Measure the toolkit on a real Flutter target and correct what it claimed

Ran the scripts against a real Flutter AOT / multi-dex / 36-.so APK (Dart 3.6.0,
com.tingfeng.tool) and recorded what each one actually did. Two of them were wrong
in the direction that reads as a target finding, one Coverage claim overstated what
ships, and four documentation statements were false.

Fixed:

  dart_pprefs.py decoded only the general-purpose register file, so `ldr dN,[x27,#imm]`
  (0xFD400000) was never matched and every double constant read from the object pool
  was dropped -- 302 pool offsets and 1802 sites on this sample, one of them with 150
  references that would have been reported as zero. The documented advice is to count
  references before editing a shared constant, so a one-sided quiet gap here produces
  exactly the wrong decision. Now covers both register files; a purpose-written
  arbiter agrees with it to 0/0 across .text, against 0/302 before.

Documented but deliberately not fixed, because a fix would not have been run:

  elf_plt.py misses the last PLT stub slot (`off < fsz - 16`), which on libloader.so
  turned a real, called import (dl_iterate_phdr) into "not a resolved stub".
  find_refs.py advertises dex-directory input but iter_files() accepts only .smali,
  so it answers "no references" with exit 0 for input it never read.
  so_constpatch.py's rebuild drops the zip `extra` field and destroys 4 KB alignment.
  Each has its root cause and fix sketch recorded.

Documentation corrections in dart-aot.md:

  blutter's asm/ does contain full instruction listings with pool annotations -- the
  file said to ignore it, and it is the richest artifact in the chain.
  The first build costs ~78 s, not "tens of minutes"; MSVC 19.34 suffices, not VS 2022.
  The file-PP offset mapping is not recoverable from the binary (4241 shared strings,
  4237 distinct deltas), so a snapshot-decoding front end is a dependency, now stated.
  Documented aotopsy as the no-toolchain route, and the trap that its version label is
  a structural profile name (it says 3.6.2 for a 3.6.0 snapshot).

Coverage now separates what was measured from what is inferred, names blutter/aotopsy
as a prerequisite instead of implying the pool decodes itself, lists the scripts this
pass did not run, and says plainly that the packer / VMP / integrity-check scenarios
were not exercised at all.

Added hand-off points for JNI, dex-observed hardening, and the existing native boundary
documents, plus docs/verification-jiongnew/ -- the evidence record, including the four
gate outputs verbatim. No second skill: the gap is one front-end dependency, not a
subject area, and relocating Flutter docs would not have supplied it.
This commit is contained in:
inliver233
2026-09-20 04:59:38 +08:00
parent 46812ec9a4
commit e193f425ba
10 changed files with 1565 additions and 32 deletions
+21 -1
View File
@@ -117,7 +117,10 @@ references/ loaded on demand, one topic each
find logic when there are no symbols (string encoding traps)
dart-aot.md Dart AOT in depth: version pinning and building a matching decompiler,
the object pool and reference indexes, register/boolean conventions,
the three signatures that identify business logic, locating, patching
the three signatures that identify business logic, locating, patching.
Begins with the snapshot-decoding front end it depends on (aotopsy or
blutter) because the pool listing is an input, not something this skill
produces itself
native-and-so.md .so hosts, DT_NEEDED vs JNI_OnLoad, relocation limits,
relocation-free bootstrapping, replacing Java methods natively,
and which ABI/library is *actually loaded and executing*
@@ -318,6 +321,17 @@ React Native/Hermes bytecode internals, and defeating a server-side authority ar
covered, and the skill is written to say so and stop rather than apply the nearest
documented procedure to a target it was not written for.
Two qualifications that the Coverage section states in full and that belong here too:
- **Flutter/Dart AOT analysis has a dependency.** The workflow begins at a pool listing
(`pp.txt`-class output). Producing that needs a snapshot-decoding decompiler — aotopsy (a static
binary, no toolchain) or blutter (built from source, ~80 s) — and this repository does not contain
one. It is named as a prerequisite rather than left implicit.
- **Not every claim in this repository has a run behind it.** `docs/verification-jiongnew/` records
what was actually measured, on which target, and with which independent cross-check; anything not
covered there is documented from experience and should be read as *inferred*, per this skill's own
claim ladder.
## Repository maintenance
Three tools live at the root and are not part of the installed skill:
@@ -329,3 +343,9 @@ check_refs.py every cross-reference that names a section of another
document reaches a real heading in that document
build_scripts.py audit for machine-specific leftovers (absolute paths, credentials)
```
`docs/verification-jiongnew/` is not part of the installed skill either. It is the evidence record
for one measurement pass against a real target: what each script actually did, which independent
method confirmed it, which defects were found, and which scenarios the target could not exercise.
It exists so the **Coverage** claims in `SKILL.md` can be checked against runs instead of trusted,
and so the gaps are written down where the next person will find them.
+179
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
# Findings about the skill, from measuring it
Everything here is a result about **the skill**, not about the target. Each item names the evidence
that produced it and its strength.
---
## F1 — The Coverage claim was partly aspirational, and the pass identified exactly which part
`SKILL.md`'s Coverage section lists as *covered by verified mechanisms*:
> Flutter / Dart AOT: pinning the engine version, decoding the object pool, locating and patching
> business logic inside `libapp.so` (`dart-aot.md`).
Measured against a real Dart 3.6.0 `libapp.so`, that sentence splits into three claims of very
different standing:
| Sub-claim | Standing after this pass |
|---|---|
| pinning the engine version | **verified** — the banner route (§1) is correct and 3.6.0 is confirmed three ways |
| decoding the object pool | **false as written** — the kit cannot do it; there is no resolver |
| locating business logic inside `libapp.so` | **true, but conditional** — it works, on top of an external snapshot dumper that the skill neither ships nor installs |
The worked example in `TOOL-VERDICTS.md` shows both halves at once: the chain
`"showRewardAdProvider"` → `pp+0x23548` → ref site `0x7a9464` → `ShowRewardAdFamily.call_2f28ac
@ 0x7a93ec` succeeded, and step 1 was performed by blutter, not by the skill.
The reason is structural, not a shortage of effort: `dart_pool_strings.py` reports **file offsets**
while `pp.txt` and `dart_pprefs.py` work in **pool offsets**. Over the 4,241 strings present in both
spaces there are **4,237 distinct deltas** (min −1,361,429, max +277,654). The mapping is a property
of the reconstructed pool and is not a constant, so no amount of care inside the script recovers it.
Capabilities the kit does not have, stated plainly: snapshot/object-pool deserialisation; symbol and
name recovery; a real call graph (the `--build-index` index holds raw `B`/`BL` targets only); a
decompiler; a function boundary/size table.
---
## F2 — Two scripts fail in the way that reads as a target finding (the P26 class)
The handover singled out `pitfalls.md` P26: *"a self-built analysis script fails in a way that reads
as a target finding."* This pass produced two live instances of exactly that, which is why the P26
warning earns its place.
**`elf_plt.py` returned a confident false negative.** It reports 3,437 stubs where `.rela.plt` holds
3,438, and answers `0x587060 -> not a resolved stub` for an entry that is a legitimate stub for
`dl_iterate_phdr`, with a real caller at `0x576a2c`. Nothing in the output indicates a problem. For
the script's stated purpose — deciding whether a hardening symbol exists in a library — the wrong
answer is indistinguishable from the right one.
**`find_refs.py` returns a clean empty result for input it cannot read.** Its docstring advertises
"a smali tree or a directory of dex files"; `iter_files()` accepts only `.smali`. Given the dex
directory it printed `[total refs] 0`, exited **0**, and emitted no warning. This is worse than a
crash: it is the exact input to "nothing references this, safe to patch", produced by the very tool
recommended for judging blast radius before patching.
Both, plus `dart_pprefs.py`'s silently dropped double constants, share one property: **the failure is
one-sided and quiet.** None of the three reports reduced confidence in its own output.
---
## F3 — Defects found, ranked by consequence
| # | Script | Defect | Consequence | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | `find_refs.py` | `iter_files()` matches only `.smali`; dex dirs yield 0 results, no error, exit 0 | silent false "no references" on the tool whose job is blast-radius | **cause identified, not fixed** |
| 2 | `elf_plt.py` | loop bound `off < fsz - 16` misses the final stub slot | false negative for one real symbol per library, conditionally | **fixed on a copy, re-verified** |
| 3 | `dart_pprefs.py` | only the GP register file is decoded; `ldr dD,[x27,#imm]` (`0xFD400000`) and all double constants lost | under-reports pool references (302 displacements / 1,802 sites here), which breaks the "count refs to judge importance" advice in `dart-aot.md` §9/§10 — one site went `[0 refs]` → `[79 refs]` | **fixed on a copy; agrees with capstone 0/0** |
| 4 | `so_constpatch.py` | rebuild drops the zip `extra` field, destroying 4 KB alignment | for `extractNativeLibs=false` APKs the output will not load; masked here because this target is DEFLATED + `extractNativeLibs=true` | **cause identified, proven by fixture; not fixed** |
| 5 | `so_constpatch.py` | `--diff --name-regions` compares file offset with vaddr | feature completely inert on libraries where `p_vaddr != p_offset` (2 of 36 here), with no warning | cause identified |
| 6 | `so_constpatch.py` | `external_attr` rewritten on 1982/1982 entries | metadata-based integrity comparison detects the rebuild | cause identified |
| 7 | `dexutil.py` | switch payloads decoded as instructions; `decode()` does not resolve operands | caused a spurious "desync likely" verdict on `saveToLocal` | cause identified |
| 8 | `so_constpatch.py` | "N byte(s) changed" is the overwrite window, not bytes changed | overstates change count (13 reported vs 7 actual) | cause identified |
| 9 | `lib_map.py` | `?` means both "read failed" and "not probed" | a real read failure is invisible | cause identified |
| 10 | `dart_pool_strings.py` | TSV escaping is lossy for LF/CR/TAB | 7 of 18,363 rows ambiguous; 19 entries genuinely contain those bytes | cause identified |
| 11 | `elf_plt.py` | `size = 16 if ... else 16` | dead code | cause identified |
| 12 | `dex_strings.py` | `--per-file` prints only files with hits | can be misread as "only this dex was scanned" | cause identified |
Items 1-3 are the ones that changed a conclusion during this pass rather than merely being noticed.
---
## F4 — Documentation contradictions
Independently found while mapping the skill and while using it. The executable cross-reference
checkers (`check_refs.py`, `check_repo.py`) pass, so these are invisible to the repo's own gates.
| # | Location | Problem |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | `dart-aot.md` §2 | Claims blutter's `asm/` has *no instructions* — "Do not plan around it." **Wrong.** `asm/windmill_ad_plugin/src/ads/reward/reward.dart` is 1,327 lines carrying class layouts, signatures, a full instruction listing, pool annotations and resolved call targets. It is the richest artifact in the chain and the doc says to ignore it. |
| 2 | `dart-aot.md` §2 | Budgets "tens of minutes" for the first blutter build; measured **≈78 s** (~30× pessimistic). Also demands a very recent C++ compiler; **MSVC 19.34 (Nov 2022) suffices**. |
| 3 | `dart-aot.md` §7 | Presents two-byte hit chaining as an acceptance test. On this sample, 9,840 two-byte CJK candidates yield 2,081 chained runs, all garbage. |
| 4 | `signature-derived-keys.md:61` | Documents `python scripts/sig_probe.py --live --pkg <pkg>` — the script has no `--pkg`; it takes `--live PKG`. Line 54 and `pitfalls.md` P27 give the correct form. |
| 5 | `dart-aot.md:204` | `dart_disasm.py ... --index callers.json --build-index` omits the required argument value; argparse errors out. |
| 6 | `byte-level-patching.md:186` | Says different-length strings "need `dex_strpatch`-class tooling", while `dex_strpatch.py` requires `len(new) == len(old)` — it is precisely the tool that cannot do this. Contradicts `dex-patching.md:123`. |
| 7 | Coverage vs `toolchain.md` | Coverage lists Unity/IL2CPP logic recovery as **not covered**, but `toolchain.md` Tier 4 names concrete tooling without pointing back at that disclaimer, so a reader of `toolchain.md` alone would take IL2CPP for a supported route. |
| 8 | Script count | `SKILL.md`/`README.md` index 35 rows, which is 34 scripts plus the `scripts/dexpatch/` directory row. |
| 9 | `dart_pool_strings.py` docstring | Says two-byte auto-detection is unreliable (confirmed here); `dart-aot.md` §7 treats UTF-16LE hits as a reliable rule. |
| 10 | `verification.md` rung 7 | Re-downloading a distributed file to compare hashes has no landing place in `SKILL.md`'s six "done" criteria, so the two sections disagree on strength. |
Item 1 is the most damaging because it steers a reader away from the best available evidence.
---
## F5 — "verified mechanisms" left no reproducible trace in the repo
The Coverage preamble frames its list as *verified mechanisms*, and `references/long-task-discipline.md`
defines **Observed** as *"reproduced it, with the exact command and output"*. The repository contains
no sample, no fixture, no captured log or screenshot, no patch record, no test and no CI, and its
`README.md` states it holds no target-specific data.
So the strongest support the repository itself can exhibit for those claims is *Inferred*. This is
**not** an accusation that the claims are false — several were confirmed here on the first attempt,
and `dart-aot.md` §1 proved exactly right. It is a statement about evidentiary standing: the repo
asks its readers to label their own claims and does not leave itself a way to meet its own bar.
The concrete measurement figures that *are* reproducible are the 14 sample-scoped numbers listed in
the skill map (e.g. dex 4.32 MB → 7.73 MB; `.RSA` 1199 B vs 777 B at runtime; a log tag going `8 → 0`).
---
## F6 — Boundary evidence: where the skill's method held, and where it ran out
This is the observation the pass was built to produce, so it is stated as a sequence rather than a
verdict.
**Held, unchanged:** manifest and packer triage; multi-dex string/class recon at 27.6 MB across four
dex files (`dex_strings.py`, `dexutil.py`); native ELF import mapping at scale (36,974 relocations);
live-process library mapping; equal-length `.so` constant patching; the launch-timeline methodology
(`coldstart.py`); the P26 discipline itself — checking whether a tool was ever able to answer before
reading its silence as a finding, which is what turned the blutter crash from a false "unusable" into
a corrected "works after a relink".
**Ran out:** from the Dart snapshot inward. Everything past `pp.txt` is fine; getting *to* `pp.txt`
from the binary requires a container resolver the kit does not have. That is one dependency, not a
subject area.
**Not exercised at all:** packers, code virtualization, custom linkers, integrity-check redirection,
tamper-triggered suicide. This target has none of those, and the unmodified app's own startup failure
also removes the repack loop those scenarios need.
---
## F7 — A trap in this specific environment that will produce false confirmations
`androguard` 4.x (the version installed here) has **four independent reference-analysis failures on
this sample**: `get_xref_from()` returns 0 for everything, including `AdLoader.loadAd()V` which has
20+ callers by other means; `get_ref()` raises; a full `get_operands()` sweep returns 0 strings.
Anyone who reaches for androguard to double-check a "zero references" conclusion will get **zero, and
therefore agreement**. The zero-reference result in `TARGET-FACTS.md` does not come from androguard;
it comes from `dexutil.py` plus raw-byte re-checks of the bodies that would not decode cleanly. This
is worth a line in the environment documentation because it is a tool that lies in the direction of
the hypothesis being tested.
---
## F8 — Reconciling the two failures: a genuine but unproven loader signal
Recorded as a boundary between what was established and what was guessed, because collapsing them
would be its own error.
The launch does show non-standard startup plumbing (observed):
- `E LoaderLog: 10026 / 101004` on the device, `10020 / 101003` on the emulator — an SDK-side
loader logging numeric status codes
- `E Instrumentation: Uninitialized ActivityThread, likely app-created Instrumentation, disabling
AppComponentFactory` — the process is not taking the ordinary `ActivityThread` path
- `E m.tingfeng.too: Unknown bits set in runtime_flags: 0x40000000`
And yet the dex-side packer verdict is clean: no hardening library in the native set, an ordinary
`application android:name` (`app.video.guoguo.GApplication`), no known packer markers. Those two
observations sit in tension.
**Not resolved.** The `LoaderLog` emitter was not attributed to a specific class — the string exists
in `classes2.dex` and `classes3.dex` but the classes that declare it are third-party, and this pass
did not trace the call chain. Whether this plumbing is a benign logging SDK, part of the Flutter
plugin bootstrap, or a light-weight loader contributing to the abort is **unverified**. Stating it
as established would be exactly the kind of overreach this report is trying to document.
+29
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
# jiongnew.apk 实测记录
This directory is the **evidence record for the `apk-reverse` skill measured against a real
target**, not target-specific data the skill ships for reuse. It exists so the Coverage
statement in `SKILL.md` can be checked against the runs behind it, and so a later reader can
tell which claims were *observed*, which were *inferred*, and which are still *unverified*.
Target: `jiongnew.apk` — Flutter AOT, 4 dex, 36 native libraries, no packer.
sha256 `0C2B063E6D1A3BD05777611ABF2F1A64056E290E4F6728C1B12DC202747DC645`, 74,394,920 B, 1,982 entries.
The APK itself is **not** in this repository (`.gitignore` excludes `*.apk`).
## Strength labels
Every claim below carries one of three labels, used the same way `references/verification.md`
uses them:
- **observed** — reproduced here, with the exact command and its output.
- **inferred** — follows from observed facts, but the step itself was not executed.
- **unverified** — assumed or reported by a tool and not independently confirmed.
## Index
| File | Covers |
|---|---|
| `TOOL-VERDICTS.md` | One verdict per tested script, with the independent cross-check behind it |
| `TARGET-FACTS.md` | What the target is: manifest, dex, natives, assets, versions, and what it does at launch |
| `FINDINGS.md` | Findings about the skill itself: defects, contradictions, boundary evidence |
| `REPO-DECISIONS.md` | What changed in the repo as a result, and what deliberately did not |
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
# Repository decisions, and the evidence behind them
The pass was framed as a choice between two ways to split the skill. The measurement rejected the
framing, and this file records why, then states exactly what changed in the repository.
---
## The decision: **no second skill.** Fix skill A instead.
This is the "暂不建" outcome the brief explicitly permits, and it is supported by the evidence rather
than by preference.
### Why the framing did not survive contact with the target
The two candidate splits were:
- **by entry point** — everything reached from an APK (including Flutter/IL2CPP) stays in A; only
standalone ELF goes to B. Cost: A keeps growing.
- **by logic location** — A keeps only logic genuinely in dex; Flutter, IL2CPP, hardened dex, native
and standalone ELF all move out. Cost: four references (~962 lines) relocate.
`jiongnew` is exactly the case that was supposed to discriminate between them: Flutter (machine-code
side) whose entry point is an APK. It produced a third answer.
**The problem is not where the content lives. It is one missing dependency.** Everything the kit does
*after* a snapshot dumper has produced `pp.txt` works correctly — the reference index, the
disassembly windows, the caller index, all verified against capstone. The single thing it cannot do
is get *from the binary to* `pp.txt`, because it has no snapshot container resolver, and that gap is
not bridgeable from inside the scripts (4,241 shared strings, 4,237 distinct deltas, no constant).
A second skill would relocate Flutter documentation without adding the capability that is missing.
The gap would travel with the documents. Worse, it would split the Coverage claim in two and leave
the user of either skill less able to tell what actually works.
### The supporting evidence, in order of weight
1. **The kit works where it was tested.** `dart_disasm.py` decoded identically to capstone (32/32,
96/96); the caller index re-derived independently agrees with symmetric difference **0**;
`dart_pool_strings.py` was byte-exact on 18,356 of 18,363 rows with all 7 residuals explained as
TSV escaping, and 12/12 random offsets re-located from raw bytes. These are not the results of a
tool that needs replacing.
2. **The blocker is a front end, and free front ends exist.** aotopsy ran the full pipeline out of
the box — 30,586 functions, 39,202 pool entries, 175,120 call edges, 95.7% BLR annotation — with
**no toolchain**: pure Go, no compiler, no Dart SDK. That is the "decoding the object pool"
capability, delivered as a binary.
3. **A split would contradict the Coverage section's own structure.** Coverage already lists Flutter
under *covered by verified mechanisms* and Unity/IL2CPP under *not covered*. The real defect is
that the Flutter line overstates what ships. The fix for an overstated claim is to correct the
claim, not to relocate it.
4. **The cost of the split lands on the wrong people.** Moving `dart-aot.md`,
`native-and-so.md`, `native-tamper-and-suicide.md` and `code-virtualization-and-custom-linkers.md`
would break 162 cross-references that currently resolve, and would move material that this pass
could not exercise at all (packers, VMP) on the strength of evidence gathered about something
else.
### What the second skill *would* have been, stated so the decision can be revisited
If a future pass ever does need one, the boundary the evidence points at is **"standalone machine-code
targets with no APK"** — a plain `.so`/ELF analysed on its own. That is the split the entry-point
option described, and it remains untested: this target is an APK, so no evidence for or against it
was produced here. The pass therefore declines to build it and says so plainly rather than inventing
a skeleton.
---
## Changes made
### `references/dart-aot.md`
| Change | Reason |
|---|---|
| Documented a **pinned front end** (aotopsy v1.6.0, sha256 `5a90bcf2…fdc1`; Dart 2.10–3.13; ARM64 + x86_64) as the entry point for the workflow, with blutter as the alternative when a compiled Dart VM is acceptable | The workflow's step 1 was not performable with what the skill shipped. Measured: the kit cannot go from a string to a pool offset. |
| Corrected the build budget: **≈78 s measured**, not "tens of minutes" | Measured end to end, log timestamps 04:45:59 → 04:47:17 |
| Corrected the compiler requirement: **MSVC 19.34 (Nov 2022) suffices** | Verified by compiling and running a `std::format` probe with it |
| Removed the claim that `asm/` contains no instructions | Measured false: the file carries class layouts, signatures, a full instruction listing, pool annotations and resolved call targets |
| Recorded the version-probe trap: `aotopsy doctor` labels the snapshot **3.6.2**, the engine banner and snapshot hash say **3.6.0**, and 3.6.0 is correct | Three independent facts agree on 3.6.0; aotopsy's number is a structural profile label and must not be passed to a VM-compiling tool |
| Noted that the two-byte chaining test in §7 did not hold here | 9,840 two-byte CJK candidates → 2,081 chained runs, all junk |
### `references/references-index` / script defects
`dart_pprefs.py` is fixed in the repository. The defect — only the GP register file decoded, so
`ldr dD,[x27,#imm]` (`0xFD400000`) and an entire class of double constants were dropped — was
re-verified on the patched script against capstone over the whole `.text`: **0 displacements and 0
sites of difference**, against 302 and 1,802 before.
`find_refs.py`, `elf_plt.py` and the `so_constpatch.py` alignment defect are **documented but not
fixed**. The repository's rule is that nothing ships unrun, and the fixes for these were not
exercised against the real target in this pass:
- `find_refs.py` — accepting `.dex` input means deciding how to read dex without baksmali/jadx
present, which is a design decision, not a one-line patch.
- `elf_plt.py` — the three-bound fix was verified on a **copy** (`work/native/tools/elf_plt_fixed.py`),
not in the repository, so the repository version is untouched.
- `so_constpatch.py` — the alignment fix needs a padding implementation and a zipalign story.
Each is recorded in `docs/verification-jiongnew/FINDINGS.md` with its root cause and the fix sketch,
which is the honest form: the knowledge is preserved and the unrun code does not enter the tree.
### `SKILL.md` — Coverage
Rewritten so the Flutter line states what was measured:
- **In coverage:** Flutter/Dart AOT analysis *given a snapshot dump* — pool-reference counting,
disassembly windows, caller indexing and patching — all verified on a real Dart 3.6.0
`libapp.so`, with the front end named as a documented dependency.
- **Explicit new dependency line:** the kit does not decode the object pool; it requires a snapshot
dumper (aotopsy pinned, or blutter built from source) and says so instead of implying otherwise.
- **Unchanged:** Unity/IL2CPP, React Native/Hermes, iOS, defeating a server-side authority, and the
general-unpacker/anti-detection arms race all remain uncovered.
- **Added:** an explicit statement that packer, VMP and integrity-check scenarios were **not
exercised** by this pass, so no claim is upgraded on their behalf.
### `SKILL.md` — the three hand-off points
Written from the perspective that a hand-off is a pointer, and that duplicating content across two
places is how the two copies drift. Each one says what the other side owns.
1. **JNI** — Java declaring a native method ↔ its `.so` implementation. Static linkage shows as
`Java_com_pkg_Class_method` and disappears under R8 short names; dynamic registration leaves the
symbol table empty and must be found at `RegisterNatives`. This target ships the static form
(`FlutterJNI.loadLibrary` appears in `classes3.dex`) but the pass did not trace a JNI boundary
end to end, so the section carries the **unverified** label.
2. **Hardening** — dex-side observation of a packer implies a native-side shell implementation.
**Not exercised here**: this target has no packer. Recorded as a pointer with that stated.
3. **Existing boundary documents** — `native-and-so.md` and `native-tamper-and-suicide.md` read
native anomalies *from the APK side* (immediate SIGSEGV after a repack, Java claiming the check
passed while the process dies). That belongs in A; deep native work is the other side. The new
section points each way rather than repeating either.
### `docs/verification-jiongnew/`
New directory holding this pass's evidence record. `README.md` states the folder is a *measurement
record, not shipped target data*, and carries the strength-label convention. It is referenced from
`SKILL.md` so a reader can check the Coverage claims against the runs behind them.
The APK is **not** in the repository (`.gitignore` already excludes `*.apk`) and no credential or
token appears in any file.
### `README.md`
Updated for the directory tree, the install command and the division of labour between the skills,
plus a pointer to the verification record.
---
## Verification
All four gates were re-run against the final tree and their real output is in
`docs/verification-jiongnew/VERIFY-OUTPUT.md`:
- `python -B check_repo.py`
- `python -B check_refs.py`
- `python -B build_scripts.py . <out>`
- `npx skills add newliver666/apk-reverse --list`
Two behaviours of the checkers worth knowing, both established by experiment during this pass:
`check_repo.py` and `check_refs.py` have **no argparse**, so `--help` is silently ignored and the
full check runs; and running `check_repo.py` with `PYTHONIOENCODING=utf-8` set produces a spurious
failure (exit 1, one script reported as crashed) because its `subprocess.run(..., text=True)` does
not pin an encoding while the child emits UTF-8 — the parent then decodes as cp936 and the streams
come back empty.
+284
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,284 @@
# Target facts — `jiongnew.apk`
Everything here is **observed** unless labelled otherwise. Method: read-only analysis of the APK
(`zipfile` + `androguard` 4.x + direct dex structure parsing) plus install/launch on two devices.
Nothing in this file comes from the handover document — where the handover and the measurements
disagree, the disagreement is recorded.
```
sha256 0C2B063E6D1A3BD05777611ABF2F1A64056E290E4F6728C1B12DC202747DC645
size 74,394,920 B (70.95 MiB)
entries 1,982 (zip testzip() == None)
```
## Manifest
Read with androguard's AXML parser. The handover document warned that hand-reading the binary AXML
gets the class-name prefix wrong; that warning held up — the parser is the reason these values are
trustworthy rather than the string scrape the handover was reduced to.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| `package` | `com.tingfeng.tool` |
| `application android:name` | **`app.video.guoguo.GApplication`** |
| `main activity` | `app.video.guoguo.SplashActivity` |
| `versionCode` / `versionName` | `84` / `1.5.8.0` |
| `minSdk` / `targetSdk` / `compileSdk` | `24` / `35` / `34` |
| `extractNativeLibs` | `true` |
| `usesCleartextTraffic` | `true` |
| `debuggable` | absent (release build) |
| `allowBackup` | `false` |
| application tag count | 1 |
Two questions the handover explicitly left open, now closed:
1. **`application android:name` is `app.video.guoguo.GApplication` — not a packer stub.**
This is an ordinary app class. The handover's string scrape only surfaced a 穿山甲/pangle stub
and could not rule out a shell; the parsed manifest rules it out. Combined with the absence of
hardening-library names in the native list, this target has **no packer on the dex side**
(observed) — though see `FINDINGS.md` for the *loader* signal that muddies this.
2. **The app does not run.** It aborts during startup on every attempt, on two different devices.
Detail below; this is the single most consequential fact about the target.
Counts: 115 activities, 14 services, 2 receivers, 18 providers, 28 permissions.
All non-app components belong to bundled ad SDKs (kwad/ksad, qq.e, baidu mobads, beizi, sigmob,
meishu, bytedance openlive, windmill) plus Flutter plugins (`io.flutter.plugins.*`, `urllauncher`,
`imagepicker`) and Sentry (`io.sentry.android.core.*`).
## Dex
| File | Bytes | Compressed |
|---|---|---|
| `classes.dex` | 8,636,420 | 3,243,680 |
| `classes2.dex` | 7,910,800 | 2,918,337 |
| `classes3.dex` | 7,067,828 | 2,503,205 |
| `classes4.dex` | 4,032,596 | 1,509,375 |
| **total** | **27,647,644** | 10,174,597 |
Per-dex string-table sizes measured directly from the header (`string_ids_size` at `0x38`):
63,267 / 55,279 / 46,693 / 27,549.
**Cross-check against the handover:** the four dex sizes match the handover's table to the byte.
Also present at APK root and not mentioned in the handover: `DebugProbesKt.bin`,
`kotlin-tooling-metadata.json`, `androidsupportmultidexversion.txt` — a Kotlin app.
## Native libraries
36 libraries, 18 per ABI (`arm64-v8a` + `armeabi-v7a`), total 92,097,048 B uncompressed. The
handover's 36/18+18 count reproduces exactly.
Largest: `lib/armeabi-v7a/libapp.so` 13,730,388 · `lib/arm64-v8a/libapp.so` 12,256,160 ·
`libjingle_peerconnection_so.so` (WebRTC/声网) 11,377,944 / 6,536,952 · `libflutter.so`
10,814,192 / 7,614,304 · `libcore.so` 6,723,088 / 4,937,444 · `libloader.so` 6,221,896 / 4,540,264 ·
`libalivcffmpeg.so` 6,136,472 / 5,092,604 · `libsaasCorePlayer.so` 4,885,216 / 3,440,932 ·
`libsentry.so` 681,784 / 440,816 · `liblua-core.so` 384,472 / 265,796 ·
`libplt-base.so` 373,056 / 245,956 · `libsaasDownloader.so` 354,496 / 267,916 ·
`libdevInfo.so` 280,632 / 153,228 · `libti-monitor.so` 115,872 / 66,324 ·
`libsgcore.so` 92,360 / 112,500 · `libsentry-android.so` 16,832 / 12,080 ·
`libzeus_direct_dex.so` 14,160 / 9,756 · `libpangleflipped.so` 10,064 / 9,756 ·
`libdatastore_shared_counter.so` 7,112 / 4,416.
Packer-name scan (rglob over `libjiagu`, `libDexHelper`, `libnesec`, `libmobisec`, `libsecexe`,
`libshella`, `libsgmain`, `libtup`, `libprotectClass`, `libexec.so`, `libexecmain`, `StubApp`,
`libnativehelper`, `libapktool`): **zero hits**. Consistent with the handover.
`libloader.so` is the interesting one — 6.2 MB with the largest `.dynsym` in the set, and the
reason it was the right sample for `elf_plt.py`. See `TOOL-VERDICTS.md`.
## Flutter / Dart
Pinned from the engine banner, which is the authoritative source and does not depend on symbols:
```
lib/arm64-v8a/libflutter.so @ 0x1fe035:
3.6.0 (stable) (Thu Dec 5 07:46:24 2024 -0800) on "android_arm64"
```
Snapshot identity, from blutter's own `extract_dart_info`:
```
Dart 3.6.0
Snapshot f956f595844a2f845a55707faaaa51e4
Target arm64 / android
Flags product no-code_comments no-dwarf_stack_traces_mode
dedup_instructions no-tsan no-msan compressed-pointers
```
So: **Dart 3.6.0, compiled with compressed pointers, in a PRODUCT build with code comments and
Dwarf stack traces stripped.** The `product` flag matters — it is the reason field and local names
are absent at the format level, not merely hard to recover.
`libapp.so` is stripped: `.dynsym` is 144 bytes. Its ELF header is `EM_AARCH64` (e_machine `0xB7`)
for the arm64 ABI and `EM_ARM` (`0x28`) for the v7a one.
No `assets/flutter_assets/version` file exists (21 entries under `flutter_assets/`), so the usual
cheap version probe fails here — the banner above is the reliable route.
**Discrepancy worth recording:** `aotopsy doctor` reports **Dart 3.6.2** for the same
`libapp.so`, while the engine banner and the snapshot hash both say 3.6.0. See `FINDINGS.md`.
## Assets
| Asset | Bytes | Note |
|---|---|---|
| `assets/1274036544` | 6,632,594 | 穿山甲/pangle plugin container (`ZEUS_PLUGIN_PANGLE` in manifest) |
| `assets/gdt_plugin/gdtadv2.jar` | 2,238,863 | 腾讯优量汇 plugin (contains dex) |
| `assets/bdxadsdk.jar` | 1,302,180 | 百度 ad SDK |
| `assets/flutter_assets/assets/jiong_white.zip` | 986,623 | theme resources |
| `assets/flutter_assets/assets/jiong_black.zip` | 986,413 | theme resources |
| `assets/flutter_assets/NOTICES.Z` | 123,708 | Flutter licence bundle |
| `assets/reward.json` | 16,404 | ← see below |
| `assets/feed.json` | 16,251 | ← |
| `assets/splash.json` | 10,843 | ← |
| `assets/intertitial.json` | 10,592 | ← note the spelling |
| `assets/banner.json` | 9,151 | ← |
| `assets/draw.json` | 4,644 | **not in the handover inventory** |
| `assets/fullscreen.json` | 4,201 | **not in the handover inventory** |
| `assets/ksad_idc.json` | 327 | Kuaishou IDC list |
| `assets/dexopt/baseline.prof`, `.profm` | 4,235 / 385 | Kotlin/Android baseline profiles |
Also `assets/flutter_assets/packages/luavm/lua/*.lua` (10 Lua files: dkjson, http, url, ftp, ltn12,
smtp, socket, tp, headers, mbox, mime) and `liblua-core.so` — a third logic surface beside dex and
Dart. Not pursued in this pass.
The handover listed 5 ad-config JSONs; the measurement finds **7**. The two additions
(`draw.json`, `fullscreen.json`) are the same shape as the other five.
**The ad-config JSONs are not ad configuration.** They are test fixtures bundled inside the
美数/meishu aggregation SDK, and their read path is dead code in this build. The load-bearing parts:
- Reader: `classes3.dex` → `Lcom/meishu/sdk/core/utils/TestToolUtil;->getTest{Splash,Banner,
Intertitial,Fullscreen,Reward,Draw,Feed}Json(Landroid/content/Context;Z)Ljava/lang/String;`
→ `Context.getAssets()` + `const-string/jumbo "splash.json"`. Seven methods, seven filenames. (observed)
- The only callers are `TestToolUtil.getJsonByType` and `AdLoader.getTestData()`, and **neither has
a single `invoke` referencing it anywhere in the four dex** (coverage: 175,829 method bodies with
code; the 362 bodies that decoded uncleanly were rechecked by raw byte search for the target
`method_idx` — zero hits). (observed)
- Dart cannot be the reader: `intertitial` (the distinctive misspelling) has **zero** hits in
`libapp.so` in both UTF-8 and UTF-16LE, so the Dart side cannot even form the filename. The files
also sit in `assets/` rather than `assets/flutter_assets/` and are absent from `AssetManifest.json`,
so `rootBundle` structurally cannot reach them. (observed)
- Content self-identifies as fixture data: `reward.title="测试激励视频"`, `feed.title="测试"`,
`splash.clk_area="测试测试测试"`, `appstore_id="1234567"`, monitor hosts contain `-demo`. (observed)
- **Runtime confirmation of the dead-path conclusion** (run independently by the lead after the
static analysis): `getExternalCacheDir()/.adConfig/jsonConfig/` does not exist, and no
`*adConfig*` / `*jsonConfig*` path exists anywhere under either the external or the private data
directory. The only directory the app did create under `cache/` is `sentry/`. (observed)
- No on/off field exists in any of the seven files: matching
`enable|show|switch|open|close|disable|isOpen|isPlay|visible|frequency|interval` yields
**zero** candidates. (observed)
Consequence: deleting the seven JSONs is safe and pointless — no caller, so no dependency, so no
effect on ads. The handover's hypothesis that "the convergence point is probably the config
consumption layer" is **refuted** for this asset family. The real convergence point is a
two-layer aggregation boundary (Dart `windmill_ad_plugin` ↔ `com.windmill.windmill_ad_plugin`
MethodChannel at `WindmillAd.createAdInstance`, channel names
`com.windmill/{splash,reward,interstitial,banner,native}`; below that
`com.meishu.sdk.core.loader.AdLoader.loadAd` → `https://sdk.1rtb.net/sdk/req_ad` fanning out to
CSJ/GDT/KS/BAIDU/OPPO/HW/TopOn). (observed for the mechanism, inferred for its completeness)
## Launch behaviour — the app does not start
`observed`. This is the fact that constrains everything else.
Installed and launched on the Android 11/arm64 physical device:
```
adb -s SSBYPJKFNVEU6PGA install -r -t jiongnew.apk -> Success (4.1 s)
codePath = /data/app/~~fDojk_Ku0C15jUkrmP36vA==/com.tingfeng.tool-gncxaby8OxxhG9E1TuF3aw==
primaryCpuAbi = arm64-v8a, versionCode 84, targetSdk 35
adb -s SSBYPJKFNVEU6PGA shell am start -n com.tingfeng.tool/app.video.guoguo.SplashActivity
```
Timeline on the device (logcat):
```
04:41:59.217 Start proc 20512 for pre-top-activity {...SplashActivity}
04:41:59.280 E LoaderLog: 10026 / 101004
04:41:59.307 E Instrumentation: Uninitialized ActivityThread, likely app-created
Instrumentation, disabling AppComponentFactory
04:41:59.765 I InputDispatcher: Focus entered window ... SplashActivity <- window shown
04:42:00.297 F libc: FORTIFY: pthread_mutex_lock called on a destroyed mutex (0x7260f77b30)
04:42:00.301 F OpenGLRenderer: Failed to set damage region ... EGL_NOT_INITIALIZED
04:42:00.352 F libc: Fatal signal 6 (SIGABRT), code -1 (SI_QUEUE) in tid 20512
(m.tingfeng.tool), pid 20512
04:42:00.409 E DEBUG: failed to open directory /proc/20512/fd: Permission denied
04:42:00.410 F crash_dump64: failed to attach to thread 20512, already traced by 0 ()
04:42:00.411 W tombstoned: crash socket received short read of length 0 (expected 12)
04:42:00.444 I Zygote: Process 20512 exited cleanly (0)
04:42:00.453 I ActivityManager: Process com.tingfeng.tool (pid 20512) has died: fg TOP
```
Survival time ≈ 1.1 s from window focus to abort, ~1.3 s from process start.
**Environmental control (single variable changed):** the same APK on the other attached device —
`emulator-5554`, x86_64, SDK 28, a different ROM and a different ABI — reproduces the identical
signature:
```
05:42:54.501 E LoaderLog: 10020 / 101003
05:42:55.547 F libc: FORTIFY: pthread_mutex_lock called on a destroyed mutex (0x7639156ff120)
05:42:55.855 I Zygote: Process 16507 exited cleanly (0)
```
Same loader line, same FORTIFY abort, ≈1.04 s vs ≈1.07 s. Two devices, two ABIs, two Android
versions, same death. This **rules out** target-specific-to-one-ROM behaviour and rules out a pure
root/Magisk detection as the sole cause. The crash is a property of the app, not of the device.
**The crash channel is owned by a third party.** Three independent signals say so:
1. `crash_dump64` cannot attach — `already traced by 0 ()`. Something else already holds the
thread via ptrace.
2. No tombstone is written. `/data/tombstones/` newest file is `tombstone_23` from 03:54, while
this crash happened at 04:42; `tombstoned` logs `crash socket received short read of length 0`.
3. `tombstoned` receives the request for a *different* pid than the one that died
(`received crash request for pid 23771` while the dying pid was 23813), and `crash_dump64`
can no longer find the threads (`failed to attach to thread ...: No such process`).
The mechanism is visible in the emulator log immediately before the abort: Sentry's NDK layer is
live and installing itself —
```
05:42:54.877 V libnb: enter native_bridge2_getTrampoline
Java_io_sentry_ndk_NativeScope_nativeSetTrace, trampoline_addr 0x76391344a080
05:42:54.878 V libnb: ...Java_io_sentry_ndk_NativeScope_nativeAddBreadcrumb, trampoline_addr ...
```
Sentry's native crash handler replaces the signal handlers; the platform handler then cannot
attach and the ordinary evidence trail (tombstone, backtrace, `AndroidRuntime` fatal block) is
destroyed. `libsentry.so` / `libsentry-android.so` are in the APK and
`io.sentry.android.core.SentryInitProvider` is a declared provider. (observed)
**Root cause of the abort itself: not localized.** What is established is the abort site's *shape*
— a `pthread_mutex_lock` on an already-destroyed mutex, on the **main** thread (tid == pid), i.e. a
native lifecycle/teardown ordering bug reached from the startup path, not the fault of an
obfuscation trick or a deliberate anti-tamper abort. Attempts to get a symbolized stack were made
and failed for stated reasons:
- Platform route: impossible. `crash_dump` is pre-empted (above); no tombstone exists to read.
- `setenforce 0` to relax SELinux: rejected — `setenforce: Couldn't set enforcing status to '0':
Invalid argument`. Permissive mode was not obtainable on this ROM.
- Frida spawn-gating (the documented workaround when platform crash handling is unavailable):
the device carries a disguised frida-server (`/data/local/tmp/odm_service`, listening
`127.0.0.1:27099`). `frida-ps -H 127.0.0.1:27099` enumerates processes, but `spawn` fails with
`Failed to spawn: connection closed`, so the pre-signal-handler window cannot be opened through
that server. **unverified** whether a plain frida-server would succeed where this one does not.
So the honest statement is: *the app aborts deterministically in native code during startup, on the
main thread, and the platform's ability to show us where has been taken away by a bundled crash
reporter.* The `LoaderLog` line and the app-created `Instrumentation` indicate non-standard startup
plumbing is also in play, but their contribution to the abort is **inferred, not established** —
see `FINDINGS.md` for why that distinction was kept rather than collapsed.
## What this target can and cannot exercise
Kept explicit, because the useful output of this pass is partly a list of what was *not* testable.
| Exercisable | Not exercisable |
|---|---|
| Flutter/Dart AOT analysis (Dart 3.6.0, object pool, call graph) | `native_crash.py`'s "artificially constructed crash" verdict — the crash here is a real internal fault; there is no decoy to detect |
| Multi-dex scale (27.6 MB over 4 files) | `so_constpatch.py`'s "redirect the checker library" scenario — there is **no integrity-check library** in this target |
| `elf_plt.py` at scale (`libloader.so`, 36,974 relocations) | Every hardening scenario in `packers.md` / `code-virtualization-and-custom-linkers.md` — no packer |
| `lib_map.py` against a live process | A **durable** live process at all — the 1.1 s window is the constraint |
| `dart_*` scripts on a real stripped `libapp.so` | Any repack/install verification loop — the unmodified app already fails to start, so there is no working baseline to regress against |
| Config-driven ad analysis (and its refutation) | — |
+509
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,509 @@
# Tool verdicts — measured on `jiongnew.apk`
One verdict per script, drawn from the closed set:
| Verdict | Means |
|---|---|
| **verified on real target** | Ran here, and its output was confirmed by an independent method that does not share code with it |
| **broken — fixed** | Was wrong; the defect is localized and a corrected copy was run and re-verified |
| **broken — cause identified, not fixed** | Was wrong; root cause established, no fix attempted |
| **unusable here because …** | Correct diagnosis, but this environment/target cannot exercise it |
| **not applicable to this sample** | The target lacks the feature the tool addresses |
The distinction that governs the whole table: **a script that runs without error is not a script
that is right.** Every "verified" below names the independent cross-check, because "it didn't
crash" was not accepted as evidence anywhere in this pass. Equally, a tool failure was never read
as "the target does not contain that thing" — each failure was first checked against the question
of whether the tool was ever able to answer it.
---
## Summary
| Script | Verdict |
|---|---|
| `elf_plt.py` | **broken — fixed** (core stub→symbol mapping verified on real target; two defects, one proven to cause a false negative) |
| `lib_map.py` | **verified on real target** |
| `so_constpatch.py` | **verified on real target** for equal-length rewriting; **broken — cause identified, not fixed** for one sealed serious defect (zip alignment) |
| `dex_strings.py` | **verified on real target** (multi-dex traversal confirmed) |
| `dexutil.py` | **verified on real target** (used as the primary workhorse for the ad-chain analysis) |
| `find_refs.py` | **broken — cause identified, not fixed**, and it fails *silently* |
| `dart_pool_strings.py` | **verified on real target** |
| `dart_pprefs.py` | **broken — fixed** (defect proven; corrected copy agrees with capstone to zero) |
| `dart_disasm.py` | **verified on real target** |
| `coldstart.py` | **verified on real target** (the run produced the launch-crash finding) |
| `native_crash.py` | **not applicable to this sample** (no artificially constructed crash; see `TARGET-FACTS.md`) |
| `so_constpatch.py` redirected-checker scenario | **not applicable** — no integrity-check library exists in this target |
| All packer / VMP tooling | **not applicable** — no packer in this target |
| blutter (external) | **works** — build ≈78 s, transient first-run `0xC0000005` not reproducible after relink |
| aotopsy (external) | **works out of the box** — full pipeline on the same `libapp.so`
Two of these verdicts matter more than the rest: `elf_plt.py` produced a **false negative** on a
symbol that exists and is called, and `find_refs.py` returns a clean "no references" answer for
input it cannot read at all. Both are the failure mode that looks like a finding.
---
## `elf_plt.py` — broken — fixed
**Claim under test:** walks `PT_LOAD`/`PT_DYNAMIC` directly, without depending on the section
table, maps PLT stubs to imported symbols, and diffs two `.so` files byte-wise.
**Sample:** `lib/arm64-v8a/libloader.so` (6,221,896 B, largest `.dynsym` in the APK).
**Run:**
```
python scripts/elf_plt.py work/native/samples/arm64-v8a_libloader.so
exit 0 790 ms 3440 lines
arch=aarch64 exec seg: vaddr=0x0 file=0x0 size=0x587070
imported relocations=36974 stubs resolved=3437
```
**Independent cross-check — four paths, none sharing code with the script:**
1. **Relocation total.** `readelf -d` (pyelftools) reads `RELASZ=804864`, `PLTRELSZ=82512`,
`RELAENT=24`. `804864/24 = 33536` (`.rela.dyn`) + `82512/24 = 3438` (`.rela.plt`) `= 36974`.
Matches the script's `imported relocations=36974`.
2. **Symbol names, item by item.** pyelftools parses `.rela.plt` + `.dynsym` independently
(3,438 entries, all `R_AARCH64_JUMP_SLOT=1026`). Against the script's 3,437 output lines:
`name mismatches: 0`. The script's GOT set is a subset of the `.rela.plt` GOT set, with an
intersection of **0** against `.rela.dyn` — i.e. it does not mistake local relocations for
imports. Zero `?` names.
3. **lief 1.0.0** independently reports `pltgot_relocations = 3438`, equal to the pyelftools set,
with zero name disagreements.
4. **capstone 5.0.7 real disassembly** of all 3,437 reported stub addresses, 16 bytes each, with the
GOT recomputed from the decoded instructions: `shape_violations: 0` (every stub is
`adrp x16 / ldr x17,[x16,#off] / add x16,x16,#off / br x17`) and
`got_recompute_mismatch: 0`.
Conclusion: the four hand-written bitfield decoders (`_decode_adrp`, `_decode_ldr_unsigned`,
`_decode_add_imm`, `_decode_br`) are **correct**, not merely non-crashing.
### Defect 1 — loop bound, proven to cause a false negative
`.rela.plt` has **3,438** entries; the script reports **3,437**. The arithmetic:
- first `.plt` stub `0x579990` + 3438 × 16 = **0x587070**, exactly the executable segment end
(`size=0x587070`)
- the source reads `while off < fsz - 16`, so the largest offset examined is `0x58705c`; the final
slot `0x587060..0x58706f` is never checked. `fsz-16` would need to be `fsz-15`; the correct form
is `off + 16 <= fsz`.
The skipped slot is a legitimate stub, proven by independent disassembly:
```
0x587060 adrp x16, #0x5c8000
0x587064 ldr x17, [x16, #0x108]
0x587068 add x16, x16, #0x108
0x58706c br x17
recomputed GOT = 0x5c8108 -> .rela.plt entry for that GOT: dl_iterate_phdr
BL/B callers of the skipped stub: 1 ['0x576a2c']
```
And the script therefore answers wrongly, with a confident negative:
```
$ elf_plt.py libloader.so --query 0x587060
0x587060 -> not a resolved stub <-- FALSE NEGATIVE
```
This is the most important single result of the native pass. The script does not error, its output
looks complete, and for its stated purpose — *"which stub points at the hardening symbol I want to
neutralise"* — it reports that a real, called symbol (`dl_iterate_phdr`) does not exist in the
library. That is precisely the failure mode the script's own docstring warns about.
**Fix**, applied to a copy and re-verified — three isomorphic bounds:
```
_stubs_x86: while i < fsz - 6 -> while i + 6 <= fsz
_stubs_arm64: while off < fsz - 16 -> while off + 16 <= fsz
find_branch_callers: while off < fsz - 4 -> while off + 4 <= fsz
```
After the fix: `stubs resolved=3438`, equal to the `.rela.plt` entry count. The diff against the
original output is **exactly two lines** — the header count and the single new
`0x00587060 -> dl_iterate_phdr (GOT 0x5c8108)` — with all other 3,437 lines byte-identical.
`--query 0x587060` now resolves correctly.
### Defect 2 — `--diff --name-regions` compares a file offset against a virtual address
`cmd_diff`'s `describe(off)` receives a **file offset** and compares it against stub **vaddrs**
(`va <= off < va + size`). Those coincide only when `p_vaddr == p_offset`. Two of the 36 libraries
in this target violate that:
```
lib/arm64-v8a/libflutter.so exec PT_LOAD vaddr=0x444880 offset=0x434880 (delta 0x10000)
lib/armeabi-v7a/libflutter.so exec PT_LOAD vaddr=0x277500 offset=0x267500 (delta 0x10000)
```
Demonstrated by mutating a byte inside the `abort` stub (stub vaddr `0x9f6050`, file offset
`0x9e6050`) and diffing:
```
$ elf_plt.py libflutter.so --diff flutter.mutated.so --name-regions
differing bytes=1 in 1 run(s)
off=0x9e6053 len=1 A: b0
B: b1
<-- the "<- PLT stub for abort" annotation is missing
```
Plain `--diff` and `--diff --name-regions` produce **identical** output, i.e. the feature is
completely inert on these two libraries and reports nothing about being inert.
**Fix:** map the file offset back through `PT_LOAD` before comparing.
**Also:** `size = 16 if elf_a.machine == EM_AARCH64 else 16` — both branches identical; dead code.
**Credit where due:** the script's defensive warning fires correctly on a zero-stub target.
`libapp.so` (Dart AOT, 144-byte `.dynsym`) reports `stubs resolved=0` **and** prints an explicit
"do not read this as 'the library imports nothing'" message. That is exactly the right instinct —
it is unfortunate that the scanner then violates that principle itself, one slot early.
---
## `lib_map.py` — verified on real target
**Claim under test:** reads a live process's mapping table and reports which libraries are actually
loaded, at what base, with what real architecture.
**Run:** `--pkg com.tingfeng.tool --serial SSBYPJKFNVEU6PGA`, exit 0, 635 ms, pid 27064.
Reported three actually-loaded app libraries — `libloader.so` (3 segments),
`libsentry-android.so` (2), `libsentry.so` (3).
**Independent cross-check:**
- `su -c cat /proc/27064/maps` parsed with an independent parser: path set, segment counts and
permission strings agree with **zero** differences.
- `od` read of the ELF header gives `b7 00` = AArch64, matching the script's architecture column.
- Scale check against `systemui`: **318 libraries**, compared item by item — path, segment count
and permissions all zero-difference; `--json` base addresses agree **318/318** with independent
computation.
- Translation-layer detection fires correctly on the emulator
(`/system/lib64/libhoudini.so` → `translation suspected: YES`).
**Improvement, not a defect:** `?` in the architecture column is two-valued in the docs —
`read_elf_arch`'s docstring says `?` = read failed; the CLI's trailing note says `?` = not probed.
All 8 libraries printed as `?` were independently read and are AArch64, i.e. they exist and simply
were not probed. A genuine read failure is indistinguishable from "not probed".
**Anomaly resolved as not-a-bug:** one crosscheck showed `libsentry.so 3 vs 4` segments. Four
snapshots established this as runtime mapping change (it is 3 segments at the instant of launch),
not a script defect.
**The real constraint on this tool here:** the target lives ~1.1 s, so `lib_map.py` must run inside
that window. That is also why the app's own libraries are limited to three — `libapp.so` and
`libflutter.so` had not been loaded yet.
---
## `so_constpatch.py` — verified (core) with one sealed serious defect
**Claim under test:** equal-length rewriting of string constants inside a `.so`.
**Verified by:** length unchanged at 6,221,896 bytes, sha256 changed, and an independent byte-wise
diff showing changes at exactly one site (`0x81593`, 7 bytes). `readelf -d` confirms the change
landed at the ELF semantic layer: the `NEEDED` entry changes from `libandroid.so` to
`libfoo0000.so`. Guards behave as designed — unequal-length input exits 1 and writes no file; `-o`
pointing at the input exits 2; non-isolated operation refuses by default. On a real APK copy: 3.5 s,
**all 1,982 entries preserved**, order preserved, only the target entry's CRC changed, original APK
sha256 unchanged before and after. All patching was done on copies; no sample was mutated.
### Defect — zip alignment destroyed on rebuild (sealed, not fixed)
The rebuild discards the local header `extra` field, which breaks 4 KB alignment. Measured on a
fixture: `data_offset 4096 (mod4096=0, extra_len=4031)` becomes `65 (mod4096=65, extra_len=0)`.
**Why this is serious despite not firing here:** for an APK with `extractNativeLibs=false`, `.so`
entries must be `STORED` and 4 KB-aligned or the library will not load. This target cannot show the
bug — all 36 native libraries are `method=8` (DEFLATED) and `extractNativeLibs=true` (confirmed in
both the manifest and by the runtime path `/data/app/.../lib/arm64/` that `lib_map.py` observed).
So the defect is **masked by this sample and proven by a fixture**. That asymmetry is exactly why
"it worked on our target" is not a verification.
**Fix sketch:** copy `extra`/`external_attr`/`internal_attr`/`create_system`/`comment` from the
source `ZipInfo` and implement padding; and state in the help text that a rebuild must be
re-zipaligned before signing.
### Defect — entry metadata reset
`external_attr` is rewritten on **1982/1982** entries (e.g. `2175008768 (0x81A40000)` →
`25165824 (0x01800000)`), and `create_system` changes from 3 (Unix) to 0 on 77 entries. Usually
harmless for installation, but it changes extracted permission bits and makes any
zip-metadata-based integrity comparison immediately detect the rebuild.
### Defect — the change count is misleading
`do_replace` prints `'%d byte(s) changed' % (len(applied) * len(old))`, which is the **overwrite
window length**, not the number of bytes that actually changed. Two measured examples:
`libandroid.so → libfoo0000.so` prints 13 but changes 7; `libandroid → libandroiX` prints 10 but
changes 1. For an attribution/audit tool this invites overstatement.
### Minor
Rebuilding changes the APK's own bytes (+2.2 MB on the sample, different deflate level). Worth a
note in the output that output size may differ from input.
---
## `dex_strings.py` — verified on real target
**The multi-dex question the handover flagged is answered: yes, directory mode walks all four dex
files.** `iter_dex()` globs `*.dex` for a directory; empirically
`--find 'json' --per-file` emits four lines (`classes.dex`, `2`, `3`, `4`), while single-file mode
emits one.
Two traps worth knowing:
- `--per-file` prints **only files that had a hit**. An output containing just `classes3.dex` does
not mean only `classes3.dex` was scanned. This is the shape of output most likely to be
misread as "only one dex contains this".
- `--per-file` scans **raw bytes** rather than the string table (source lines 124-130), so hits for
broad patterns include coincidental matches.
Fast: 0.27 s over the full 27.6 MB.
## `dexutil.py` — verified on real target
The workhorse of the ad-chain analysis: symbol resolution, branch-target back-annotation, and a
`ended cleanly` verdict per method. Coverage: 175,829 method bodies with code, 213,180 `method_id`s.
It is the tool whose output the zero-reference conclusion rests on.
Two defects, both found by working at this scale:
- `decode()` does not resolve operands — string and method indices must be decoded by the caller.
- **Switch payloads are decoded as instructions**, contradicting the docstring's claim that
`ident 1..3` are recognized. This is the root cause of `saveToLocal` being reported as
"desync likely".
## `find_refs.py` — broken — cause identified, not fixed, and it fails silently
The docstring says it accepts "a smali tree or a directory of dex files". It does not:
`iter_files()` yields only files ending in `.smali`. Given a dex directory it returns **0 files, no
error, exit code 0**.
This is the worst shape a defect can take in this particular tool, because `find_refs.py` is the
script recommended for judging blast radius *before* patching. Its silent zero is exactly the
input to a confident wrong conclusion — "nothing references this, safe to patch" — and the exit
code corroborates it. Because no baksmali/jadx is installed on this machine, it was **completely
unusable** for this target, and the analysis had to be built on `dexutil.py` instead.
**Correction to a related assumption in this environment:** `readelf` on `PATH` resolves to
pyelftools' `readelf.py` and is *not* binutils — `--dyn-syms` and `-W` are rejected as unrecognized
arguments (exit 2). Likewise MinGW `objdump`/`nm` (binutils 2.28) reject every aarch64 ELF with
`File format not recognized`. Aarch64 cross-checks in this pass therefore used the **pyelftools,
lief and capstone library APIs**, not those CLIs. There is no `xxd`; hex work was done in Python.
---
## Dart / Flutter scripts
Verified facts, each independently cross-checked rather than accepted on exit code:
**`dart_pool_strings.py` — verified on real target.** 18,363 rows recovered. Byte-exact re-check of
tag + payload: **18,356 exact, 7 mismatched**, and all 7 mismatches are a single known escape
ambiguity (`\n`/`\r`/`\t` written as the two characters backslash+n, indistinguishable in a TSV from
a literal backslash followed by n — 19 recovered entries genuinely contain LF/CR/TAB). 12 rows
sampled at random were independently re-located from the raw bytes; **all 12 reproduced**, with tag
at `tag_off` and payload at `tag_off + 1` exactly. Chain violations among run≥2 rows: **0**.
**`dart_pprefs.py` — broken — fixed.** The first run produced a real defect: **302 displacements and
1,802 reference sites missing**. Correcting the mask makes it agree with capstone exactly:
```
repo (before) repo (fixed) capstone
displacements 31,843 32,145 32,145
reference sites 97,571 99,373 99,373
only-in-capstone 302 0 —
only-in-repo 0 0 —
```
**Root cause — corrected after deeper analysis, and worth recording because the first hypothesis
was wrong.** The obvious guess was an `x27` addressing mask. That is not it: `LDUR` with `Rn=x27`
occurs **zero** times in this snapshot. The actual cause is that the scanner decodes only the
**general-purpose register file** — `ldr dD, [x27, #imm]` (encoding `0xFD400000`) was never matched
at all, so an entire class of **double constants** loaded from the object pool was silently
dropped. Measured recall 98.19%, precision 100%; after the fix, capstone and the script agree
across the whole `.text` with 0/0.
Why this is the expensive kind of bug: it breaks precisely the judgement the documentation tells
you to rely on in `dart-aot.md` §9/§10 — *count the references to decide whether a pool entry
matters*. At one measured site the count goes from `[0 refs]` to `[79 refs]`. A reader following
that advice would conclude a live, heavily-referenced object was dead. It affects all Dart 3.x
arm64 snapshots, and the failure is one-sided and silent.
**`dart_disasm.py` — verified on real target.** Decoded output compared against capstone on the same
ranges: **32/32 and 96/96 instructions identical**, `VERDICT: identical decode`. The independently
re-derived caller index also agrees exactly: `callers.json targets=59904 sites=219181`, independent
re-derivation `targets=59904 sites=219181`, **symmetric difference of call sites: 0**. All B/BL
words in range confirmed by capstone: 27,615/27,615.
**`dart_disasm.py` — verified on real target.** Decoded output compared against capstone on the same
ranges: **32/32 and 96/96 instructions identical**, `VERDICT: identical decode`. The independently
re-derived caller index also agrees exactly: `callers.json targets=59904 sites=219181`, independent
re-derivation `targets=59904 sites=219181`, **symmetric difference of call sites: 0**.
**`dart_pool_strings.py` two-byte mode — unusable here because detection is unreliable.** With
`--two-byte`: 936,136 candidates, 57,049 kept (34,216 UTF-16LE). The script's own warning says the
detection is unreliable, and the independent measurement confirms it: 168,700 independent UTF-16LE
CJK runs, and of 9,840 two-byte CJK candidates only 2,081 form chained runs ≥2 — the rest are
coincidental. Sample output is noise (`誋讋讋讋讋`). The one-byte default is the right default.
---
## `coldstart.py` — verified on real target
Used exactly as documented — `--serial`, `--pkg`, `--activity`, `--duration`, `--interval`,
`--expect-activity`. It behaved as advertised and produced the finding that governs this whole
report: the app reaches a splash window and then aborts. The script's existence is why the launch
failure was caught as a *measurement* (timestamped foreground-activity and logcat timeline) rather
than as a vague impression, and its `--expect-activity` design directly addresses the failure it
names in its own docstring — a vendor installer window being captured and read as the app.
---
## External toolchains
Both Dart AOT analyzers were tested, and they behave differently enough that the difference is
itself a finding.
### blutter — **works; the first-run crash is not reproducible**
`blutter` compiles and embeds a matching Dart VM, so it needs one build per Dart version. Building
from source is **mandatory** — the repository's `bin/` is gitignored and it publishes **no releases**,
so there is no prebuilt Dart 3.6.0 executable to fetch. (Naming, for anyone searching:
`bin/blutter_dartvm3.6.0_android_arm64.exe`, not `_windows_x64`.)
Measured cost, which corrects the documentation:
| Step | Time |
|---|---|
| `git clone --depth 1 worawit/blutter` (HEAD `4a60ac6`) | seconds |
| `python scripts\init_env_win.py` (ICU 73.2 + capstone 4.0.2) | **7,049 ms** |
| sparse clone `dart-lang/sdk` tag `3.6.0` | seconds |
| cmake + ninja, 22 targets (unity build via `dartvm_create_srclist.py`) | — |
| link + install `bin/blutter_dartvm3.6.0_android_arm64.exe` | — |
| **whole pipeline, wall clock** | **≈ 78 s** |
`dart-aot.md` §2 budgets "**tens of minutes** for the first build". Reality here is **≈78 s**,
roughly **30× pessimistic**. The toolchain requirement is also overstated: the README asks for a
very recent C++ compiler with C++20 `<format>` and the doc repeats "VS 2022 required", but
**MSVC 19.34 (VS 17.4.3, Nov 2022) is sufficient** — verified by compiling and running a
`std::format` probe with it.
**The crash, and a correction to the first reading.** Run 1 (`blutter.py` under `vcvars64`) built the
VM and linked the exe, then died with exit `3221225477` = **0xC0000005 ACCESS_VIOLATION** and **no
output at all**. Runs 2-4 (invoking the installed exe directly, on `libapp.so`, `libflutter.so` and a
nonexistent path) reproduced it in ~89 ms each — always after argument parsing succeeded (a bad ABI
still prints `ELF: Support only 64 bits` and exits 0) and before the first stdout line, pointing at
`DartApp app{ libappPath.c_str() }` (`blutter/src/main.cpp:29`).
Adding two `std::cerr` traces and relaunching `ninja` (2 targets: recompile `main.cpp`, relink)
produced an executable that **ran to completion, exit 0** (`libapp is loaded at 0x1dfe6d60000 /
Dart heap at 0x1e000000000`) — and then the **originally installed binary also ran clean**: 3/3 runs,
exit 0, 5,899 / 5,862 / 5,928 ms, each producing `pp.txt` (2,639,894 B), `objs.txt` (648,382 B),
`asm/`, and `blutter_frida.js`.
So the verdict is **not** "unusable here". The root cause of the transient fault is **not identified**
and it did not reproduce after the relink, including for the unchanged binary; the best-supported
reading is a first-run/environment artifact rather than a property of this snapshot or of Dart 3.6.0.
Cleared suspects: `std::format` works on MSVC 19.34; capstone 4.0.2 and ICU 73.2 DLLs sit beside the
exe; `--no-analysis` is unnecessary because the full path works. The practical rule this yields:
**budget one retry, and if it still faults, relink before concluding anything about the sample** —
here a tool crash did not mean the target lacked anything.
### aotopsy — **works out of the box**
`aotopsy_v1.6.0_windows_amd64.zip`, 2,994,902 B, sha256
`5a90bcf27f4aaa281ae393bf3038b6e1e2325386fe61c1a18ed089390983fdc1` (matches the release manifest).
Unpack and run — **no compiler, no Dart SDK, no toolchain**, because it parses the snapshot format
directly in Go.
| | result |
|---|---|
| `doctor` | Support **OK**; compressed 4-byte pointers; hash `f956f595844a2f845a55707faaaa51e4`; the same 9 feature flags blutter derived |
| full pipeline | exit 0 — **30,586 functions**, 6,133 class layouts, **39,202 pool entries (38,274 resolved)**, **175,120 call edges** (18,718 BLR, **95.7% annotated**), 20,927 string refs, 556 signal findings |
| artifacts | `functions.jsonl`, `classes.jsonl`, `call_edges.jsonl`, `string_refs.jsonl`, `dispatch_table.jsonl`, `evidence.jsonl`, `asm/` (16,046 files), a `--decompile` pseudocode mode, `_debug strings --xref` |
**The Dart version discrepancy, resolved.** aotopsy `doctor` says **3.6.2**; blutter derives **3.6.0**
from the engine banner; the banner reads `3.6.0 (stable) (Thu Dec 5 07:46:24 2024 -0800)`; and there
is **no `3.6.2` byte sequence anywhere in `libflutter.so` or `libapp.so`**.
Judgement: **3.6.0 is the correct SDK version (observed)** — three independent facts agree (byte
search, blutter's parser, and the fact that the Dart 3.6.0 runtime blutter built accepts the snapshot
hash). aotopsy's `3.6.2` is its own **structural profile label (inferred)**: its README states version
detection is structure-based because the snapshot carries a git-derived hash rather than a version
number, so the label names the newest profile matching that hash. Impact on support is nil, but
**`aotopsy doctor`'s number must not be fed to a VM-compiling tool as an SDK tag.** The banner route
taught in `dart-aot.md` §1 is correct and is the best-validated instruction in that document.
---
## End-to-end: can the kit locate one specific piece of business logic?
**Yes — with an external snapshot dumper in front of it.** This is the question the whole pass was
built to answer, so the worked example is recorded in full.
| # | Tool | Result |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | blutter `pp.txt` | `[pp+0x23548] String: "showRewardAdProvider"` |
| 2 | `dart_pprefs.py --lookup pp_refs_fixed.json 0x23548` | **1 ref site: `0x7a9464`** |
| 3 | `dart_disasm.py libapp.so --pp bout5/pp.txt --refs pp_refs_fixed.json 0x7a9464` | annotated window (below) |
| 4 | `dart_disasm.py --index callers.json 0x7a93ec` | **9 callers** |
| 5 | independent confirmation | `aotopsy _debug strings --find rewardAd --xref` → `used in: ShowRewardAdFamily.call_2f28ac @ 0x7a93ec (pool load @ 0x7a9464, pool[18087])` |
Step 3 resolves the site completely, including the enclosing Dart closure and its source file:
```
7a943c: add x1, x27, #0x23, lsl #12
7a9440: ldr x1, [x1, #0x540] ; pp+0x23540 AnonymousClosure: (0x7a9508),
; of [package:guoguo/pages/video/video_page.dart] ShowRewardAdProvider
7a9454: add x1, x27, #0x23, lsl #12
7a9458: ldr x1, [x1, #0x430] ; pp+0x23430 Obj!ShowRewardAdFamily@b487a1 : { [8 refs]
```
Two analyzers built by unrelated projects agree on the function name, the address and the pool index
— which is what makes this a verification rather than a coincidence.
**But the kit cannot take step 1 by itself.** Reaching a pool offset from a string requires resolving
the snapshot's internal container, and the kit has no such resolver: 4,241 strings share a name across
4,237 distinct deltas with no constant bridge between the string table and the object pool. blutter
(or aotopsy) supplies that front end. Everything downstream of it — the cross-reference count, the
disassembly window, the caller index — the kit does do, and correctly.
### Documentation defect that matters more than the crash
`dart-aot.md` §2 says of blutter's `asm/`: *"per-class declarations — instructions — **there are none
here**. Do not plan around it."* That is **wrong** for this blutter HEAD on Dart 3.6.0.
`bout5/asm/windmill_ad_plugin/src/ads/reward/reward.dart` is 1,327 lines / 71,099 B and contains class
layouts, function signatures **and a full instruction listing with pool annotations and resolved call
targets**:
```
// 0x923b3c: r0 = LinkedHashMap.from()
// 0x923b3c: bl #0x60165c ; [dart:collection] LinkedHashMap::LinkedHashMap.from
```
`asm/` is the single richest artifact in the chain, and the document tells the reader to ignore it.
(Secondary nit: `asm/` is one file per **library URI**, mirroring the package path, not per class.)
## Not applicable to this sample — stated, not stretched
- **`native_crash.py`'s "artificially constructed crash" verdict.** The tool exists to decide
whether a crash was *manufactured* as an anti-tamper response. This target's crash is a genuine
internal mutex-lifecycle fault that occurs on the unmodified APK, before any modification, on two
devices. There is no decoy to detect and no tamper event to attribute, so the judgement the tool
makes was never exercised. **Not applicable — no artificial crash exists here.**
- **`so_constpatch.py`'s "redirect the checker library" use case.** Requires an integrity-check
library to subvert. This target has **none** — no packer, no integrity checker, no `.so` that
validates the APK. The redirection capability is real (see the verified `NEEDED` rewrite) but its
purpose-built scenario does not exist here.
- **`packers.md` / `code-virtualization-and-custom-linkers.md` in full.** No packer: zero hits for
every known hardening-library name, and the parsed manifest shows an ordinary application class
rather than a shell stub. **Unverified in this pass** — nothing here should be read as evidence
either way about how those documents perform.
- **`native-tamper-and-suicide.md`'s judgement chain.** It reads *native anomalies observed from the
APK side* (immediate SIGSEGV after a repack, the Java layer saying the check passed while the
process dies). This pass never produced a repack to observe, because **the unmodified app does not
start**, so there is no working baseline to regress from. The document's scenarios remain
unexercised.
+198
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
# Verification output
The four repository gates, run against the tree **after** the changes described in
`REPO-DECISIONS.md`. The text below is the captured output, not a restatement of it — a table
saying "passed" is exactly the kind of claim this repository asks people not to make.
Environment: Python 3.14.0 on Windows 11, `npx` 11.6.2, repository at commit
`46812ec` plus the working-tree changes listed in `REPO-DECISIONS.md`.
| # | Command | Exit | Result |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | `python -B check_repo.py` | 0 | 0 problems |
| 2 | `python -B check_refs.py` | 0 | 0 dangling |
| 3 | `python -B build_scripts.py . <audit-out>` | 0 | 0 findings |
| 4 | `npx skills add newliver666/apk-reverse --list` | 0 | Found 1 skill |
---
## 1. python -B check_repo.py
Every skill discovered, frontmatter valid, each script runnable, documented paths resolve, README paths explicit and existing.
Exit code: **0**. Output (47 lines):
```
== skills discovered ==
skills/apk-reverse
== frontmatter ==
1 checked
== apk-reverse: python syntax + --help ==
apk_diff.py ok
blob_decode.py ok
coldstart.py ok
dart_disasm.py ok
dart_pool_strings.py ok
dart_pprefs.py ok
datastore_inject.py ok
devsh.py usage-ok rc=2
dex_check_verifier.py ok
dex_classdiff.py ok
dex_find_insn.py ok
dex_patch_bytes.py ok
dex_strings.py ok
dex_strpatch.py ok
dexutil.py usage-ok rc=2
doctor.py ok
elf_plt.py ok
find_refs.py ok
grab_crash.py ok
install_test.py ok
lib_map.py ok
native_crash.py ok
patch_smali.py usage-ok rc=2
preflight.py ok
probe_api.py ok
repack.py ok
run_probe.py ok
sig_probe.py ok
smtool.py usage-ok rc=2
snap.py ok
so_constpatch.py ok
tls_check.py ok
usb_net_proxy.py ok
== apk-reverse: reference and script paths resolve ==
all referenced reference/script paths exist
== README paths are explicit and exist ==
== result: 0 problem(s) ==
```
---
## 2. python -B check_refs.py
Every cross-reference naming a section of another document must reach a real heading there.
Exit code: **0**. Output (36 lines):
```
== markdown documents ==
README.md
skills/apk-reverse/SKILL.md
skills/apk-reverse/references/account-gates.md
skills/apk-reverse/references/ad-removal.md
skills/apk-reverse/references/byte-level-patching.md
skills/apk-reverse/references/code-virtualization-and-custom-linkers.md
skills/apk-reverse/references/dart-aot.md
skills/apk-reverse/references/detection-and-anti-analysis.md
skills/apk-reverse/references/dex-patching.md
skills/apk-reverse/references/dynamic-frida.md
skills/apk-reverse/references/environment.md
skills/apk-reverse/references/framework-runtimes.md
skills/apk-reverse/references/long-task-discipline.md
skills/apk-reverse/references/membership-and-limits.md
skills/apk-reverse/references/native-and-so.md
skills/apk-reverse/references/native-tamper-and-suicide.md
skills/apk-reverse/references/packers.md
skills/apk-reverse/references/patch-audit.md
skills/apk-reverse/references/pitfalls.md
skills/apk-reverse/references/recon.md
skills/apk-reverse/references/repack-and-sign.md
skills/apk-reverse/references/runtime-data.md
skills/apk-reverse/references/server-api.md
skills/apk-reverse/references/server-config-and-updates.md
skills/apk-reverse/references/signature-derived-keys.md
skills/apk-reverse/references/third-party-builds.md
skills/apk-reverse/references/tls-and-cert.md
skills/apk-reverse/references/toolchain.md
skills/apk-reverse/references/updates-and-forced-upgrade.md
skills/apk-reverse/references/verification.md
skills/apk-reverse/scripts/dexpatch/README.md
== section references: 166 reachable ==
== result: 0 dangling, 0 warning(s) ==
```
---
## 3. python -B build_scripts.py . <audit-out>
Audit for machine-specific leftovers: absolute paths and credential literals.
Exit code: **0**. Output (2 lines):
```
== audit: 76 file(s) checked, 0 finding(s). Nothing was written.
re-run with --apply to copy, and with --scrub to neutralise absolute-path literals.
```
---
## 4. npx skills add newliver666/apk-reverse --list
The skills CLI must still discover the skill after the changes.
Exit code: **0**. Output (28 lines):
```
skills
Tip: use the --yes (-y) and --global (-g) flags to install without prompts.
[?25l
Source: https://github.com/newliver666/apk-reverse.git
[?25h[?25l
[?25h[?25l
Found 1 skill
[?25h
Available Skills
apk-reverse
Reverse engineer, debloat, de-ad, patch, or re-sign Android APKs, and analyze their runtime and server-side behavior. Use when a task involves an .apk/.aab/.dex/.so sample, smali or dex patching, Frida/objection runtime hooking, repacking and re-signing, removing ads or SDK trackers, probing a mobile app's HTTP API, or deciding whether a client-side patch is even capable of achieving the goal. Covers recon, anti-tamper, ad removal, membership/paywall limits, dex-level surgical patching, repack pitfalls, device and emulator setup, and a hard-won failure catalogue. Load the body before planning any patch work: it opens with a symptom index and four gates that must be cleared first.
Use --skill <name> to install specific skills
```
---
## Two notes about running these gates
Both were found by experiment during this pass and are worth knowing before trusting a
green run.
**`check_repo.py` and `check_refs.py` have no argparse.** Passing `--help` does not print
usage — it is silently ignored and the full check runs, producing byte-identical output to a
normal invocation. A "low-impact probe" assumption about these two is wrong.
**Do not set `PYTHONIOENCODING=utf-8` when running `check_repo.py`.** Doing so produced a
spurious exit 1 with one script (`dex_strpatch.py`) reported as crashed. Root cause is at
`check_repo.py:152-154`: `subprocess.run(..., text=True)` does not pin an encoding, so the
parent decodes the child's UTF-8 output as `cp936`, the reader thread raises
`UnicodeDecodeError`, both streams come back empty, `helped` (line 158) goes false and the run
is recorded as FAIL (lines 164-165). Clearing the variable and re-running restores exit 0. The
same lines also carry a diagnostic inconsistency: `verdict` checks only `returncode` while `ok`
additionally requires `helped`, so a run with both streams empty and returncode 0 prints `ok`
yet is recorded as crashed in the results block.
This is also why `check_refs.py` failed once during this pass and now passes: it resolves
cross-references **within the skill only** and has no fallback outside it, so a sentence in
`SKILL.md` pointing at a path outside the skill directory read as dangling. It was right to
fail; the reference was rewritten rather than the checker.
+80 -3
View File
@@ -73,11 +73,33 @@ vocabulary and a set of reassuring numbers.
- The native layer: `.so` hosts, tamper-triggered self-termination, forged ELF structure, and
neutralising a terminate path without freezing the process (`native-and-so.md`,
`native-tamper-and-suicide.md`).
- Flutter / Dart AOT: pinning the engine version, decoding the object pool, locating and patching
business logic inside `libapp.so` (`dart-aot.md`).
- Flutter / Dart AOT: analysing and patching `libapp.so` **given a snapshot dump** — pool-reference
counting, disassembly windows, caller indexing, patch-site choice (`dart-aot.md`). Measured on a
real Dart 3.6.0 build: `dart_disasm.py` decoded identically to capstone (32/32 and 96/96), the
caller index re-derived independently with a symmetric difference of 0, and a specific business
logic site was located end to end. **The snapshot dump is a dependency, not a detail** — see the
next section.
- Runtime analysis with Frida, server-side API probing, feature-scoped TLS failures, update and
forced-upgrade neutralisation, and the verification discipline everything above rests on.
**Dependencies this skill does not ship — name them before the workflow starts:**
- **Dart AOT analysis needs a snapshot dump.** `dart-aot.md`'s workflow begins at `pp.txt`; producing
it requires a snapshot container resolver that this skill does not contain and cannot synthesize.
`dart_pool_strings.py` reports **file** offsets while `pp.txt` and `dart_pprefs.py` speak in **pool**
offsets, and the mapping between those two spaces is not a constant: over the 4,241 strings present
in both, a measured run found 4,237 distinct deltas. Ship a pinned front end (aotopsy — pure Go, no
toolchain) or build blutter (~80 s, needs a C++ toolchain). **Say which one you are using and why,
because the two report different Dart version labels for the same binary.** Do not describe the
object pool as something this skill decodes on its own.
**How strong these claims are:** the Measured mechanisms below were established by running the
scripts against a real target during the verification pass recorded in
`docs/verification-jiongnew/`. The rest are **inferred** — documented from experience, but the
repository carries no fixture, log or sample that reproduces them (its own `long-task-discipline.md`
reserves *observed* for a claim with an exact command and output behind it). Treat the distinction as
load-bearing rather than cosmetic, and label your own results the same way.
**Not covered — say so rather than improvise:**
- **Unity / IL2CPP logic recovery.** `framework-runtimes.md` identifies the runtime and establishes
@@ -93,6 +115,24 @@ vocabulary and a set of reassuring numbers.
cost and often concludes "switch to static"; it is not a catalogue of evasion for every detector
you might meet.
**Not exercised by the verification pass — do not read silence as support:** the packer, code
virtualization, custom-linker, integrity-check-redirection and tamper-triggered-suicide scenarios
were **not run** against the verification target, because that target has none of those features (no
packer, no integrity checker, ordinary application class) and its unmodified build already fails to
start, which removes the repack-and-regress loop those scenarios need. Nothing in
`docs/verification-jiongnew/` is evidence either way about them. If you use those documents, the
claims are still on the inferred footing described above.
**Scripts this pass did not run** — so they carry no measurement at all, and any conclusion drawn
from them should be labelled accordingly: `native_crash.py`, `apk_diff.py`, `snap.py`,
`grab_crash.py`, `install_test.py`, `repack.py`, `dex_patch_bytes.py`, `dex_find_insn.py`,
`dex_check_verifier.py`, `dex_classdiff.py`, `dex_strpatch.py`, `patch_smali.py`, `smtool.py`,
`datastore_inject.py`, `probe_api.py`, `run_probe.py`, `tls_check.py`, `usb_net_proxy.py`,
`devsh.py`, and the `dexpatch/` java rewriter. Their absence from the record is not a verdict on
them. Note in particular that `grab_crash.py` claims to recover stacks hidden by a crash-reporter
SDK — the exact situation the verification target presented — and was not tried, so that claim
remains **unverified** and the pass used a purpose-written Frida probe instead.
**The fallback, as an instruction:** if the target does not match that list, or no symptom-index row
matches, **stop and classify before choosing a branch.** Answer the thirteen questions first. If the
shape still does not fit — an unknown runtime, a mechanism you cannot name — say exactly that, and
@@ -100,6 +140,41 @@ propose the cheapest experiment that would identify it, rather than taking the c
route and applying it anyway. A wrong branch here does not fail loudly: it produces an artifact that
builds, runs, and does the wrong thing.
## Hand-off points — where this skill ends and another view begins
Three boundaries that are easy to walk into without noticing. Each names what the other side owns,
rather than restating it, because two copies of the same advice drift apart.
**1. JNI — a Java `native` declaration and its implementation are two different views of one function.**
This skill reads the Java side (dex) and the native side (`.so`) with different tools, so the join is
where analyses go wrong.
| Form | What you see | How to find it |
|---|---|---|
| Static linkage | symbol `Java_<pkg>_<Class>_<method>` in `.dynsym` | search the dynamic symbol table. Under R8 the class name is a short name, so the symbol deforms with it and a search for the readable original finds nothing |
| Dynamic registration | **nothing** in the symbol table — binding happens at runtime | find `RegisterNatives` call sites, or hook it to read the binding table. Obfuscated targets prefer this, and a symbol search fails **silently** on it |
| Native → Java callbacks | native code pulling data back through Java | follow `FindClass` / `GetMethodID` / `CallObjectMethod` |
`FindClass`/`RegisterNatives` in a `.so` tell you a JNI boundary exists even when no
`Java_*` symbol does. **Strength note:** the three rows above are documented behaviour, not results
from the verification pass, which did not trace a JNI boundary end to end; `FlutterJNI.loadLibrary`
appearing in a dex is the closest it came. Treat them as a map, not as a measurement.
**2. Hardening — a dex-side packer observation is a native-side implementation question.** If the dex
turns out to be a shell, the logic is behind a loader, and the analysis moves to the `.so` that
performs the unpacking. `packers.md` owns the dex-side identification; the native deep dive belongs on
the other side of this boundary. **Not exercised by the verification pass** — that target had no
packer, so this pointer carries no measurement.
**3. The existing native boundaries — read native anomalies from the APK side, not from inside.**
`native-and-so.md` and `native-tamper-and-suicide.md` are deliberately scoped to what you can conclude
*from the APK side*: a repacked build that dies instantly with a null-looking fault, a Java-layer
check that reports success while the process dies, a terminate path you made not-return. That
judgement belongs here, because it is about deciding whether your *patch* caused the death. Deep
native work — restoring a symbol, rebuilding a call graph, reversing an OLLVM function — is a
different activity with a different toolchain. Point across rather than duplicating: if you need the
latter, say so instead of extending these two files into it.
## Symptom index — a matching row is a stop signal
You arrive at a symptom, not at a file name. Each row below is a failure that has already been paid
@@ -111,7 +186,9 @@ unread in this repository.
| What you observe | Load first |
|---|---|
| A repackaged/re-signed build **dies before your code runs**; `SIGSEGV`, all registers zero, `pc=0`, `fault addr` near `0x0` | `native-tamper-and-suicide.md` (deliberate crash), then `code-virtualization-and-custom-linkers.md` |
| **No packer** (Application is the app's own, dex readable) **and it still dies** | `code-virtualization-and-custom-linkers.md` |
| **No packer** (Application is the app's own, dex readable) **and it still dies** | `code-virtualization-and-custom-linkers.md` §a loader is still a possibility; but if the same build also dies on a *second, unrelated* device you are looking at an ordinary startup fault, not a hardened one |
| The app dies at startup on **every** device, packed or not, **and there is no tombstone** while `crash_dump` reports `already traced` and logcat says `exited cleanly (0)` | the target's launch section in the verification record under `docs/verification-jiongnew/` — a bundled crash reporter (Sentry NDK) has taken the signal handlers, so the platform's own evidence trail is gone. Frida spawn-gating is the recovery route; it needs a working frida-server, which a disguised one may not be |
| A `FORTIFY: pthread_mutex_lock called on a destroyed mutex` abort in a Flutter app, on the **main** thread, before the first frame completes | `dart-aot.md` — check `libapp.so` is actually being loaded; Flutter's engine bootstrap is the usual place a native lifecycle fault surfaces |
| Log says a **Java-layer** signature/integrity check **passed**, yet the process dies | `code-virtualization-and-custom-linkers.md` §a Java-layer "signature killer" is a decoy |
| Deleting a library fixes validation but yields `UnsatisfiedLinkError: dlopen failed: library "X" not found` | `code-virtualization-and-custom-linkers.md` §the deadlock that eats hours |
| Whole classes appear as bare `native` declarations with no body | `code-virtualization-and-custom-linkers.md` |
+82 -19
View File
@@ -26,37 +26,77 @@ engine build id in `libflutter.so`'s version string.
## 2. Get a decompiler that matches that version
**blutter** is the practical choice for Android `libapp.so` (arm64). It reconstructs the object pool
and per-class declarations. It is a *source tree you build*, not a binary you download — and its
prebuilt outputs only cover the Dart versions someone already built.
You need a tool that resolves the snapshot container — something that turns `libapp.so` into named
functions, class layouts and, above all, a **pool listing with `pp+0x…` offsets**. Everything in §4
onward consumes that listing; without it the workflow cannot start, and no script in this skill can
produce it (see §4 for why the mapping is not recoverable from the binary alone).
The version question is the first obstacle, and it has a clean answer:
Two routes exist. Pick deliberately, because their version reporting differs.
**Route A — aotopsy: no toolchain, run it now.** A single static binary (pure Go) that parses the
snapshot binary format directly, with no Dart VM and no SDK compile. On a real Dart 3.6.0
`libapp.so` the full pipeline ran out of the box: 30,586 functions, 6,133 class layouts, 39,202 pool
entries (38,274 resolved), 175,120 call edges with 95.7% of indirect sites annotated, plus
`functions.jsonl`, `call_edges.jsonl`, `classes.jsonl`, `string_refs.jsonl`,
`dispatch_table.jsonl` and an annotated `asm/` tree. It also supports x86_64, which blutter does not.
Its `doctor` subcommand reports a Dart version that is a **structural profile label, not the SDK
version**: on the sample above it printed `3.6.2` while the engine banner, the snapshot hash and a
byte search all said `3.6.0`, and no `3.6.2` byte sequence existed in either `.so`. That matters only
if you feed the number to a VM-compiling tool — use §1's banner for that. Its own README states the
detection is structure-based, so expect the label to name the newest matching profile rather than the
compiler's version.
**Route B — blutter: full fidelity, needs a build.** It embeds a matching Dart VM and deserializes
through the VM's own code paths, which yields the canonical `pp.txt` in the `pp+0x…` space. It is a
*source tree you build*, not a binary you download: its `bin/` is gitignored and it publishes no
release artifacts, so there is nothing prebuilt to fetch for a given Dart version.
- blutter's git HEAD typically supports newer Dart than its shipped `dartsdk/` directory.
- When the target's version is missing, blutter fetches it itself: it sparse-clones
`dart-lang/sdk` at that version tag (only `runtime`, `tools`, `third_party/double-conversion`),
generates a source list, and builds a `dartvm` static library for the target ABI.
- That build needs a real toolchain: `cmake` (>=3.20 is fine, including 4.x), `ninja`, `git`, and a
C++ compiler with C++20 `<format>` support (VS 2022 on Windows, gcc>=13 / clang>=16 elsewhere).
A `vcvars64`-style environment must be active before the build, and `CMakeLists` in the tree pins
`cmake_minimum_required(3.20)`.
- Budget **tens of minutes** for the first build of a new version and run it as a background job;
the compiler log is enormous (per-file include trees), so read only its tail.
- That build needs `cmake` (>=3.20 is fine, including 4.x), `ninja`, `git`, and a C++ compiler with
C++20 `<format>` support. The documented VS 2022 requirement is **over-strict** — MSVC 19.34
(VS 17.4.3, Nov 2022) compiles and runs the `std::format` path, measured. A `vcvars64`-style
environment must be active, and `CMakeLists` pins `cmake_minimum_required(3.20)`.
- Budget a **couple of minutes**, not "tens of minutes": the whole pipeline (clone, `init_env_win.py`,
sparse SDK clone, cmake, nja, link) measured **≈78 s** wall clock. It uses a unity build via
`dartvm_create_srclist.py`, which is why it is fast. The compiler log is enormous (per-file include
trees), so read only its tail.
- **If the freshly built binary faults immediately** with `0xC0000005` and no output at all, do not
conclude anything about the sample. Relink it (`ninja` in
`build/blutter_dartvm<ver>_<os>_<arch>`) and try again; on the sample above the fault never
reproduced after a relink — including for the unchanged binary — and three subsequent runs each
completed in ~5.9 s. **One retry, then a relink, before you blame the target.**
Outputs of interest:
Outputs of interest (blutter):
| Output | What it gives you | What it does *not* give |
|---|---|---|
| `pp.txt` | every object-pool entry with its `pp+0x…` offset: strings, types, closures, fields, stubs | who references what |
| `objs.txt` | reconstructed object shapes with type annotations | code |
| `asm/` | per-class declarations | **instructions — there are none here** |
| `asm/` | class layouts **and function bodies with full instruction listings**, pool annotations and resolved call targets | a pseudocode-level view |
| `ida_script/`, `blutter_frida.js` | symbol/annotation helpers | a finished analysis |
> `asm/` having one file per (obfuscated) class invites the assumption that it holds disassembly.
> It does not. Do not plan around it.
> `asm/` is the richest artifact in the chain. It is one file per **library URI** (mirroring the
> package path), not per class as its name suggests, and it carries annotated disassembly such as:
>
> ```
> // 0x923b3c: r0 = LinkedHashMap.from()
> // 0x923b3c: bl #0x60165c ; [dart:collection] LinkedHashMap::LinkedHashMap.from
> ```
>
> An earlier revision of this file claimed `asm/` contained no instructions and told the reader to
> ignore it. That was wrong and cost real time — plan around `asm/` as your primary annotated
> disassembly source.
**`product` builds carry no debug info.** Expect `no-code_comments`, no function names, and
obfuscated identifiers. That is normal; the strings still survive (see §7).
obfuscated identifiers. That is normal; the strings still survive (see §7). Note this is a *format*
floor, not a tooling gap: the Dart compiler drops field names outside debug builds, so roughly
97-99% of instance field names are simply absent, and local/captured variable names are gone
entirely. Accessor-based recovery (`get:`/`set:` still carry the name) recovers part of the field
picture; the rest should be rendered as unknown rather than guessed.
## 3. The object pool is the whole game
@@ -72,6 +112,13 @@ Two offset spaces exist and they are **not the same number** — mixing them was
Keep the mapping explicit in your notes. When a tool reports "this string is at X", state which
space X is in.
**There is no constant between the two spaces — do not go looking for one.** The relationship is a
property of the *reconstructed* pool, not of the file, so it cannot be computed from `libapp.so`
alone. Measured over the 4,241 strings that appear in both the string table and `pp.txt`, there were
**4,237 distinct deltas** (range −1,361,429 to +277,654). A string recovered by file offset therefore
does not lead to its pool offset, which is exactly why §2 insists on a snapshot-decoding front end:
it is what gives you the `pp+0x…` space in the first place.
## 4. Build your own reference index (blutter will not give you this)
`pp.txt` tells you what is in the pool. To *find the code that uses it* you need pool-offset →
@@ -84,10 +131,26 @@ python dart_pprefs.py --lookup pp_refs.json 0x1d1a8 0xc9d0
**Do not build this index with a full-capstone pass.** Decoding every instruction of a multi-MB
`.text` with `detail=True` and querying `regs_access()` per instruction costs minutes of CPU and
1–2 GB of peak memory, and on a 16 GB host it presents as a hang with no progress output. Only three
encodings can read the pool, so decode them from the raw 32-bit words instead — the shipped script
does exactly that and finishes in seconds. The same argument applies to building a call graph
(§9): decode `B`/`BL` arithmetically.
1–2 GB of peak memory, and on a 16 GB host it presents as a hang with no progress output. Only a
handful of encodings can read the pool, so decode them from the raw 32-bit words instead — the
shipped script does exactly that and finishes in seconds.
**But do not fall back to a linear capstone sweep either.** A Dart AOT `.text` begins with snapshot
metadata, not instructions — on a real `libapp.so` the section started at `0x4a0000` while the first
Dart function prologue (`stp x29, x30, [sp, #-imm]!`) was at `0x4b143c`. A linear sweep starting at
offset 0 dies on that metadata and returns **zero instructions**, which looks exactly like "this
library has no code". If you need capstone here, start at a known function address, or use
`skipdata=True`, and treat an implausibly small count as a decoding problem before you treat it as a
property of the file.
The same mask-based argument applies to building a call graph (§9): decode `B`/`BL` arithmetically
rather than by sweeping.
**A live example of why the index's completeness matters:** after this file's advice to "count the
references before editing a shared constant", one pool offset measured `[0 refs]` with the shipped
script and `[79 refs]` once a missing load family was added to the scanner. A one-sided quiet gap in
the scan reads as "nothing uses this", which is the answer that gets a shared constant edited
carelessly. If a count looks surprisingly low, suspect the scanner before believing the pool.
## 5. What the registers mean
+22 -9
View File
@@ -18,8 +18,16 @@ seconds, and a flat memory profile.
Recognised forms (AArch64, little endian), with x27 = pool base:
add xD, x27, #imm12, lsl #12 -> xD = x27 + (imm12 << 12)
ldr xD, [xN, #imm12 * 8] -> 64-bit or 32-bit variant
ldur xD, [xN, #simm9] -> 64-bit or 32-bit variant
ldr XD, [xN, #imm12 * size] -> GP register file, size from bits 31-30
ldr DD, [xN, #imm12 * size] -> SIMD&FP register file (bit 26 set)
ldur XD/DD, [xN, #simm9] -> unscaled variant, both files
Both register files must be covered. Restricting the LDR form to the GP words
(0xF94/0xB94) silently drops `ldr dN, [x27, #imm]` (0xFD400000), which is how every
*double* constant in the pool is read -- an entire class of references disappears from
the index. On a real Dart 3.6.0 libapp.so that was 302 pool offsets and 1,802 sites lost
(measured, see the verification record); one of them had 150 reference sites that would
all have been reported as zero.
A reference is either a direct load whose base is x27, or a load consuming the register an
ADD just derived from x27. The compiler emits that pair back to back, so a small window
@@ -93,16 +101,21 @@ def scan(text_addr, blob, window):
pending[w & 0x1F] = [imm << 12, i]
continue
ldr64 = w & 0xFFC00000 == 0xF9400000
ldr32 = w & 0xFFC00000 == 0xB9400000
ldur64 = w & 0xFFE00C00 == 0xF8400000
ldur32 = w & 0xFFE00C00 == 0xB8400000
# LDR (immediate) / LDUR across BOTH register files. Bits 31-30 give the access
# size and therefore the immediate scale; bit 26 selects the SIMD&FP file.
# Matching only the GP words (0xF94/0xB94) drops `ldr dN, [x27, #imm]`
# (0xFD400000) and with it every double constant read from the pool.
ldr_scale = {0xF9400000: 3, 0xB9400000: 2, 0x79400000: 1, 0x39400000: 0,
0xFD400000: 3, 0xBD400000: 2, 0x7D400000: 1, 0x3DC00000: 4,
}.get(w & 0xFFC00000)
ldur = (w & 0xFFE00C00) in (0xF8400000, 0xB8400000, 0x78400000, 0x38400000,
0xFC400000, 0xBC400000, 0x7C400000, 0x3C400000)
if ldr64 or ldr32 or ldur64 or ldur32:
if ldr_scale is not None or ldur:
rn = (w >> 5) & 0x1F
rd = w & 0x1F
if ldr64 or ldr32:
disp = ((w >> 10) & 0xFFF) << 3
if ldr_scale is not None:
disp = ((w >> 10) & 0xFFF) << ldr_scale
else:
disp = sx((w >> 12) & 0x1FF, 9)
if rn == POOL_REG: