Add signature-derived-key coverage, PID attach, MMKV; fix stale question count
New: references/signature-derived-keys.md (apps that use their own signing certificate as crypto key material: detection greps, why offline extraction is unreliable -- the runtime value is a certificate DER from inside the PKCS#7 chain, not the .RSA container -- plus the hardcode-then-verify procedure); scripts/sig_probe.py (offline candidates via --apk, authoritative read via --live, both exercised); pitfalls.md P27 (rebuilt APK installs and renders but every signed request returns empty/-1 signing params). Updated: dynamic-frida.md (attach by PID when enumerate_processes omits the target; verify runtime/Java-bridge availability before blaming the script); runtime-data.md (MMKV format, parse/write snippet, crc32 and in-memory-overwrite traps); server-api.md (route the signature-derived-key case to the new reference); SKILL.md and README.md (new classification question, corrected question count, index entries).
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@@ -18,6 +18,9 @@ directly.
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machine", and confusing the two is the most expensive drift in this domain.
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- Choosing the **safest patch layer** for a given change, and avoiding the layers that
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break the app.
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- Catching the repack failure that looks like success: an app that installs, launches and
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renders perfectly while **every signed request is rejected**, because the client derives its
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request-signing key from its own signing certificate.
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- Separating **your own mistakes from the app's or the server's problems** — a
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feature-scoped failure (login, registration, payment) is often a TLS/certificate issue on
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one code path, not a consequence of the patch you just built. Device state, a dead device
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@@ -50,6 +53,9 @@ references/ loaded on demand, one topic each
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long-task-discipline.md live record, conclusion grading, drift control, timeout and
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wait calibration, deliverable-form drift, handover
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ad-removal.md ad taxonomy, wrapper mapping, callback trap, global gates, verification
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signature-derived-keys.md when the app's own signing certificate is used as key material:
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detection greps, why offline extraction is unreliable, the
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hardcode-then-verify procedure
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membership-and-limits.md server vs client authority; what is and is not patchable
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server-api.md probe an app's API; prove who owns the gate
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tls-and-cert.md feature-scoped network failures: expired certs, dual trust chains
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@@ -94,6 +100,8 @@ scripts/ parameterized, path-agnostic
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(base64/hex x rotation x deflate); re-encode the edited payload
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snap.py bounded burst screenshots + control-tree capture with a stall
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detector, and a verdict on whether the tree is usable at all
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sig_probe.py find the exact signatures[0].toCharsString() value — offline
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candidates from an APK, or the authoritative read from a device
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```
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## Install
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