|
||||
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(root, name), []byte(name), 0600); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
s := &Server{Store: storage.Local{Root: root}, Auth: &auth.Manager{Guest: &auth.Account{Mask: auth.Read}}, SearchMaxResults: 2}
|
||||
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/chfs/search?str=.txt", nil)
|
||||
s.search(rr, req)
|
||||
if rr.Code != 200 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("search status=%d", rr.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(rr.Body.Bytes()) == 0 || !contains(rr.Body.String(), `"truncated":true`) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("search did not report truncation: %s", rr.Body.String())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func contains(s, sub string) bool {
|
||||
return len(s) >= len(sub) && (s == sub || func() bool {
|
||||
for i := 0; i+len(sub) <= len(s); i++ {
|
||||
if s[i:i+len(sub)] == sub {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAuditThumbnailPixelLimit(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
root := t.TempDir()
|
||||
img := image.NewRGBA(image.Rect(0, 0, 20, 20))
|
||||
img.Set(0, 0, color.White)
|
||||
f, err := os.Create(filepath.Join(root, "large.png"))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := png.Encode(f, img); err != nil {
|
||||
f.Close()
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
f.Close()
|
||||
s := &Server{Store: storage.Local{Root: root}, Auth: &auth.Manager{Guest: &auth.Account{Mask: auth.Read}}, ImagePreview: true, ThumbnailMaxPixels: 100}
|
||||
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/chfs/thumbnail?file=large.png", nil)
|
||||
s.thumbnail(rr, req)
|
||||
if rr.Code != 415 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("thumbnail pixel-limit status=%d want 415", rr.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAuditThumbnailRejectsDeclaredHugeDimensionsBeforeDecode(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
root := t.TempDir()
|
||||
f, err := os.Create(filepath.Join(root, "bomb.png"))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
img := image.NewRGBA(image.Rect(0, 0, 1, 1))
|
||||
if err := png.Encode(f, img); err != nil {
|
||||
f.Close()
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := f.Close(); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
data, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(root, "bomb.png"))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
// PNG IHDR starts at byte 16. Replace the 1x1 declaration with a
|
||||
// deliberately huge image while keeping the file otherwise tiny/valid.
|
||||
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(data[16:20], 100000)
|
||||
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(data[20:24], 100000)
|
||||
crc := crc32.ChecksumIEEE(data[12:29])
|
||||
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(data[29:33], crc)
|
||||
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(root, "bomb.png"), data, 0600); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
s := &Server{Store: storage.Local{Root: root}, Auth: &auth.Manager{Guest: &auth.Account{Mask: auth.Read}}, ImagePreview: true, ThumbnailMaxPixels: 40_000_000}
|
||||
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/chfs/thumbnail?file=bomb.png", nil)
|
||||
s.thumbnail(rr, req)
|
||||
if rr.Code != 415 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("thumbnail bomb status=%d want 415", rr.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAuditUploadMaxBytesReaderBeforeMultipartSpool(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
for _, tc := range []struct {
|
||||
name string
|
||||
handler func(*Server, http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request)
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{"upload", (*Server).upload},
|
||||
{"upload2", (*Server).upload2},
|
||||
} {
|
||||
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
root := t.TempDir()
|
||||
var body bytes.Buffer
|
||||
mw := multipart.NewWriter(&body)
|
||||
part, err := mw.CreateFormFile("file", "oversize.bin")
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, err := part.Write(make([]byte, 1024)); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := mw.Close(); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/chfs/"+tc.name+"?folder=", &body)
|
||||
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", mw.FormDataContentType())
|
||||
s := &Server{Store: storage.Local{Root: root}, Auth: &auth.Manager{Guest: &auth.Account{Mask: auth.Write}}, UploadMaxTotalSize: 128}
|
||||
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
tc.handler(s, rr, req)
|
||||
if rr.Code != http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("status=%d want 413", rr.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
+195
-12
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ type Server struct {
|
||||
WebDAVRoot string
|
||||
WebDAVFS webdav.FileSystem
|
||||
Allow string
|
||||
TrustedProxies string
|
||||
MultiRoot bool
|
||||
RemoveMode int
|
||||
ImagePreview bool
|
||||
@@ -56,6 +57,14 @@ type Server struct {
|
||||
Log *opslog.Logger
|
||||
UserStore *auth.UserStore
|
||||
UserHome string
|
||||
ThumbnailMaxSize int64
|
||||
ThumbnailMaxPixels int64
|
||||
ZipMaxSize int64
|
||||
ZipMaxFiles int
|
||||
UploadMaxSize int64
|
||||
UploadMaxTotalSize int64
|
||||
UploadMaxFiles int
|
||||
SearchMaxResults int
|
||||
ThumbnailCache *thumbnailCache
|
||||
thumbnailCacheOnce sync.Once
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -138,11 +147,11 @@ func (s *Server) logOp(r *http.Request, action string) {
|
||||
if a != nil {
|
||||
user = a.Username
|
||||
}
|
||||
_ = s.Log.Write(clientIPString(r), user, action)
|
||||
_ = s.Log.Write(s.clientIPString(r), user, action)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func clientIPString(r *http.Request) string {
|
||||
ip := clientIP(r)
|
||||
func (s *Server) clientIPString(r *http.Request) string {
|
||||
ip := s.clientIP(r)
|
||||
if ip == nil {
|
||||
return "-"
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -516,6 +525,10 @@ func (s *Server) exist(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
p := strings.Trim(strings.ReplaceAll(raw, "\\", "/"), "/")
|
||||
if !account(r, s).MaskFor(p).HasRead() {
|
||||
writeJSONError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "has no privilege")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
_, e := s.Store.Stat(p)
|
||||
if e != nil {
|
||||
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
|
||||
@@ -639,7 +652,7 @@ func (s *Server) password(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
writeJSONError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid json")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if a.Password != req.CurrentPassword && a.PasswordHash != auth.PasswordHash(req.CurrentPassword) {
|
||||
if a.Password != req.CurrentPassword && !auth.VerifyPasswordHash(a.PasswordHash, req.CurrentPassword) {
|
||||
writeJSONError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "current password incorrect")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -836,8 +849,15 @@ func (s *Server) updatetext(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
writeCreated(w)
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (s *Server) upload(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
if s.UploadMaxTotalSize > 0 {
|
||||
r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, s.UploadMaxTotalSize)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if e := r.ParseMultipartForm(64 << 20); e != nil {
|
||||
http.Error(w, e.Error(), 400)
|
||||
if _, ok := e.(*http.MaxBytesError); ok {
|
||||
http.Error(w, e.Error(), http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
http.Error(w, e.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
a := account(r, s)
|
||||
@@ -855,8 +875,24 @@ func (s *Server) upload(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
// This prevents duplicate/bad entries from leaving a partial upload.
|
||||
seen := make(map[string]struct{})
|
||||
var saved []string
|
||||
var totalUpload int64
|
||||
var uploadFiles int
|
||||
for _, hs := range r.MultipartForm.File {
|
||||
for _, h := range hs {
|
||||
uploadFiles++
|
||||
if s.UploadMaxFiles > 0 && uploadFiles > s.UploadMaxFiles {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "upload file count limit exceeded", http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if s.UploadMaxSize > 0 && h.Size > s.UploadMaxSize {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "upload file too large", http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
totalUpload += h.Size
|
||||
if s.UploadMaxTotalSize > 0 && totalUpload > s.UploadMaxTotalSize {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "upload total size limit exceeded", http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
name := filepath.ToSlash(h.Filename)
|
||||
if name == "" || strings.HasPrefix(name, "/") || unsafePath(name) {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "invalid filename", 400)
|
||||
@@ -881,7 +917,7 @@ func (s *Server) upload(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
for _, hs := range r.MultipartForm.File {
|
||||
for _, h := range hs {
|
||||
target := path.Join(dir, filepath.ToSlash(h.Filename))
|
||||
if e := savePart(s.Store, target, h); e != nil {
|
||||
if e := savePart(s.Store, target, h, s.UploadMaxSize); e != nil {
|
||||
for _, previous := range saved {
|
||||
_ = s.Store.Remove(previous)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -908,7 +944,7 @@ func createExclusive(st storage.Storage, target string) (*os.File, error) {
|
||||
return st.Create(target)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func savePart(st storage.Storage, target string, h *multipart.FileHeader) error {
|
||||
func savePart(st storage.Storage, target string, h *multipart.FileHeader, maxSize int64) error {
|
||||
in, e := h.Open()
|
||||
if e != nil {
|
||||
return e
|
||||
@@ -919,8 +955,18 @@ func savePart(st storage.Storage, target string, h *multipart.FileHeader) error
|
||||
return e
|
||||
}
|
||||
copyErr := func() error {
|
||||
_, err := io.Copy(f, in)
|
||||
var src io.Reader = in
|
||||
if maxSize > 0 {
|
||||
src = io.LimitReader(in, maxSize+1)
|
||||
}
|
||||
n, err := io.Copy(f, src)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if maxSize > 0 && n > maxSize {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("upload file too large")
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}()
|
||||
closeErr := f.Close()
|
||||
if copyErr != nil {
|
||||
@@ -935,6 +981,9 @@ func savePart(st storage.Storage, target string, h *multipart.FileHeader) error
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Server) upload2(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
if s.UploadMaxTotalSize > 0 {
|
||||
r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, s.UploadMaxTotalSize)
|
||||
}
|
||||
a := account(r, s)
|
||||
rawDir := r.URL.Query().Get("folder")
|
||||
if unsafePath(rawDir) {
|
||||
@@ -947,14 +996,34 @@ func (s *Server) upload2(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := r.ParseMultipartForm(128 << 20); err != nil {
|
||||
http.Error(w, err.Error(), 400)
|
||||
if _, ok := err.(*http.MaxBytesError); ok {
|
||||
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Preflight the complete multipart batch before creating anything.
|
||||
// This prevents duplicate/bad entries from leaving a partial upload.
|
||||
seen := make(map[string]struct{})
|
||||
var totalUpload int64
|
||||
var uploadFiles int
|
||||
for _, hs := range r.MultipartForm.File {
|
||||
for _, h := range hs {
|
||||
uploadFiles++
|
||||
if s.UploadMaxFiles > 0 && uploadFiles > s.UploadMaxFiles {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "upload file count limit exceeded", http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if s.UploadMaxSize > 0 && h.Size > s.UploadMaxSize {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "upload file too large", http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
totalUpload += h.Size
|
||||
if s.UploadMaxTotalSize > 0 && totalUpload > s.UploadMaxTotalSize {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "upload total size limit exceeded", http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
name := filepath.ToSlash(h.Filename)
|
||||
name = strings.TrimPrefix(name, "/")
|
||||
if name == "" || unsafePath(name) {
|
||||
@@ -981,7 +1050,7 @@ func (s *Server) upload2(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
for _, h := range hs {
|
||||
name := strings.TrimPrefix(filepath.ToSlash(h.Filename), "/")
|
||||
target := path.Join(dir, name)
|
||||
if err := savePart(s.Store, target, h); err != nil {
|
||||
if err := savePart(s.Store, target, h, s.UploadMaxSize); err != nil {
|
||||
for _, previous := range saved {
|
||||
_ = s.Store.Remove(previous)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1015,6 +1084,11 @@ func (s *Server) search(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
needle := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(r.URL.Query().Get("str")))
|
||||
out := make([]searchFileInfo, 0)
|
||||
maxResults := s.SearchMaxResults
|
||||
if maxResults < 0 {
|
||||
maxResults = 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
truncated := false
|
||||
var walk func(string) error
|
||||
walk = func(dir string) error {
|
||||
items, err := s.Store.List(dir)
|
||||
@@ -1022,6 +1096,10 @@ func (s *Server) search(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, fi := range items {
|
||||
if maxResults > 0 && len(out) >= maxResults {
|
||||
truncated = true
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
p := path.Join(dir, fi.Name())
|
||||
if !a.MaskFor(p).HasRead() {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
@@ -1041,7 +1119,7 @@ func (s *Server) search(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
http.Error(w, err.Error(), 500)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
writeJSON(w, map[string]any{"virtualRoot": 0, "currentMask": permString(rootMask), "files": out})
|
||||
writeJSON(w, map[string]any{"virtualRoot": 0, "currentMask": permString(rootMask), "files": out, "truncated": truncated})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func sharedPath(parts ...string) string {
|
||||
@@ -1183,6 +1261,10 @@ func (s *Server) thumbnail(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
http.NotFound(w, r)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if s.ThumbnailMaxSize > 0 && fi.Size() > s.ThumbnailMaxSize {
|
||||
writeJSONError(w, http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, "thumbnail file too large")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
key := thumbnailCacheKey{Path: file, Size: fi.Size(), ModTime: fi.ModTime().UnixNano()}
|
||||
s.thumbnailCacheOnce.Do(func() {
|
||||
if s.ThumbnailCache == nil {
|
||||
@@ -1190,6 +1272,16 @@ func (s *Server) thumbnail(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
data, err := s.ThumbnailCache.Do(key, func() ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
config, _, err := image.DecodeConfig(f)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if s.ThumbnailMaxPixels > 0 && int64(config.Width)*int64(config.Height) > s.ThumbnailMaxPixels {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("thumbnail dimensions too large")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, err := f.Seek(0, io.SeekStart); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
src, _, err := image.Decode(f)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
@@ -1287,6 +1379,62 @@ func (s *Server) qrcode(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
_, _ = w.Write(data)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Server) zipStats(a *auth.Account, roots []string) (int64, int, error) {
|
||||
var total int64
|
||||
files := 0
|
||||
seen := map[string]bool{}
|
||||
var walk func(string) error
|
||||
walk = func(p string) error {
|
||||
if seen[p] {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
seen[p] = true
|
||||
fi, err := s.Store.Stat(p)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !a.MaskFor(p).HasRead() {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !fi.IsDir() {
|
||||
files++
|
||||
total += fi.Size()
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
items, err := s.Store.List(p)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, it := range items {
|
||||
child := path.Join(p, it.Name())
|
||||
if err := walk(child); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, root := range roots {
|
||||
if err := walk(root); err != nil {
|
||||
return 0, 0, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return total, files, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Server) checkZipLimits(a *auth.Account, roots []string) error {
|
||||
total, files, err := s.zipStats(a, roots)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if s.ZipMaxFiles > 0 && files > s.ZipMaxFiles {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("zip file count limit exceeded")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if s.ZipMaxSize > 0 && total > s.ZipMaxSize {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("zip size limit exceeded")
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Server) downloadSelectedZip(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
a := account(r, s)
|
||||
paths := r.URL.Query()["path"]
|
||||
@@ -1312,6 +1460,10 @@ func (s *Server) downloadSelectedZip(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := s.checkZipLimits(a, paths); err != nil {
|
||||
writeJSONError(w, http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, err.Error())
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/zip")
|
||||
w.Header().Set("Content-Disposition", `attachment; filename="download.zip"`)
|
||||
zw := zip.NewWriter(w)
|
||||
@@ -1403,6 +1555,10 @@ func (s *Server) downloadDir(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := s.checkZipLimits(a, []string{p}); err != nil {
|
||||
writeJSONError(w, http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, err.Error())
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
name := fi.Name()
|
||||
if name == "." || name == "" {
|
||||
name = "download"
|
||||
@@ -2064,7 +2220,7 @@ func (f *webdavAuthFS) checkTree(ctx context.Context, name string, p auth.PermMa
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Server) ipFilter(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
||||
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
if s.Allow != "" && !allowedIP(s.Allow, clientIP(r)) {
|
||||
if s.Allow != "" && !allowedIP(s.Allow, s.clientIP(r)) {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "forbidden", http.StatusForbidden)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -2072,6 +2228,33 @@ func (s *Server) ipFilter(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Server) clientIP(r *http.Request) net.IP {
|
||||
host, _, _ := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
|
||||
remote := net.ParseIP(host)
|
||||
if remote == nil {
|
||||
remote = net.ParseIP(r.RemoteAddr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if remote == nil || s.TrustedProxies == "" || !allowedIP(s.TrustedProxies, remote) {
|
||||
return remote
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Only a trusted proxy may supply the forwarding chain. Walk right-to-left
|
||||
// and return the first address that is not itself a trusted proxy.
|
||||
parts := strings.Split(r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"), ",")
|
||||
for i := len(parts) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
|
||||
ip := net.ParseIP(strings.TrimSpace(parts[i]))
|
||||
if ip == nil {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !allowedIP(s.TrustedProxies, ip) {
|
||||
return ip
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if v := net.ParseIP(strings.TrimSpace(r.Header.Get("X-Real-IP"))); v != nil && !allowedIP(s.TrustedProxies, v) {
|
||||
return v
|
||||
}
|
||||
return remote
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func clientIP(r *http.Request) net.IP {
|
||||
host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
|
||||
if err == nil {
|
||||
|
||||
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
+20
-2
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
jwt "github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v4"
|
||||
"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
type PermMask uint8
|
||||
@@ -86,17 +87,34 @@ func ParseRules(values []string) (*Manager, error) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (m *Manager) Authenticate(user, pwd string) *Account {
|
||||
if a, ok := m.Accounts[user]; ok && (a.Enabled || a.PasswordHash == "") && (a.Password == pwd || a.PasswordHash == PasswordHash(pwd)) {
|
||||
if a, ok := m.Accounts[user]; ok && (a.Enabled || a.PasswordHash == "") {
|
||||
if a.Password == pwd || VerifyPasswordHash(a.PasswordHash, pwd) {
|
||||
return a
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if user == "" && pwd == "" {
|
||||
return m.Guest
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
func PasswordHash(password string) string {
|
||||
h, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(password), bcrypt.DefaultCost)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return ""
|
||||
}
|
||||
return string(h)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func VerifyPasswordHash(stored, password string) bool {
|
||||
if stored == "" {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
if strings.HasPrefix(stored, "$2a$") || strings.HasPrefix(stored, "$2b$") || strings.HasPrefix(stored, "$2y$") {
|
||||
return bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword([]byte(stored), []byte(password)) == nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Legacy unsalted SHA-256 hashes remain readable for one migration cycle.
|
||||
h := sha256.Sum256([]byte(password))
|
||||
return hex.EncodeToString(h[:])
|
||||
return hex.EncodeToString(h[:]) == stored
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (a *Account) MaskFor(path string) PermMask {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
|
||||
package auth
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"crypto/sha256"
|
||||
"encoding/hex"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func TestPasswordHashUsesBcryptAndVerifies(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
hash := PasswordHash("correct horse battery staple")
|
||||
if len(hash) < 4 || (hash[0:4] != "$2a$" && hash[0:4] != "$2b$") {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("hash=%q is not bcrypt", hash)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !VerifyPasswordHash(hash, "correct horse battery staple") {
|
||||
t.Fatal("bcrypt password did not verify")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if VerifyPasswordHash(hash, "wrong") {
|
||||
t.Fatal("wrong password verified")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestLegacySHA256PasswordStillVerifies(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte("legacy-pass"))
|
||||
hash := hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
|
||||
if !VerifyPasswordHash(hash, "legacy-pass") {
|
||||
t.Fatal("legacy hash did not verify")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if VerifyPasswordHash(hash, "wrong") {
|
||||
t.Fatal("wrong legacy password verified")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ type Config struct {
|
||||
Path []string
|
||||
Port int
|
||||
Allow string
|
||||
TrustedProxies string
|
||||
Rules []string
|
||||
Log string
|
||||
FileRemove int
|
||||
@@ -34,13 +35,21 @@ type Config struct {
|
||||
HTMLNotice string
|
||||
UserFile string
|
||||
UserHome string
|
||||
ThumbnailMaxSize int64
|
||||
ThumbnailMaxPixels int64
|
||||
ZipMaxSize int64
|
||||
ZipMaxFiles int
|
||||
UploadMaxSize int64
|
||||
UploadMaxTotalSize int64
|
||||
UploadMaxFiles int
|
||||
SearchMaxResults int
|
||||
SSLCert string
|
||||
SSLKey string
|
||||
Accounts []AccountConfig
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func Default() Config {
|
||||
return Config{Path: []string{"."}, Port: 80, FileRemove: 1, ImagePreview: true, FolderDownload: "enable", SessionTimeout: 30, UserHome: "users"}
|
||||
return Config{Path: []string{"."}, Port: 80, FileRemove: 1, ImagePreview: true, FolderDownload: "enable", SessionTimeout: 30, UserHome: "users", ThumbnailMaxSize: 32 << 20, ThumbnailMaxPixels: 40_000_000, ZipMaxSize: 2 << 30, ZipMaxFiles: 5000, UploadMaxSize: 2 << 30, UploadMaxTotalSize: 4 << 30, UploadMaxFiles: 100, SearchMaxResults: 500}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func Load(path string) (Config, error) {
|
||||
@@ -101,6 +110,8 @@ func Load(path string) (Config, error) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
case "allow":
|
||||
c.Allow = val
|
||||
case "trusted-proxies":
|
||||
c.TrustedProxies = val
|
||||
case "rule":
|
||||
if val != "" {
|
||||
c.Rules = append(c.Rules, val)
|
||||
@@ -133,6 +144,38 @@ func Load(path string) (Config, error) {
|
||||
c.UserFile = val
|
||||
case "user.home":
|
||||
c.UserHome = strings.Trim(val, "/")
|
||||
case "thumbnail.max-size":
|
||||
if n, e := strconv.ParseInt(val, 10, 64); e == nil && n >= 0 {
|
||||
c.ThumbnailMaxSize = n
|
||||
}
|
||||
case "thumbnail.max-pixels":
|
||||
if n, e := strconv.ParseInt(val, 10, 64); e == nil && n >= 0 {
|
||||
c.ThumbnailMaxPixels = n
|
||||
}
|
||||
case "zip.max-size":
|
||||
if n, e := strconv.ParseInt(val, 10, 64); e == nil && n >= 0 {
|
||||
c.ZipMaxSize = n
|
||||
}
|
||||
case "zip.max-files":
|
||||
if n, e := strconv.Atoi(val); e == nil && n >= 0 {
|
||||
c.ZipMaxFiles = n
|
||||
}
|
||||
case "upload.max-size":
|
||||
if n, e := strconv.ParseInt(val, 10, 64); e == nil && n >= 0 {
|
||||
c.UploadMaxSize = n
|
||||
}
|
||||
case "upload.max-total-size":
|
||||
if n, e := strconv.ParseInt(val, 10, 64); e == nil && n >= 0 {
|
||||
c.UploadMaxTotalSize = n
|
||||
}
|
||||
case "upload.max-files":
|
||||
if n, e := strconv.Atoi(val); e == nil && n >= 0 {
|
||||
c.UploadMaxFiles = n
|
||||
}
|
||||
case "search.max-results":
|
||||
if n, e := strconv.Atoi(val); e == nil && n >= 0 {
|
||||
c.SearchMaxResults = n
|
||||
}
|
||||
case "ssl.cert":
|
||||
c.SSLCert = val
|
||||
case "ssl.key":
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -150,7 +150,49 @@ func (s Local) Trash(path string) error {
|
||||
if e != nil {
|
||||
return e
|
||||
}
|
||||
return wastebasket.Trash(p)
|
||||
if err := wastebasket.Trash(p); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
_ = cleanupSystemTrash(30 * 24 * time.Hour)
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func cleanupSystemTrash(maxAge time.Duration) error {
|
||||
base := os.Getenv("XDG_DATA_HOME")
|
||||
if base == "" {
|
||||
home, err := os.UserHomeDir()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
base = filepath.Join(home, ".local", "share")
|
||||
}
|
||||
root := filepath.Join(base, "Trash")
|
||||
filesDir := filepath.Join(root, "files")
|
||||
infoDir := filepath.Join(root, "info")
|
||||
now := time.Now()
|
||||
entries, err := os.ReadDir(infoDir)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
if os.IsNotExist(err) {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, entry := range entries {
|
||||
if entry.IsDir() || filepath.Ext(entry.Name()) != ".trashinfo" {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
info, err := entry.Info()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
if now.Sub(info.ModTime()) <= maxAge {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
name := strings.TrimSuffix(entry.Name(), ".trashinfo")
|
||||
_ = os.Remove(filepath.Join(infoDir, entry.Name()))
|
||||
_ = os.RemoveAll(filepath.Join(filesDir, name))
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s Local) MoveToTrash(path, trashRoot string) error {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
package storage
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"os"
|
||||
"path/filepath"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func TestCleanupSystemTrashRemovesOldEntries(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
data := t.TempDir()
|
||||
t.Setenv("XDG_DATA_HOME", data)
|
||||
files := filepath.Join(data, "Trash", "files")
|
||||
info := filepath.Join(data, "Trash", "info")
|
||||
if err := os.MkdirAll(files, 0755); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := os.MkdirAll(info, 0755); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
oldInfo := filepath.Join(info, "old.txt.trashinfo")
|
||||
oldFile := filepath.Join(files, "old.txt")
|
||||
if err := os.WriteFile(oldInfo, []byte("[Trash Info]\n"), 0600); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := os.WriteFile(oldFile, []byte("old"), 0600); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
old := time.Now().Add(-31 * 24 * time.Hour)
|
||||
if err := os.Chtimes(oldInfo, old, old); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := cleanupSystemTrash(30 * 24 * time.Hour); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, err := os.Stat(oldInfo); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("old info remains: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, err := os.Stat(oldFile); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("old file remains: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user